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Abstract
Psychopathy is associated with severe and violent
aggressive behaviors, poor treatment outcomes and high
rates of recidivism. In youth, conduct problems and
callous/unemotional characteristics are associated with
characteristics of adulthood psychopathy. Downward
extending adult criteria to youth is problematic. However,
there is substantial evidence that adults with psychopathy
traits began that developmental trajectory in childhood.
This study adds to the developing literature clarifying the
construct of psychopathy in youth, including the nature of
callous/unemotional traits and the relationship to socialcognitive processes. Results indicate the
callous/unemotional trait significantly predicted empathic
concern, perspective taking, cognitive dysregulation, and
outcome values in obtaining a tangible reward and getting
in trouble or being punished.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Aggression affects multiple facets of public life
including crime rates and the social and financial
functioning of families and communities (Connor, 2002).
Although juvenile violence has seen an overall decrease
since the mid 1990’s, it remains at historically high
levels (Connor, 2002). Public concern continues to rise due
to recent high profile youth crime witnessed in the
community such as school shootings (Connor, 2002).
Regardless of the overall crime decrease, the focus on
childhood aggression is warranted as researchers have shown
that adult antisocial behavior begins in childhood (Broidy
et al., 2003). Further, for those youth demonstrating
extreme antisocial behaviors, these behaviors are likely to
continue into adulthood (Loeber, 1982).
The extreme antisocial behaviors that account for the
most severe group of adult offenders are called
psychopathic traits (Hare, 1993). Psychopathy is associated
with severe and violent aggressive behaviors, poor
treatment outcomes and high rates of recidivism (Gacono &
Hughes, 2004; Hemphill, Hare, & Wong, 1998). The classic
definition of psychopathy, proposed by Cleckley in 1941,
includes a constellation of deviant personality traits such
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as lack of remorse or shame, absence of
nervousness/psychoneurosis, inadequately motivated
antisocial behavior, general poverty in major affective
reactions, and a failure to follow any life plan (Cleckley,
1941) among sixteen characteristics. In 1993, Hare and
colleagues updated this definition by separating Cleckley’s
psychopathic traits into two factors, 1) personality traits
and 2) antisocial behaviors. Personality traits or Factor
1, include the characteristics of pathological lying,
callousness/lack of empathy, lack of remorse of guilt, and
shallow affect (Hare, 1993) among others. Socially deviant
behaviors, also known as Factor 2, include poor behavioral
controls, early behavioral problems, irresponsibility, need
for stimulation/proneness to boredom, and impulsivity
(Hare, 1993).
Psychopaths comprise 15-30% of criminals in the adult
offender population (Hare, 1993; Salekin et al., 2004).
Researchers show that psychopathic offenders commit more
violent and nonviolent crimes than nonpsychopath offenders
(Porter, Birt, & Boer, 2001). On average this group begins
offending in late adolescence with the rate of offending
remaining at high levels into their late 40s (Porter et
al., 2001). Because of the reported age of onset, much of
the research attempting to understand psychopathic traits
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in children began with retrospective investigations
conducted with adults categorized by psychopathic traits.
In a review of retrospective studies concerning psychopathy
and recidivism, researchers found psychopathic traits
evidenced in childhood to predict severe and violent
antisocial behavior in adults (Hemphill et al., 1998).
These findings suggest psychopathy may be a developmental
disorder in which specific personality traits can be
assessed in children (Viding, 2004).
Substantial attention has been given to understanding
psychopathy in children including how the definition
applies to children, assessment practices, and examining
the developmental trajectory of risk factors associated
with violence, aggression and psychopathy (Frick, 1998;
Lynam, 1997; Salekin, Rogers, & Machin, 2001; Seagrave &
Grisso, 2002). Simply, downward extending adult criteria to
youth is problematic. Thus, using a factor analysis Frick
and colleagues (1994) identified characteristics of
psychopathy in youth. Two factors emerged in children that
were related to characteristics found in adults with
psychopathy including impulsivity/conduct problems and
callous/unemotional traits (Frick, O’Brien, Wootton, &
McBurnett, 1994). The impulsivity/conduct problems factor
consisted of behaviors such as impulsivity, poor impulse
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control, and delinquent behaviors (Frick et al., 1994)
similar to Factor 2 reported in adults by Hare (1991). The
callous/unemotional factor was characterized by lack of
guilt, lack of empathy, and superficial charm (Frick et
al., 1994) similar to Factor 1 reported in adults by Hare
(1991). In a community sample of adolescents, three factors
emerged including an impulsivity/conduct problems factor, a
callous/unemotional factor, and a narcissism factor (Frick,
Bodin, & Barry, 2000). Although the narcissism factor has
appeared in these samples, researchers conceptualize it as
a condition for a subtype of psychopathy and not
necessarily a main factor (Poythress & Skeem, 2006). With
adults, narcissistic personality disorder typically loads
on the first factor of psychopathy (Harpur, Hare, &
Hakstian,, 1989). Narcissistic characteristics that are
found on the first factor include such traits as a
grandiose sense of self-importance, arrogant selfappraisal, lack of empathy, an unwillingness to recognize
or identify with feelings or needs of others, and
interpersonal exploitation (Widiger, 2006). Narcissism’s
relationship to psychopathy remains unclear requiring
further investigation.
The prevalence of psychopathy in the young offender
population has been estimated at 21.5%, similar to the 15-
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30% estimate for adults (Salekin et al., 2004). Early
identification of these youth could influence the safety of
communities and aid in the understanding of the etiology,
development, and treatment regimens of psychopaths (Gacono
& Hughes, 2004; Lynam, 1997; Salekin et al., 2004).
In an attempt to further understand the nature of
individuals with psychopathy, social cognitive processes
have been examined. Social cognitive processes are defined
as the mechanisms that lead to social behaviors that are
the basis of social adjustment evaluations made by others
(Crick & Dodge, 1994). The Center for Disease Control
(2005) identified social cognitive deficits as a risk
factor for increasing the probability of violence during
adolescence and young adulthood. Researchers argue that
examining social cognitions of children will help explain
the construct of psychopathy in youth. That is, impaired
social cognition offers a possible explanation for the
evidence of persistent conduct problems of children with
significant psychopathic, or in terms consistent with Frick
and colleagues’ (1994) work, callous/unemotional (CU)
traits. Pardini et al., (2003) demonstrated children high
on CU traits had significant difficulty in modifying their
social cognitions for goal-driven behavior when punished.
Specifically, they concluded this group of children may
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have trouble considering the probability of various
outcomes, particularly when outcomes are negative, of their
antisocial behavior (Pardini, Lochman, & Frick, 2003).
Further, some research shows individuals with significant
psychopathic traits demonstrate adequate intellect (e.g.,
cognitive abilities) (Loney, Frick, Ellis, and McCoy, 1998;
Newman & Wallace, 1993), are free from symptoms of a
thought disorder yet frequently fail to utilize good
judgment in decision-making (Newman & Wallace, 1993). These
results highlighted the need to clarify the connection
between psychopathic traits and social cognition.

Second,

errors made in social-information processing are a
consistent finding in the development and maintenance of
delinquent behavior in antisocial children who are not
evidencing psychopathy (Dodge, Lochman, Harnish, Bates, &
Pettit, 1997). Thus, a more complete understanding of how
psychopathic traits in youth (also termed
callous/unemotional & impulsivity and conduct problems) are
related to social-information processing is needed.
Most of the research samples examining psychopathy
utilize individuals who are incarcerated, likely because of
the availability of these offenders (Kirkman, 2002).
However, not all psychopaths are recidivist criminals in
incarcerated settings (Cleckley, 1976; Hare, 1993). Some
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psychopaths have no criminal record at all but are members
of our communities and neighborhoods (Hare, 1993). It is
necessary to study those individuals who demonstrate
psychopathic traits and who are capable of avoiding the
prisons and jails in order to fully understand the
psychopathic personality (Hare, 1993; Kirkman, 2002). In
regard to children, researchers examining clinic-referred
and forensic samples generate mixed results in terms of
whether the callous/unemotional traits found in
incarcerated samples are characteristic of all antisocial
youth (Frick, Cornell, Bodin, Dane, Barry, & Loney, 2003).
Studying psychopathy in a community sample of aggressive
youth offers the prospect of expanding the knowledge
concerning the definition of psychopathy but also this
study assists in gaining more information concerning
various types of social cognition in children (Kirkman,
2002). If children with psychopathic traits can be
correctly identified, then the social environment of a
school would be an excellent place to study the functioning
of the psychopaths who are, according to Lynam (1997), the
“truly successful or noninstitutionalized people”. It is
also possible that by studying individuals who display
psychopathic traits but do not demonstrate a level of
behavior requiring incarceration, researchers can start to
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distinguish the traits that are specific to psychopathy
from those primarily related to criminality (Kirkman, 2002;
Lynam, 1997). That is, differentiating traits related to a
personality structure (e.g., Factor 1) from those that are
mostly behavioral (e.g., Factor 2; Gacono & Hughes, 2004).
The purpose of the current study was to expand
previous research conducted by Pardini and colleagues in
2003. Pardini and colleagues (2003) examined the definition
of psychopathy in a sample of adjudicated youth as well as
its relationship to social-cognitive processes. The current
study sought to clarify how the findings from an
incarcerated sample of youth who exhibited various levels
of psychopathy are comparable to youth who require
treatment for aggression outside of the scope of services
typically provided by a student’s home school district but
who do not require incarceration. The current study
examined psychopathy, via callous/unemotional traits,
impulsivity/conduct problems, and narcissistic traits as
they related to social-cognitive processes (e.g., values
and outcome expectations) on a range of social
interactions/events in a community sample of children with
behavioral and emotional difficulties. The narcissism
factor was included in this study as a preliminary
investigation of the psychopathy factor structure in the
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current community sample due to the investigation which
identified narcissism as a distinct factor in a community
sample of 1,136 elementary school-age children (Frick,
Bodin, & Barry, 2000).
The current study contributed to the literature base
in a number of ways. Specifically, the current study
further clarified the definition of psychopathy in a subset
of youth who require treatment for aggression in an
alternative education center. Lack of empathy is often
referred to as a key developmental component in the
development of the callous/unemotional trait (Frick et al.,
1994; Hare, 1991, 1993; Cleckley, 1941). Thus, examining
empathy as it related to callous/unemotional factor helped
to clarify and distinguish the callous/unemotional factor
from the impulsivity/conduct problems and narcissism
factors.
Dysregulated behaviors also referred to as behavioral
and cognitive impulsivity (Loeber et al., 2001) or
behavioral, emotional, and cognitive dysregulation
(Mezzich, et al., 1997), characterize children with conduct
problems (Loeber, 1982; Frick et al., 1994); however,
dysregulated behaviors alone do not distinguish groups of
antisocials (Frick et al., 2003). Also, children presenting
with both callous/unemotional traits and dysregulated
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behaviors are those who present as similar to the profile
of an adult psychopath (Frick et al., 2003). Thus,
examining dysregulation was an important part of clarifying
the construct of child psychopathy.
Finally, behavioral inhibition, also referred to as
fearfulness (Pardini et al., 2003), is associated with
increased levels of the impulsivity/conduct problems factor
of psychopathy (Frick, Lilienfield, Ellis, Loney, &
Silverhorn, 1999; Pardini et al., 2003). Similarly,
fearfulness is related to decreased levels of the
callous/unemotional factor (Pardini et al., 2003). Thus,
examining behavioral inhibition assisted in further
clarifying childhood psychopathy and helped distinguish the
impulsivity/conduct problems, callous/unemotional traits,
and narcissism factors. In summary, by examining the
contribution of the callous/unemotional factor,
impulsivity/conduct problems and narcissistic traits as
they related to important developmental tasks such as
empathy, behavior regulation and adequate management of
behavioral inhibition (fear) contributed to the literature
defining psychopathy.
The examination of the role of the psychopathic traits
and social-cognitive processes also contributed to the
current literature. Specifically, the use of the
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callous/unemotional trait, impulsivity/conduct problems
factor, and narcissism factor in explaining variance in
outcome expectations and values when engaging in aggressive
behaviors to obtain tangible rewards, reduce aversive
treatment, avoid punishment, and portray dominance helped
to expand and clarify earlier findings.
Four research questions were investigated in the
current study. Generally, the current study hypothesized
that the community sample would demonstrate similar, yet
less severe patterns of psychopathy and callous/unemotional
symptoms while evidencing similar impulsivity/conduct
problems as the incarcerated sample of youth found in the
Pardini and colleagues’ 2003 study. Due to conflicting
research, it was unclear how the narcissism factor would
project in this study (Frick et al., 2000; Harpur et al.,
1989).
Specifically, the first research question investigated
how much variance the callous/unemotional factor explained
in both emotional (personal distress and empathic concern)
and cognitive (perspective taking) empathy and likewise,
how much variance the impulsivity/conduct problems factor
explained in both emotional (personal distress and empathic
concern) and cognitive (perspective taking) empathy and how
much variance the narcissism factor explained in both
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emotional (personal distress and empathic concern) and
cognitive (perspective taking) empathy? The current study
hypothesized that the callous/unemotional trait would
predict emotional and cognitive empathy; however, the
impulsivity/conduct problems factor would not. Because the
narcissism factor has been found to load on Factor 1 of
Hare’s two factor model (1993) as does the
callous/unemotional factor (Harpur et al., 1989), it was
hypothesized that the narcissistic factor may share
variance with the callous/unemotional trait in predicting
emotional and cognitive empathy. However, in the one study
where the narcissism factor emerged in the community
sample, the narcissism traits were more closely related to
measures of impulsivity/conduct problems (Frick et al.,
2000). Therefore, it was also possible that the narcissism
factor, similar to the hypothesis concerning the
impulsivity/conduct problems factor, would not predict
cognitive or emotional empathy.
The second research question examined whether the
impulsivity/conduct problems factor predicted dysregulated
behaviors (behavioral, cognitive, and emotional), the
callous/unemotional factor predicted dysregulated behaviors
(behavioral, cognitive, and emotional), and the narcissism
factor predicted dysregulated behaviors (behavioral,
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cognitive, and emotional)? It was hypothesized that
impulsivity/conduct problems would explain variance in the
dysregulated behaviors variables including behavioral,
emotional, and cognitive dysregulation; however, the
callous/unemotional factor would not. Again, previous
findings were unclear concerning the narcissistic factor;
therefore, it was unclear whether the narcissism factor
would explain variance in dysregulated behaviors, as
hypothesized with the impulsivity/conduct problems factor,
or would not, as hypothesized with the callous/unemotional
factor.
The third research question investigated how much
variance in behavioral inhibition or fearfulness was
uniquely explained by the callous/unemotional,
impulsivity/conduct problems factors, and narcissism
factor? It was hypothesized that the callous/unemotional
trait would not explain variance within the behavioral
inhibition or fearfulness variable and in fact would
demonstrate a negative relationship; whereas, the
impulsivity/conduct problems factor would predict
behavioral inhibition/fearfulness. Again, previous findings
were unclear concerning the narcissistic factor; therefore,
it was unclear whether the narcissism factor would explain
variance in behavioral inhibition, as hypothesized with the
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impulsivity/conduct problems factor, or would not, as
hypothesized with the callous/unemotional factor.
Finally, did callous/unemotional traits,
impulsivity/conduct problems, and narcissistic traits
independently predict social-cognitive processes in
community youth displaying aggressive behaviors? It was
hypothesized that the callous/unemotional factor, but not
the impulsivity/conduct problems factor would predict a
higher value placed on aggressive acts and a disregard for
the negative consequences of aggressive behavior. More
specifically, the callous/unemotional factor would predict
increased expectations and values associated with the
positive outcomes of aggressive behavior and decreased
expectations and values associated with the negative
consequences for aggressive behavior. It was expected that
the impulsivity/conduct problems factor would not be
related to the outcome expectations or values. Again,
previous findings were unclear concerning the narcissism
factor; therefore, it was unclear whether the narcissism
factor would explain variance in social cognition, as
hypothesized with the callous/unemotional factor, or would
not, as hypothesized with the impulsivity/conduct problems
factor.
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CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW
General Aggression
Aggression research is essential because of its
negative effects on an individual’s development, family
cohesion, the social and financial cost to local, state,
and federal agencies and the overall quality of life
indicators such as crime rates, community safety(Connor,
2002). Recently the focus on understanding aggression in
children and adolescents has increased from public concern
over school shootings, to community delinquency such as
gang activity and anecdotal cases highlighted in the media
of families, to unrecognized and untreated mental illness
and violence in youth (Connor, 2002). The study of
aggression is complicated as various terms apply to the
same construct or one term has divergent definitions
depending on the field of study. Terms that are often used
to describe aggression include violence, delinquency,
oppositionality, criminality, conduct-disorder, antisocial
behavior, psychopathic or sociopathic behavior (Connor,
2002).

Webster’s College Dictionary (2002) defines

aggression as a forceful action or procedure, especially an
unprovoked attack; hostile, injurious, or destructive
behavior or outlook especially when caused by frustration.
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The criminal justice field defines aggression or antisocial
behaviors as an act that violates the rules and laws of
society; an act that is illegal, no matter what the age of
the perpetrator (Steiner & Cauffman, 1998). Clinical
definitions often refer to childhood aggression as
synonymous with the DSM’s diagnosis conduct disorder (APA,
1994). Psychometric based definitions may refer to
externalizing behaviors as aggressive as compared to
internalizing behaviors (Achenbach & Edelbrock, 1978;
Naglieri, LeBuffe, & Pfeiffer, 1994). Psychometrically,
aggression is a type of externalizing behavior
characterized by impulsive, hyperactive, delinquent and
aggressive behaviors (Achenbach & Edelbrock, 1978; Naglieri
et al, 1994). Personality and Social Psychology definitions
categorize extreme aggression as antisocial personality
disorder and/or sociopathic/psychopathic personality (APA,
1994). Obviously, aggression is an enormously heterogeneous
and broad category of behavior that is defined in several
ways. In addition to definitional differences, there are
multiple ways aggressive behaviors can be subdivided into
meaningful categories
First it is important to distinguish adaptive and
maladaptive aggression. Not all aggression serves the same
purpose (Connor, 2002). Adaptive aggression occurs in the
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service of ensuring the integrity or survival of the
individual (Connor, 2002). It is a behavioral expression of
intact internal mechanisms (e.g., biological,
psychological, cognitive, and emotional) utilized across
environments to compete for resources or defend oneself to
ensure survival (Wakefield, 1992). Although adaptive
aggression is recognized as a natural human process, and is
described in the research, maladaptive aggression is the
central focus of psychological research and concern in
society (Connor, 2002). Maladaptive aggression does not
occur in the service of an individual or group and is an
expression of a disordered internal mechanism, usually the
central nervous system, across a range of environments
(Wakefield, 1992). Maladaptive aggression transpires
independently of typical social contexts, occurs in the
absence of antecedent social cues, and is
disproportionately intense, frequent, severe and long
lasting without appropriate termination (Connor, 2002).
Classifications of Maladaptive Aggression
Maladaptive aggression is routinely described by one
of six categories. Although each has a different name, many
of the categories are quite similar. The differences
between category labels are related to preference of the
author/field or theoretical perspective than the actual
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aggressive behaviors described. One dichotomy is offensive
vs. defensive aggression found in neurobiological research
on animals (Blanchard & Blanchard, 1984). Offensive
aggression is defined as an unprovoked attack on another
and arises out of a challenge over obtaining a scant
resource (Blanchard & Blanchard, 1984)). Defensive
aggression, is provoked and in response to a threatening
situation (Blanchard & Blanchard, 1984). The applicability
of these aggression styles to human behavior is largely
theoretical (Connor, 2002). Pulkkinen (1987) conducted one
of the only empirically based tests of offensive-defensive
aggression with 196 boys and 173 girls, average age 8 years
3 months. The study defined offensive aggression as
unprovoked verbal or physical attack on another child and
defensive aggression as an angry reaction to an irritation
(Pulkkinen, 1987). Peer nominations and teacher rating
scales were utilized in order to define/categorize
aggressive behavior shown in the classroom (Pulkkinen,
1987). The study assumed that aggressive and nonaggressive
behaviors could be categorized into the dimensions, SocialActivity (offensive)-Social Passivity (defensive)
(defensive) or Strong Control of Behavior (offensive)-Weak
Control of Behavior (defensive). The findings of the study
did not support the defensive vs. offensive aggression
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dichotomy; all aggressive behaviors fell within the
quadrant, Social Activity and Weak Control of Behavior
(Pulkkinen, 1987).
A second category is relational aggression. Relational
aggression is defined as angrily excluding a peer from the
group, purposely ending a friendship to reject a peer,
spreading rumors, indirectly retaliating toward a peer by
having other friends exclude or reject someone and tattling
(Crick & Grotpeter, 1995; Crick & Werner, 1998; Hood,
1996). Typically, when children use relational aggression
they focus on ways to undermine the goals valued by
respective peers (Crick & Grotpeter, 1995; Crick & Werner,
1998; Hood, 1996). Higher rates of relational aggression
are reported in females when compared to males (Bjorkqvist,
Osterman, & Kaukiainen, 1992). Researchers hypothesize that
girls tend to focus on relational issues in their social
interactions; thus their aggression will reflect these
themes (Bjorkqvist et al., 1992; Crick & Grotpeter, 1995).
A third classification of aggression is overt vs.
covert aggression. Overt aggression is an openly
confrontational act of physical aggression (Achenbach,
Conners, Quay, Verhulst, & Howell, 1989; Loeber &
Schmaling, 1985; Waschbusch, 2002). Examples include
physical fighting, bullying, using weapons, open defiance
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of rules (Achenbach et al., 1989; Loeber & Schmaling,
1985), annoying others, temper tantrums, arguing with
others, being stubborn, and being easily touchy or annoyed
(Waschbusch, 2002). Covert aggression is any hidden,
furtive, and clandestine act of aggression (Achenbach et
al., 1989; Loeber & Schmaling, 1985). Covert aggression is
non-confrontational and those engaging in this type of
aggression tend to be more socially withdrawn, anxious, and
have internalizing problems (Waschbusch, 2002). Examples
include stealing, fire setting, truancy, and running away
(Achenbach et al., 1989; Loeber & Schmaling, 1985;
Waschbusch, 2002). Oppositional defiant behaviors often lie
at the midpoint between overt and covert aggression
(Connor, 2002).
Reactive vs. proactive aggression is another
aggression category. The theoretical roots for these
constructs lie in social-psychological research on
aggression in humans (Connor, 2002). Reactive aggression
occurs when a frustrating or threatening event triggers an
aggressive act and induces anger (Blair, Mitchell, & Blair,
2005). Here aggression is an angry, defensive response to
threat, frustration, or provocation (Crick & Dodge, 1996)
sometimes termed “hot blooded” aggression (Waschbusch,
2002). The goal of reactive aggression is solely to defend
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oneself against a perceived threat or to inflict harm on a
source of frustration (Dollard, Doob, Miller, Mowrer, &
Sears, 1939). Children who are categorized as reactive in
their aggression report early experiences of physical
abuse, and ongoing hostile attributions, which is the
tendency to view the world as negative, out to get you and
dangerous (Waschbusch, 2002). Physiologically and
behaviorally, reactive aggression is characterized by
intense central nervous system autonomatic arousal,
irritability, fear or anger, and frenzied, unplanned
attacks on the object of frustration (Dodge, 1991). The
Basic Threat Circuitry is the neural circuitry implicated
in the expression of reactive aggression and is used for
response to basic (real or perceived) threats in the
environment (Greg & Siegal, 2001; Panksepp, 1998).
Stimulated at low levels from a distant threat the Basic
Threat Circuitry initializes a freezing response (Blair,
Mitchell, & Blair, 2005; Blanchard, Blanchard, & Takahashi,
1977). At higher levels of stimulation from a more proximal
threat, the system initializes escape-related behaviors and
at even higher levels of stimulation when escape is
impossible, the basic threat circuitry initiates reactive
aggression (Blair et al., 2005; Blanchard et al., 1977).
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Proactive aggression is non-impulsive, planned “cold
blooded” aggression (Waschbusch, 2002). It is associated
with a learning history where aggressive behavior is found
to be a viable means to obtain a goal (Waschbusch, 2002).
Those engaging in proactive aggression report overly
positive evaluations of the outcomes of their aggressive
acts (Waschbusch, 2002). Proactive aggression highly
resembles instrumental aggression discussed in detail
below.
Instrumental vs. hostile aggression encompasses
another subdivision of the aggression construct. Hostile
aggression occurs with the intention to inflict injury or
pain upon a victim, with little advantage to the aggressor
(Connor, 2002). Instrumental aggression is purposeful and
goal directed (Dodge, 1991). The goal is not usually the
pain of the victim but rather the victim’s possessions or
to increase one’s status within a hierarchy (Blair et al.,
2005). This type of aggression is highly organized,
patterned, and directed toward the promise of a reward
(Dodge, 1991). Physiologically and behaviorally, there is
little central nervous system arousal, irritability, anger,
or fear (Connor, 2002). According to Bandura (1973),
instrumental aggression is learned through reinforced
social role modeling and positive outcomes for aggressive

22

behaviors in social settings. Most antisocial behavior is
goal directed (Blair et al., 2005).
The research shows mixed support for the instrumental
vs. hostile aggression dichotomy (Hartup & de Wit, 1974;
Rule, 1974; Willis & Foster, 1990).

First there is overlap

between the behavioral reactions of instrumental and
hostile acts with both instrumental and hostile reactions
demonstrated in many aggressive incidents (Hartup & de Wit,
1974). Second, in studies examining children’s social
perceptions, children perceive episodes of instrumental and
hostile aggression similarly and evaluate both as equally
problematic and negative (Rule, 1974; Willis & Foster,
1990). Other studies report that a child’s behavior can
differentiate the two constructs (Hartup, 1974).
Examining aggression in preschoolers and elementary school
children Hartup (1974) found that hostile aggression
increased with age while instrumental aggression decreased.
Also, boys demonstrated more hostile reactions as compared
to girls (Hartup, 1974). Moreover, clinically referred
children evidence this distinction (Atkins & Stoff, 1993;
Atkins, Stoff, Osborne, & Brown, 1993). On two studies with
adolescent boys referred for disruptive behavior disorders,
researchers found an association between impulsivity and
hostile aggression but not instrumental aggression,
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offering more support for the distinction (Atkins & Stoff,
1993; Atkins et al., 1993). Generally, it appears that a
distinction between hostile and instrumental aggression is
supported in terms of children’s behavior but may not be
evident in social peer perception.
A distinction that mirrors the differentiation between
instrumental/proactive and reactive aggression is that of
predatory vs. affective aggression. The theoretical roots
of this distinction lie in neurobiological research on
aggression in animals (Connor, 2002). Predatory aggression,
similar to instrumental and proactive aggression, is
defined as a motivated, goal-oriented behavior executed
with planning by the animal with good motor control and low
autonomic nervous system arousal (Eichelman, 1987; Moyer,
1976). Affective aggression on the other hand is similar to
the description of reactive aggression. Simply, it is a
reaction to a threat. This threat may be directed toward
the animal itself, its young, or its territory (Eichelman,
1987; Moyer, 1976). The goal of affective aggression as in
reactive aggression is defensive and includes an unplanned
attack, poor motor control, and high anatomic nervous
system arousal (Connor, 2002).
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Aggression in the Current Study
It is apparent from this review that differences in
aggression terminology simply lie in the population
examined, wording, or theoretical perspective. Most types
of aggression depicted can be divided into reactive
(hostile and affective) and instrumental (predatory and
proactive) aggression. A unitary model with dichotomous
terminology is helpful when discussing aggression simply
for conceptualization; however, Loeber and StouthamerLoeber (1998) argue that “a unitary model of externalizing
problems does not adequately account for types of
delinquent offenders (e.g., overt, violent offenders vs.
covert, minor delinquents) or differences in terms of time
of onset and differential life-course trajectories among
offender subtypes” (p.243).
Subsequently, not all aggressive individuals will fall
nicely into one category or the other. The current study
focuses on aggression found at the extreme end of the
distribution of antisocial individuals, specifically those
exhibiting psychopathic personality traits, and proposes a
type of aggression that combines instrumental and reactive
aggression, with the instrumental aggression remaining the
dominant means of negative interactions.
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Research has offered support for two major categories
of aggressive individuals, those engaging in solely
reactive aggression and those demonstrating high frequency
of both instrumental and reactive aggression (Barratt et
al., 1999; Connor, 2002; Crick & Dodge, 1996; Linnoila et
al., 1983). Those individuals who engage in primarily
reactive aggression demonstrate an indifference to
conventional rules (Blair et al., 2005). The description of
reactive, hostile, and affective aggression previously
discussed also applies to these individuals. Individuals
evidencing both reactive and instrumental aggression are
indifferent to moral transgressions and demonstrate little
guilt or empathy with their victims (Blair et al., 2005).
In addition to demonstrating the reactive, hostile, and
affective aggression defined earlier, these individuals
more predominantly exhibit instrumental, proactive, and
predatory characteristics of aggression.
Consistent with the second category of aggressive
individuals, those individuals who demonstrate psychopathic
personality present with elevated levels of instrumental
aggression (Woodworth & Porter, 2002). The behavior of the
psychopath is often motivated by distinct goals rather than
emotional reactions. This coincides with the lack of
emotional reactivity often associated with the classic
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psychopath (Cleckley, 1976). Woodworth and Porter (2002)
investigated whether psychopaths engage in more
instrumental or reactive aggression. They found that
psychopaths were more likely to engage in instrumental
violence than nonpsychopaths with almost all of the
psychopaths committing instrumental homicidal violence
rather than impulsive homicidal violence. Other researchers
found similar results with psychopathic offenders being
motivated more by material gain and not by heightened
emotional arousal as well as exhibiting a higher likelihood
to engage in instrumental violence than reactive violence
(Cornell, Warren, Hawk, Stafford, Oram, & Pine, 1996).
However, other researchers argue individuals with
psychopathy demonstrate high levels of both reactive and
instrumental aggression (Cornell et al., 1996; Williamson
et al., 1987) and speculate because psychopathy is
associated with high impulsivity this suggests psychopaths
may engage in reactive aggression if subjected to
provocation (Woodworth & Porter, 2002).
Prevalence of Aggression
Aggression is not a recent concern in terms of
children and adolescents (Connor, 2002). Over the past 50
years, rates of maladaptive aggression and antisocial
behaviors increased in frequency and severity among
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children and adolescents in the United States (Connor,
2002). Juvenile violence peaked in the 1980’s and early
1990’s (Loeber & Hay, 1997; Waschbusch, 2002). Although it
has been decreasing since the middle 1990’s, juvenile
violence continues to remain at historically high levels
(Connor, 2002). Estimates suggest that a small proportion
of adolescents (6-8%) are responsible for a large
proportion (60-85%) of serious criminal acts (Cruise,
Colwell, Lyons, & Baker, 2003). Between 1993 and 2003,
juveniles were involved, as victims or offenders, in 38% of
all violent crimes in which the victim could estimate the
age of the offender (OJJDP, 2005). According to the
National Crime Victimization Survey (NCVS) and the
Supplementary Homicide Reports from the FBI, four out of
five violent victimizations of younger teens aged 12-14
involved offenders perceived to be juveniles (OJJDP, 2005).
Homicide is the second leading cause of death in 15-19 year
olds (CDC, 2005; Loeber & Hay, 1997) and the leading cause
of death in African Americans between the ages of 15 and 19
(CDC, 2005). It is evident from these statistics that
although juvenile violence appears to be decreasing, it
continues to be a serious problem for society. It should
also be noted that the statistics recorded do not encompass
all episodes of aggression that occur everyday in schools
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and communities. Aggression does not always result in a
statistic but does have largely negative effects on
children, families, schools, and communities.
Stability of Aggression
For the past 80 years, an abundance of research has
addressed the early-onset of aggressive/antisocial
behaviors (Connor, 2002). Research demonstrates that adult
antisocial behavior is evidenced in childhood (Broidy et
al., 2003; Loeber, 1982; Waschbusch, 2002). In a study
examining developmental trajectories of childhood
delinquency, Broidy et al. (2003) found that physical
aggression in male children is a distinct predictor of
later violent delinquency and is the most consistent
predictor of both violent and nonviolent offending in
adolescence. Youth demonstrating extreme antisocial
behavior have the greatest likelihood of continuing
antisocial behavior (Loeber, 1982). The earlier the
antisocial behaviors/conduct problems are established the
more stable they will be with estimates of 50% of those
individuals with early behavior/conduct problems remaining
antisocial into adolescence and adulthood (Waschbusch,
2002). As adults, these children engage in more murder,
robbery, rape, and arson, are more likely to exhibit
multiple offences, and be incarcerated compared to those
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who develop late onset conduct problems (Waschbusch, 2002).
For later onset of conduct problems, the stability seems to
be less predictable and has been shown to decrease and end
in young adulthood (Waschbusch, 2002).
Furthermore, those children demonstrating chronic
delinquency displayed antisocial behavior in more than one
setting, demonstrated a higher variety of antisocial
behaviors, and showed an earlier onset of these behaviors
(Loeber, 1982). Loeber (1982) also found that the patterns
of antisocial behavior tend to change during preadolescence
and adolescence with the number of youth engaging in overt
antisocial acts declining between the ages of 6 and 16;
whereas, the number of youths engaging in covert antisocial
acts increases.
Risk Factors for Aggression
Many factors influence aggression including
environmental, emotional, and cognitive factors.
Environmental aspects include such issues as divorce, job
loss, birth of siblings, stress, SES, a history of
aggression, parental psychopathology, exposure to violence,
and ineffective parenting (CDC, 2005; Connor, 2002).
Emotional precursors include difficult temperament, poor
attachment, and poor emotional regulation (Connor, 2002;
Loeber & Hay, 1997). Cognitive antecedents include low

30

intelligence, reading problems, attention problems, social
cognitive deficits, mental scripts, favorable attitudes
toward aggression, rejection sensitivity, and inflated
self-esteem (CDC, 2005; Loeber & Hay, 2005). A complete
discussion of each of these risk factors is beyond the
scope of this paper. What is evident from the listing is
that multiple risk factors exist, there is not a single
pattern or combination that predicts aggression or
violence, and the presence of protective factors may
influence the development of later aggression (Connor,
2002).
Psychopathology of Aggression
The development of aggression and similar behaviors is
one of the most common reasons children and adolescents are
psychiatrically referred to mental health settings (Connor,
2002). Aggression, disruptive behaviors, and antisocial
behaviors viewed as severely maladaptive may be considered
for mental health diagnoses. Disorders are classified by
two predominant methods. The American Psychiatric
Association (APA) utilizes criteria presented in the
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders IV
(DSM-IV; APA, 1994) and the World Health Organization (WHO)
classifies psychiatric illness according to the
International Classification of Diseases, which is in its
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10th revision (ICD-10; WHO, 1992). The current paper
utilizes the DSM-IV’s descriptions of disruptive behavior
disorders.
The DSM-IV (APA, 1994) describes a number of
disruptive behavior disorders including oppositional
defiant disorder, conduct disorder, and antisocial
personality disorder (DSM-IV; APA, 1994). These disorders
comprise the diagnoses most commonly associated with the
development of aggression in children, adolescents, and
adults. Each is described briefly below.
Oppositional Defiant Disorder (ODD) is depicted in the
DSM-IV (APA, 1994) as a recurrent pattern of negativistic,
defiant, disobedient, and hostile behavior toward authority
figures that persists for at least 6 months, is
characterized by frequent arguments with adults, defying or
refusing to comply with adults, deliberately annoying
others, being easily annoyed, being angry or resentful, and
being spiteful or vindictive. A diagnosis of ODD requires
that the behaviors occur more often than typically seen in
individuals of a similar age and developmental level (APA,
1994). The behaviors must also lead to significant
impairment in social, academic, or occupational functioning
(APA, 1994). The diagnosis of ODD is not made if the
behaviors occur exclusively during the course of a
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Psychotic or Mood disorder or if the behaviors meet the
criteria for a diagnosis of Conduct Disorder or Antisocial
Personality Disorder (APA, 1994). An individual is usually
identified as a child with ODD before the age of 8 and
typically no later than early adolescence (APA, 1994). ODD
is often a developmental antecedent to a diagnosis of
conduct disorder; however, although it is a precursor to
Conduct Disorder, not all children with ODD will develop
Conduct Disorder (APA, 1994; Greene et al., 2002).
Conduct Disorder (CD) is defined as a repetitive and
persistent pattern of behavior in which the basic rights of
others or major age-appropriate societal norms or rules are
violated and in which antisocial behaviors are exhibited to
the extreme given the individuals’ developmental level
(APA, 1994; Salekin et al., 2002). At least 3 of the
following behaviors must be evident in the past 12 months
with at least one present for at least 6 months: aggression
to people and animals, destruction of property,
deceitfulness or theft, and serious violations of rules
(APA, 1994). The disturbance in behavior must cause
clinically significant impairment in social, academic, or
occupational functioning and if the individual is 18 or
older, the symptoms do not meet the criteria for Antisocial
Personality Disorder (APA, 1994).
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CD is subtyped by the age of onset into ChildhoodOnset Type and Adolescent-Onset Type (APA, 1994).
Childhood-Onset Type is defined by the onset of at least
one criterion before the age of 10 years old (APA, 1994).
These children are usually male, exhibit frequent physical
aggression toward others, have disturbed peer
relationships, may have previously been diagnosed with ODD,
and typically demonstrate symptoms meeting full criteria CD
before puberty (APA, 1994). Individuals with ChildhoodOnset Type are more likely to have persistent CD and to
develop adult Antisocial Personality Disorder than those
with Adolescent-Onset Type (APA, 1994). Adolescent-Onset
Type is defined by the onset of at least one criterion
after the age of 10 years (APA, 1994). These children are
less likely than those with Childhood-Onset Type to display
aggressive behaviors and are more likely to have more
normative peer relationships (APA, 1994). These individuals
are less likely to have persistent CD or to develop adult
Antisocial Personality Disorder (APA, 1994).
Antisocial Personality Disorder (ASPD) is
characterized by four criteria. First, at least three of
the following must be present since the age of 15 for the
diagnosis of ASPD: failure to conform to social norms,
deceitfulness/lies, impulsivity, irritability and
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aggressiveness/fights and assaults, reckless disregard for
safety of self or others, irresponsibility, and lack of
remorse (APA, 1994). Second and third, the individual’s
current age must be at least 18 and he/she has previously
held a diagnosis of Conduct Disorder with onset before age
15 (APA, 1994). Finally, the antisocial behavior must not
occur exclusively during schizophrenia or manic episodes
(APA, 1994). This pattern of behavior has also been
referred to as dissocial personality disorder, sociopathy,
and psychopathy (APA, 1994). Of specific concern in this
paper is the inclusion of psychopathic personality disorder
under the diagnosis of antisocial personality disorder.
The diagnosis of Antisocial Personality Disorder is
based largely on a pervasive pattern of antisocial
behaviors. This fails to take into account the personality
dimension argued to be an essential element in describing
psychopaths (Gacono & Hughes, 2004). A purely behavioral
definition of psychopathy identifies the disorder through a
history of chronic antisocial behaviors without examining
these behaviors for antisocial personality dimensions
(Viding, 2004). Examining both affective and interpersonal
traits and not simply antisocial behaviors, facilitates a
more thorough understanding of psychopathic and
nonpsychopathic criminals (Gacono, Loving, & Bodholdt,
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2001). It has been argued that the exclusive behavioral
definition allows for the overdiagnosis of psychopathy in
criminals and an underdiagnosis in non-criminals (Viding,
2004).
Conceptualizing psychopathy as consisting of twofactors, personality traits and behaviors, results in
conflicting base rates for psychopathy and ASPD (Gacono et
al., 2001). Rates of ASPD in the community are estimated at
5.8% for men and 1.2% for women; however, in forensic
populations, 50-80% of the individuals meet the criteria
for an ASPD diagnosis (Gacono et al., 2001). Interestingly,
only 15-25% of the same forensic population will classify
as psychopaths (Gacono et al., 2001). Gacono et al. (2001)
argued that ASPD and psychopathy are not equivalent and
that when compared, ASPD is more heterogeneous. The ASPD
diagnosis could be arrived at by an unlimited combination
of the criteria and some have estimated a possible 27
trillion combinations (Rogers and Dion, 1991). This leads
to extremely different individuals being included together
under a single diagnosis (Gacono et al., 2001). Gacono and
Hughes (2004) explained that most psychopaths meet ASPD
criteria but most individuals with an ASPD diagnosis are
not psychopaths. Contrary to ASPD, psychopathy is a
homogenous diagnosis and continues to hold important
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implications for research and clinical usage (Gacono et
al., 2001). Further, psychopathy holds a higher risk for
both offending and violence than ASPD (Gacono & Hughes,
2004). For these reasons, it is vitally important that the
characteristics of psychopaths are examined and understood
in order to gain a complete awareness of how the psychopath
is unique and what implications this may have for diagnosis
and treatment.
Psychopathy
The smallest, most severe group of offenders in the
adult population is that of the psychopath (Hare, 1993).
The word psychopathy literally means “mental illness”
derived from psyche or mind and pathos or disease (Hare,
1993). Philippe Pinel, a nineteenth century French
psychiatrist, was one of the first to write about
psychopaths (Hare, 1993). Pinel attempted to describe a
pattern of behavior that appeared to be void of remorse
with a total lack of restraint using the term insanity
without delirium (Hare, 1993; Millon, Simonsen, & BirketSmith, 1998). Since the nineteenth century, the term
psychopathy has been taken through many conceptions. The
classic definition of psychopathy, as it is referred to
today, was first proposed by Cleckley in his book The Mask
of Sanity, first published in 1941. He described
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psychopathy as a constellation of deviant personality
traits with sixteen specific characteristics including:
Table 1
Cleckley’s Psychopathy Characteristics
_______________________________________________________________________
Characteristics
_______________________________________________________________________
superficial charm/good intelligence
no delusions/irrational thinking insight
absence of nervousness/psychoneurosis
untruthfulness and insincerity with/without drink
lack of remorse or shame
inadequately motivated antisocial behavior
poor judgment/failure to learn
pathologic egocentric/incapacity for love
general poverty in major affective reactions
unreliability
unresponsiveness in general interpersonal relations
Fantastic and uninviting behavior with/without drink
Suicide rarely carried out
Sex life impersonal, trivial, and poorly integrated
Failure to follow any life plan
_______________________________________________________________________

Hare et al. (1993) later identified twenty characteristics
to describe psychopathy characterized as either personality
traits or antisocial behaviors.
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Table 2
Hare’s Psychopathy Traits
_______________________________________________________________________
Factor 1

Factor 2

Personality Traits

Socially Deviant Behaviors

_______________________________________________________________________
pathological lying

need for stimulation/

callous/lack of empathy

proneness to boredom

glibness/superficial charm

irresponsibility

lack of remorse or guilt

parasitic lifestyle

shallow affect

early behavioral problems

conning/manipulative

juvenile delinquency

failure to accept responsibility

poor behavioral controls
revocation of conditional
release
promiscuous sexual behavior
impulsivity
criminal versatility
lack of realistic long-term
goals
many short-term marital
relationships

_______________________________________________________________________

Definitions of psychopathy continue to be modified as
more information and research is collected and as various
perspectives are adopted on this construct. Cook and
colleagues (Cook & Michie, 2001; Cooke, Michie, Hart, &
Clark, 2004) described psychopathy with three dimensions.
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The first consists of an arrogant, deceitful interpersonal
style (ADI) which is includes glibness or superficial
charm, self-centeredness or a grandiose sense of selfworth, lying, conning, manipulation, and deceitfulness
(Cook & Michie, 2001; Cooke et al.,

2004). The second

dimension is the deficient affective experience (DAE)
comprised of low remorse, low guilt, weak conscience,
callousness, low empathy, shallow affect, and a failure to
accept responsibility for one’s actions (Cook & Michie,
2001; Cooke et al., 2004). The final aspect is the
impulsive or irresponsible behavioral style (IIB) which
includes boredom, excitement-seeking, a lack of long-term
goals, impulsiveness, failing to think before acting, and a
parasitic lifestyle (Cook & Michie, 2001; Cooke et al.,
2004). Close review of this description of psychopathy
reveals that the three dimensions appear to simply consist
of rewording of the original personality and behavior
dimensions originally identified by Cleckley and then Hare.
The current study utilizes Hare’s two factor model of
psychopathy as the basis for the definition of psychopathy.
Paul Frick, in conjunction with other professionals, has
completed considerable research in understanding severe
antisocial behavior in youth, working to extend Hare’s two-
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factor model of psychopathy to younger populations (Frick &
Hare, 2001; Hare, 1991).
General Psychopathy Definition in Children
Psychopathy in children has been receiving increased
attention in terms of definition, assessment, and
trajectory (Frick, 1998; Lynam, 1997; Salekin et al., 2001;
Seagrave & Grisso, 2002). Psychopathic characteristics in
children are often equated with or subsumed under the
diagnoses of Conduct Disorder and Oppositional Defiant
Disorder (Salekin et al., 2001). Similar to Antisocial
Personality Disorder, CD and ODD do not include personality
dimensions in their definitions. Because these personality
dimensions are integral to the understanding of
psychopathy, there is a need for further understanding of
traits unique to psychopathy.
Research attempting to understand psychopathic traits
in children has relied on research conducted with adults
with psychopathy. Research has demonstrated that adults
with psychopathy began exhibiting antisocial behaviors and
psychopathic characteristics in childhood (Forth, Hart &
Hare, 1990; Loeber, 1982). A factor analysis conducted by
Frick and colleagues (1994) demonstrated two predominant
factors that identified children with psychopathic
characteristics: impulsivity/conduct problems (I/CP) and
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callous/unemotional characteristics (CU). Frick and
colleagues (1994) proposed that the callous/unemotional
traits correspond with Factor 1 and that the
impulsivity/conduct problems correspond to Factor 2 of
Hare’s two-factor model. The impulsivity/conduct problems
factor comprised behaviors including impulsivity, poor
impulse control, and delinquent behaviors (Frick et al.,
1994). The callous/unemotional factor was characterized by
lack of guilt, lack of empathy, and superficial charm
(Frick et al., 1994). Frick and colleagues’ downward
extension of psychopathic traits in children encompasses
the constructual definitions utilized in this study, which
will be discussed in more detail further on in this
document.
Though it is useful to extend adult criteria downward
to children, it must be noted that many researchers have
argued that this downward extension is problematic (Lynam,
1997; Salekin et al., 2001). Frick and colleagues (1994)
found that the characteristics grandiose sense of selfworth, failure to accept responsibility for own actions,
and boredom susceptibility were related to the I/CP factor
in children whereas in adults these behaviors were
associated with more psychopathic behaviors. The
researchers suggest that the differences could suggest
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developmental differences in the manifestation of
psychopathy in youth (Frick et al., 1994).

Lynam (1997)

examined childhood psychopathy in 430 boys ages 12 and 13
in order to assess whether childhood psychopathy resembled
adult psychopathy. He found that children with psychopathic
personalities were serious and stable offenders, impulsive,
and more prone to externalizing than internalizing disorder
(Lynam, 1997). These findings are consistent with findings
concerning adult psychopathy and again suggest that
psychopathy may manifest in youth. However, although an
important reference, the downward extension of adult
criteria should be utilized with caution due to the varying
factor structures identified in youth. Further
clarification of psychopathy in youth is warranted.
Prevalence of Psychopathy
Psychopaths comprise 15-25% of criminals in the adult
federal offender population (Hare, 1993) and are five times
more likely than nonpsychopaths to engage in violent
recidivism within 5 years of release (Serin & Amos, 1995).
Psychopaths commit 50% more crimes than nonpsychopaths and
are not only more likely to commit a violent offense but
also to commit a wide variety of offences (Hare, 1993).
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The prevalence of psychopathy in the young offender
population has been estimated at 21.5%, similar to the 1530% estimate for adults (Salekin et al., 2004).
Stability of Psychopathy
Personality is stable (Lynam, 1997). The stability
appears greater between the ages of 18 and 32 (r=.55) than
between the ages of 10 and 18 (r=.38) but there exists
significant stability during adolescent years. According to
Farrington, there is no dramatic change in personality or
behavior at age 18; rather there exists a continuity from
childhood to adulthood (Farrington, 1991). One specific
example was found in a study conducted by Caspi (2000)
where under-controlled children at age 3 significantly
reported that they were reckless and careless, and enjoyed
dangerous and exciting activities at age 18.
According to Cleckley (1976), Hare (1993), Cook and
colleagues (2001), Frick (1994) and others, the definition
of psychopathy includes personality. Since personality is
stable and children exhibit personality traits similar to
those displayed in adults, it follows that the child who
most closely resembles the psychopath in childhood will
closely resemble the psychopath in adulthood (Lynam, 1997).
Research demonstrates that adult antisocial behavior and
psychopathy are evidenced in childhood (Loeber, 1982;
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Lynam, 1997). Porter and colleagues (2001) found that
psychopathic offenders commit more violent and nonviolent
crimes than nonpsychopaths from late adolescence to their
late 40s.

Psychopathic traits in children have been found

to predict severe and violent antisocial behavior in adults
(Salekin, Neumann, Leistico, DiCicco & Duros, 2004). Viding
(2004) argues that this finding suggests that psychopathy
may be a developmental disorder in which specific
personality traits can be assessed in children. Early
identification of these youth would have important safety
implications for the community as well as assisting our
understanding of the etiology, development, and treatment
regimens of psychopaths (Gacono & Hughes, 2004; Lynam,
1997; Salekin et al., 2004).
Theories of Psychopathy
Does psychopathy develop through nature, brain anatomy
and biology, or through nurture, environment and parenting?
The general consensus is that individuals with psychopathy
are a homogeneous group and that not one theory can explain
the process by which these individuals develop psychopathic
characteristics (Blackburn, 2006). Theoretical perspectives
that have considered antisocial behavior and psychopathy
include evolutionary, genetics, developmental, social-
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learning, psychoanalytic, personality, neurobiological, and
cognitive.
Evolutionary theory. Evolutionary theory suggests that
the basis of human nature includes adaptations taking the
form of evolved psychological mechanisms for solving
specific problems of survival or reproduction (Buss, 1999).
Precise motives, goals, and strivings developed from these
adaptations with the most universal being for status in the
competition for resources (Buss, 1999). This competition
entails impeding others’ likelihood of acquiring resources
which can include stealing, cheating, attacking,
humiliating, or guaranteeing compliance of others (Buss,
1999). It is proposed that psychopathy represents an
evolutionary process based on a cheating strategy that
would have supported reproductive success in ancestral
environments (Beck & Freeman, 1990). Basically, individuals
who engaged in the cheating strategy would survive through
frequency-dependent selection (Buss, 1999), maintaining
themselves as a small frequency in a predominantly
cooperative population (Blackburn, 2006).
Genetic theory. Genetic research has investigated twin
and adoption studies in order to learn more about the
etiology of antisocial and psychopathic behaviors. A metaanalysis of 51 twin adoption and sibling designs found that
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on average 41% of the variance in antisocial behavior is
due to genetic factors, 16% is due to shared environmental
factors, and 43% is due to non-shared environmental factor
(Rhee & Waldman, 2002). Antisocial behavior, according to
this meta-analysis, is moderately heritable (Rhee &
Waldman, 2002). The Twins Early Development Study (TEDS)
consisted of teacher ratings of more than 7000 seven yearold twins. This study found that antisocial behavior in
children with elevated levels of the callous/unemotional
traits were under an extremely high genetic influence (.81)
and no influence of the shared environment. Conversely,
those children demonstrating antisocial behavior without
evidencing callous/unemotional traits showed moderate
genetic influence (.30) and substantial environmental
influence (shared environment = .34; non-shared environment
= .26) (Viding et al., 2005). These results indicate that
the family-wide environmental influences that are not
acting on the child’s genotype are important for the
development of antisocial behavior when callous/unemotional
traits are not present (Viding et al., 2005). Because
environmental influences act in tandem with the genotype,
as well as the environmental influences unique to the child
(essentially, shared and nonshared environmental
influences), it appears that the combination is more
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important for the development of antisocial behaviors in
children with elevated levels of callous/unemotional traits
than children with antisocial behaviors absent of high
levels of callous/unemotional traits where environment
alone plays a more important role(Viding et al., 2005).
Attachment theory. Attachment theory emphasizes the
quality of infant-caregiver relationships during the first
year of life as a predictor of cognitive and social
development (Bowlby, 1969). Attachment research
demonstrates that cold rejecting parents or disrupted
families tend to produce cold, callous children who are
unable to develop warm relationships, have low empathy, and
are likely to offend (Farrington, 2005). These children are
naturally hedonistic and selfish (Farrington, 2005). They
seek pleasure and avoid pain (Farrington, 2005). It is well
recognized that empathy-producing, positive parenting
practices lead to less antisocial behavior than punishmentbased, negative parenting practices (Blair, 2003). This
relationship has been demonstrated in healthy individuals
as well as those displaying conduct disorders without
evidence of the emotional dysfunction of psychopaths
(Blair, 2003). Conversely, children with conduct disorder
who do demonstrate emotional dysfunction of psychopaths do
not show the connection between parenting behaviors and
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level of antisocial behavior (Wootton, Frick, & Shelton,
1997). The emotional impairment found in individuals with
psychopathy interferes with the natural socialization so
that the individual does not learn to avoid antisocial
behavior (Blair, 2003).
Role-taking theory. Gough’s role-taking theory
attempts to explain psychopathy through the argument that
individuals with psychopathy demonstrate impairment in
role-taking abilities (Blackburn, 1984). Gough’s (1948)
role-taking theory states that the self-concept and the
capacity to examine oneself as an object emerge as a result
of social interaction and communication. During the roletaking process, the person develops a conception of the
“generalized other” which advances through the integration
of different conceptions of “me” (Blackburn, 2006). Roletaking abilities are central to an individual’s ability to
be sensitive to the reactions of others and are necessary
for self-criticism and self-control (Blackburn, 2006). The
argument is that the characteristics of the psychopath
including ignoring the rights of others, impulsivity,
emotional poverty, and the inability to form lasting
interpersonal attachments could be accounted for by a
pathological deficiency in role-taking ability (Blackburn,
2006).
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Psychoanalytic theory. Psychoanalytic theory has
attempted to explain the development of the psychopath
(Blackburn, 2006). The depiction of the psychopath as an
egocentric, impulsive, guiltless, and unempathic individual
has its roots in psychodynamic thinking (Blackburn, 2006).
Freud discussed the process of socialization in early
childhood with the development of the superego and argued
that impaired socialization occurs when parents fail to
meet the child’s emotional needs by way of rejection,
neglect, or inconsistency (Blackburn, 2006). More recent
psychodynamic theories stress the importance of object
relations which is “the enduring patterns of interpersonal
relationships derived from internal cognitive and affective
representations” (Blackburn, 2006, p.36). In this view, the
psychopath has a biologically predisposed excessive
aggressive drive, which becomes the dominant interaction
style in response to early traumatic experiences or
distortions in attachment resulting from abuse and
abandonment (Kernberg, 1996). The individual adopts rage
and envy as primary affects and defends against a dangerous
world by using grandiosity and devaluation (Kernberg,
1996). The superego system uses primitive, punitive
prohibitions with a reliance on immediate external cues and
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basic self-interest for the regulation of interpersonal
behavior (Kernberg, 1996).
Personality theory. Personality theories offer
multiple explanations for the psychopathic personality
including but not limited to Eysenck’s theory, the Big 5
Personality Theory, and the Interpersonal Circumplex. Each
will be discussed briefly. Eysenck’s (1977; 1996) theory
focuses on three independent dimensions of personality
including Neuroticism-Stability (N), Psychoticism-Superego
(P), and Extraversion-Introversion (E). N, E, and P all
have biological basis concerned with activity in the limbic
and autonomic systems as well as cortical arousal (Eysenck,
1996). Importantly, extraverts, compared to introverts,
demonstrate low arousal, form conditioned responses less
readily, and require more extreme stimulation to maintain a
“hedonic tone” (Eysenck, 1996). Basically, the theory
argues that individuals with psychopathy, similar to
typical criminals, exhibit lower arousal and weaker
conditionability and will demonstrate higher mean scores on
all three dimensions, N, E, and P (Eysenck, 1996).
Blackburn (2006) explains that supportive research for this
theory is lacking in that support is unsubstantial for the
central theoretical links between extraversion, its
physiological substrate, and the process of socialization.
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Antisocial behavior and psychopathic personality has
been related to the Big 5 Personality Theory or Five Factor
Model (FFM). The 5 personality factors included in this
theory include extraversion, agreeableness,
conscientiousness, neuroticism, and openness (Farrington,
2005). Extraversion is “a trait characterized by a keen
interest in other people and external events, and venturing
forth with confidence into the unknown" (Ewen, 1998, p.
289). Agreeableness is defined as straightforwardness,
altruism, modesty, and tendermindedness on the positive end
and deceitfulness, exploitiveness, arrogance, and
callousness on the negative end (Farrington, 2005).
Conscientiousness is defined as dutifulness, achievement
striving, self-discipline, and deliberation on the positive
end with poor dependability, aimlessness, hedonism, and
carelessness at the negative end (Farrington, 2005).
Neuroticism is defined as impulsiveness and angry hostility
which includes self-consciousness with glibness and
shamelessness on the negative end and vulnerability with
fearlessness at the opposite end (Farrington, 2005).
Openness refers to how willing people are to make
adjustments in notions and activities in accordance with
new ideas or situations (Ewen, 1998). Three of these
factors were found to be connected with psychopathy in
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children and adolescents including agreeableness,
conscientiousness, and neuroticism. Agreeableness is
related to Factor 1 in Hare’s definition. Conscientiousness
is more related to Factor 2 and neuroticism is related to
both Factor 1 and Factor 2, but more particularly Factor 2
(Lynam et al., 2005). Psychopathy is negatively correlated
with conscientiousness and agreeableness (Lynam et al.,
2005).
Another personality theory relating to psychopathy is
the Interpersonal Circumplex (Lynam et al., 2005). The
Interpersonal Circumplex describes personality with seven
characteristics including assured-dominant, arrogantcalculating, cold-hearted, aloof-introverted, unassuredsubmissing, warm-agreeable, and gregarious-extraverted
(Lynam et al., 2005). According to this theory, psychopaths
tend to be cold-hearted and arrogant-calculating (Lynam et
al., 2005).
Neurobiological theory. Neurobiological theories also
describe the development of antisocial behavior and
psychopathic personality. Specific theories concerning
psychopathy include the Left Hemisphere Activation
Hypothesis (LHA), the Frontal Lobe Dysfunction Hypothesis,
and the Somatic Marker Hypothesis. Each will be discussed
briefly. The Left Hemisphere Activation Hypothesis (LHA)
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states that individuals with psychopathy have deficits in
cognitive processing that are state-specific and occur only
under circumstances that selectively and differentially
activate the left hemisphere resources (Kosson, 1998). In
general, information processing will be disrupted in
psychopaths when the left hemisphere is substantially
activated by processing demands (Kosson, 1998). The
foundation of this hypothesis comes from the work of Hare
and Jutai (1988, p. 329) who speculated that individuals
with psychopathy may demonstrate “weak or unusual
lateralization of language function, and that psychopaths
may have fewer left hemisphere resources for processing
language than do normal individuals”. Studies examining
language function prompted Hare and Jutai’s speculation.
For example, in one study, individuals were presented with
word stimuli to both the left and right visual fields and
were expected to state whether the word matched a
previously presented word, a semantic category, or an
abstract category (Hare & Jutai, 1988). The study found
that individuals with psychopathy demonstrated difficulty
in the area of abstract category discrimination if the word
was presented to the right visual field (Hare & Jutai,
1988). However, these same individuals demonstrated
superior performance when the stimuli were presented to the
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left visual field (Hare & Jutai, 1988). Dichotic listening
tasks also demonstrated an unusual lateralization in
individuals with psychopathy (Hare & McPherson, 1984).
These tasks required individuals to report what they heard
when words were played to the right or left ear (Hare &
McPherson, 1984). Individuals with psychopathy demonstrated
impairment when reporting words that were played to the
right ear but not the left (Hare & McPherson, 1984). These
findings were replicated in adolescents demonstrating
psychopathic traits (Raine et al., 1990). While these
studies appear to demonstrate support for the Left
Activation Hypothesis, Blair and colleagues (2005) argue
that the hypothesis lacks specificity in that it does not
fully explain why the left hemisphere should disrupt
cortical functioning, which systems in the left hemisphere
disrupt cortical functioning when it is over-activated, and
how greater left hemisphere activation should be
quantified.
The second hypothesis is the Frontal Lobe Dysfunction
Hypothesis. The frontal lobe and executive dysfunction have
long been related to antisocial behavior (Barratt, 1994;
Elliot, 1978; Gorenstein, 1982; Moffitt, 1993). This
conclusion has been made from three types of data. The
first examined patients with acquired lesions of the
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frontal cortex that evidenced emotion and personality
changes such as euphoria, irresponsibility, lack of affect,
lack of concern for the present and/or future, and
increased aggression (Hecaen & Albert, 1978). These
individuals demonstrated increased levels of reactive but
not instrumental aggression, which contradicts the
psychopathic personality who demonstrates predominantly
instrumental aggression (Blair et al., 2005). Studies with
these patients have found that the orbital and medial
cortices, but not the dorsolateral cortex were involved in
regulating reactive aggression (Blair et al., 2005).
Gorenstein (1982) found psychopaths’ performance relative
to a control group to be comparable to patients with
lesions in the frontal lobe on the Wisconsin Card Sorting
Task and the Necker Cube Reversals but not the Sequential
Matching Memory Task (Gorenstein, 1982). Blair et al.
(2005) point out that these studies demonstrate key
differences between individuals with lesions in the
orbitofrontal cortex and those with psychopathy.
The second type of patient examined in developing the
Frontal Lobe Dysfunction Hypothesis are those individuals
with antisocial behavior who show deficits in executive
functions (Blair et al., 2005). However, making causal
inferences from this research is difficult because many of
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the studies failed to distinguish among specific areas of
the brain (Blair et al., 2005). Specifically, much of the
literature concentrates on tasks examining the functions of
the executive functions commonly linked to orbitofrontal
and medial frontal cortex and not the dorsolateral
prefrontal cortex that are involved in regulation of
reactive aggression (Damasio, 1994; Grafman et al., 1996;
Volavka, 1995). Research has found that psychopaths do not
show executive dysfunction on measures that specifically
examine the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex; however, they
do show executive dysfunction on tasks linked to the
orbital frontal cortex (Kandal & Freed, 1989). Meaning,
psychopaths do not demonstrate deficits in functioning
related to the regulation of reactive aggression
(dorsolateral prefrontal cortex) but do demonstrate
deficits in tasks assessing orbital frontal cortex
dysfunction such as response reversal and response control.
The third type of study examined violent individuals
who demonstrated significantly reduced levels of cerebral
blood flow (CBF) in the medial and frontal cortex (Blair et
al., 2005). Lower levels of normalized CBF in the orbital
frontal cortex (BA 47) correlates with a history of
aggression (Dolan et al., 2002). Negative correlations have
been found between the callous-unemotional (Factor 1)
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dimensions and frontal and temporal perfusion (Soderstrom
et al., 2002), which means the higher the callousunemotional characteristics, the less blood flow observed
in the frontal and temporal regions. This research
demonstrates support that Frontal Lobe Dysfunction is
evident in individuals with psychopathy.
A third hypothesis is the Somatic Marker Hypothesis.
The Ventromedial Frontal Cortex is involved in linkages
between factual knowledge and bio-regulatory states
(Bechara, Damasio, & Damasio, 2000). When emotionally
significant decisions are made either involving reward or
punishment, bodily states provide affective coloring that
automatically biases an individual toward or away from the
available response options (Blair et al., 2005). The bodily
feedback or somatic marker provides an automatic way of
labeling an option as good or bad and influencing the
likelihood that that response is made (Blair et al., 2005).
Patients with lesions to the ventromedial frontal cortex
fail to show autonomic responses to visually presented
social stimuli under passive viewing conditions (Damasio et
al., 1990). Patients with ventromedial damage show deficits
on the four pack card task, continuing to choose from the
disadvantaged package and failing to show skin conductance
before the choices of packs (Damasio et al., 1990).
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Children and adults with psychopathy show deficits on the
card task; however, they do not show deficits on the
autonomic responses to social stimuli and therefore, they
appear to generate somatic markers (Blair, 1999).
Therefore, the evidence for the Somatic Marker Hypothesis
remains divided.
Multiple areas of the brain are implicated in the
development of antisocial behavior including the ventrolateral section, the orbital frontal cortex, and the
amygdala (Blair et al., 2005). The ventro-lateral section
of the brain is related to response control which is
defined as a resolution of response competition in tasks
where there is no clear expectation of reward or punishment
(Blair et al., 2005). Tasks that focus on response control
includes go/no go and the stop task and allow for a direct
test of whether a non-emotion based difficulty exists in
the control of motor responses (Blair et al., 2005). Two
out of three studies that have examined response control in
psychopathic individuals have shown that these individuals
have difficulty with the go/no go task (LaPierre et al.,
1995; Roussy & Touplin, 2000). One study using the stop
task showed that psychopaths demonstrate more impairment on
withholding their responses following the stop signal than
controls (Roussy & Touplin, 2000). This demonstrates a lack
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of response control in individuals with psychopathic
traits.
The orbital frontal cortex is involved in response
reversal (Blair et al., 2005). Response reversal is defined
as changing a response to a stimulus as a function of a
change in a contingency (Rolls, 1997). The individual
learns to withhold a response that, although previously
rewarded, is now punished (Rolls, 1997). This task is
distinct from passive avoidance tasks in that response
reversal requires a change or reversal in the response,
whereas, passive avoidance demands learning to respond to
one stimulus and withhold a response to another stimuli but
never reverse the responses (Newman & Kosson, 1986). The
orbital frontal cortex is critical to this reversal (Blair
et al., 2005). Response reversal is a function of the
degree to which there is a mismatch between the expectation
of reinforcement and the presence of a reinforcer (Cools,
Clark, Owen & Robbins, 2002). Blair et al. (2005) argue
that clear evidence does not exist that individuals with
psychopathy demonstrate a weakness in this skill. Research
demonstrates adult psychopaths display significant
impairment in response reversal tasks in which they must
reverse their responding to the object that had previously
elicited rewards but now elicits punishment (Mitchell,
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Colledge, Leonard, & Blair, 2002); however, children with
psychopathic traits do not demonstrate a deficit in
response reversal (Blair, Colledge, & Mitchell, 2001).
It is suggested that one of the principal neural
systems implicated in the psychopathic pathology is
amygdala dysfunction (Patrick, 1994). In contrast to
studies measuring orbital frontal cortex performance,
performance on measures thought to require the amygdala has
been found to be significantly impaired in both adults and
children displaying psychopathy. The amygdala consists of
two parts including the basolateral (BLA) and the central
nuclei (CeN) (Johnston, 1923). The amygdala is one of the
most vital areas of the brain for emotional processing
(LeDoux, 1998). The integrated emotion systems (IES) model
explains how the amygdala interacts with other portions of
the brain to affect emotion processing (Blair, Mitchell, &
Blair, 2005). There are three major connection systems
involving the amygdala (Price, 2003). First, a
predominantly forebrain system including the olfactory
cortex, ascending taste/visceral pathways, posterior
thalamus, and sensory association cortical areas provide
sensory input to both parts of the amygdala (Price, 2003).
The amygdala most likely modulates sensory processing due
to the reciprocal nature of many of the connections of the
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sensory input structures and the amygdala (Price, 2003).
Second, a system of projections to the brainstem exists in
which changes, mostly extending from the CeN, of the
visceral function relating to emotional stimuli are made
(Blair et al., 2005). Finally, a system of reciprocal
connections to the forebrain including the ventromedial
frontal, rostral insular, rostral temporal cortex, medial
thalamus, and the ventromedial basal ganglia allow the
amygdala, mostly the BLA, to influence goal-directed
behavior (Blair et al., 2005).
It is necessary to first understand the learning
functions of the amygdala, which will be used to explain
amygdala dysfunction found in individuals with psychopathy.
The amygdala permits three conditioned stimulus
associations to be formed (Everitt et al., 2003). These
associations include conditioned stimulus (CS) –
unconditioned response (UR) associations, conditioned
stimulus (CS) - affect representation associations (i.e.
fear or the expectation of reward), and conditioned
stimulus (CS) – valenced sensory properties of the
unconditioned stimulus (US) associations (Everitt et al.,
2003). The amygdala is necessary for the formation of the
CS-UR and CS-reinforcement associations, but not the CS-CR
associations (Blair et al., 2005). Evidence suggests that
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individuals with psychopathy demonstrate impairment in the
formation of the CS-UR and CS-reinforcement associations,
as they are the configurations in which the amygdala is
essential (Blair et al., 2005).
The amygdala is involved in many processes that when
impaired yield the functional impairments demonstrated in
individuals with psychopathy (Blair, 2003). The first
process is the expression of basic emotional reactions for
which there are three types of evidence for amygdala
dysfunction in individuals with psychopathy (Blair et al.,
2005). First, amygdala dysfunction has been evidenced
through impaired aversive conditioning tasks in individuals
with psychopathy (Flor et al., 2002; Hare, 1970).
Individuals with psychopathy when compared to controls fail
to exhibit a conditioned skin conductance response to
typically aversive stimuli (Flor et al., 2002). Blair and
colleagues (2005) argue that although it is not yet
understood if this is evidence of an impaired CS-UR or CSaffect representation association, either implicates
amygdala dysfunction. Blair and colleagues (2005) cite that
recent neuro-imaging completed by Veit and colleagues
(2002) demonstrates reduced amygdala activity during
aversive conditioning tasks in individuals with
psychopathy.
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Second, data suggests that the amygdala is involved in
modulating startle responses by conditioned stimuli (CS)
(Angrilli et al., 1996; Davis, 2000). Startle responses
have been related to anxiety levels in both animals and
humans (Davis, 2000). Everitt and colleagues (2003) suggest
that a visual prime CS can increase the brainstem neuron
activity which would intercede in the startle reflex
through the CeN by means of the BLA as a result of a CSaffect representation. Research argues that dysfunction in
either the BLA or CeN would induce a reduced escalation of
the startle reflex by visual primes seen by those with
psychopathy (Leventon et al., 2000; Pastor et al., 2003;
Patrick et al., 1993).
Third, the amygdala is involved in the activation of
autonomic responding (Blair et al., 2005). Individuals with
psychopathy demonstrate appropriate skin conductance
responses to visual threats; however, display reduced skin
conductance responses to facial expressions of sadness
(Blair, 1999; Blair et al,. 1997), imagined threat scenes
(Patrick et al., 1994), anticipated threat (Hare 1982), and
emotionally evocative sounds (Verona et al., 2004). Blair
and colleagues (2005) argue that individuals with
psychopathy must demonstrate impairment in skin conductance
responses when they are related to the amygdala due to the
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fact that visual threats have been shown to be more
disrupted in individuals with orbital frontal cortex
lesions than the amygdala (Tranel and Damasio, 1994).
The second process the amygdala is related to is
stimulus selection or attention (Blair et al., 2005).
Attention is the consequence of competition for neural
representation between multiple stimuli (Desimone & Duncan,
1995; Duncan, 1998). Attention is given to the stimuli that
win the competition through both top-down influences such
as directed attention and bottom-up sensory processes
including stimulus salience (Desimone & Duncan, 1995;
Duncan, 1998). Research demonstrates that the amygdala
augments attention to emotional information as compared to
neutral information (Anderson & Phelps, 2001). Basically,
reciprocal connections from affect representation and CS
representations should bring about improved performance if
the CS is the target stimulus for goal-directed behavior
and impaired performance if the CS distracts from goaldirected behavior (Blair et al., 2005). This process is
found in healthy individuals on tasks requiring
identification of emotional words; however, individuals
with psychopathy demonstrate reduced reaction times to
emotional words as well as evoked related potential
differences between neutral and emotional words (Day &
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Wong, 1996; Lorenz & Newman, 2002; Williamson et al.,
1991).
The amygdala, specifically the BLA, is involved in
instrumental learning which occurs in individuals learning
to perform an action to a stimulus if the action results in
reward and to withhold performing an action to a stimulus
if the action results in punishment (Blair, 2006; Blair et
al., 2005). Some instrumental learning tasks involve the
formation of CS-affect representation and CS-valenced
sensory properties of stimulus associations such as passive
avoidance learning tasks (Blair et al., 2005). Passive
avoidance tasks require participants to learn to respond to
good stimuli and avoid responding to bad stimuli (Blair,
2006; Blair et al., 2005). When individuals form positive
CS-affect associations they will respond to the stimulus;
conversely, negative CS-affect associations result in the
participant avoiding the stimulus (Blair et al., 2005).
Individuals with psychopathy demonstrate impaired
performance on these tasks, displaying difficulty in
forming negative CS-affect associations (Blair et al.,
2004; Newman & Kosson, 1986; Newman & Schmitt, 1998). Other
instrumental learning tasks involve stimulus-response
associations, which are not linked to the amygdala,
including object discrimination and conditional learning
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tasks (Blair et al., 2005). Individuals with psychopathy do
not demonstrate impaired performance on these tasks, which
is expected due to the fact that they are not related to
amygdala functioning (Blair et al., 2005).
Finally, the amygdala is implicated in the development
of moral socialization (Blair et al., 2005). Socialization
occurs through a process in which caregivers and others
reinforce behaviors that are desired and punish behaviors
that should be discouraged (Blair et al., 2005). This
process occurs through aversive conditioning and
instrumental learning, notably two tasks for which
individuals with psychopathy demonstrate impairment (Blair
et al., 2005). The US or punisher most often present when
antisocial behavior occurs, especially during childhood, is
the distress of the victim (Blair et al., 2005). Therefore,
sadness and fearfulness of a victim acts as a US which
elicits aversive conditioning and instrumental learning
(Blair et al., 2005). Negative actions then must be
associated with an aversive unconditioned stimulus such as
the distress of the victim in order to learn not to commit
the negative actions (Blair et al., 2005). Additionally,
learning avoidance of engaging in moral transgressions
entails either personally committing or witnessing another
commit a moral transgression and subsequently be punished
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by the aversive response, namely the victim’s distress
(Blair et al., 2005). Individuals with psychopathy
demonstrate significant impairment in processing sad and
fearful expressions, exhibiting reduced autonomic responses
to these expressions (Aniskiewicz, 1979; Blair et al.,
1997). Children with psychopathic traits, in particular,
demonstrate an impaired ability to recognize sad and
fearful expressions (Blair et al., 2001).
Appropriate moral socialization, evidenced through an
understanding of the distinction between moral (victimbased) and conventional (social disorder-based)
transgressions, can be demonstrated in children as early as
3.5 years old (Smetana, 1993; Turiel et al., 1987).
Typically developing children are best able to distinguish
between moral and conventional transgressions when they are
to imagine situations in which no rules prohibit the
offenses (Blair et al., 2005). Both adults with psychopathy
and children demonstrating psychopathic traits are least
likely to exhibit the ability to discriminate under the no
rules condition (Blair, 1995; Blair et al., 1997). Adults
with psychopathy also show less understanding of situations
that are likely to generate guilt; although, they do
demonstrate comprehension of emotions such as happiness,
sadness, and embarrassment (Blair, 1995). The amygdala
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responds to fear and sadness of victims, permitting the
formation of moral transgression-victims’ distress
associations (Blair et al., 2005). Individuals who
demonstrate decreased fearfulness due to amygdala
dysfunction, such as individuals with psychopathy, would
not find the distress of others aversive and thus will have
decreased ability to socialize (Wootton et al., 1997). The
above research concerning various brain regions, especially
the amygdala, and hypotheses demonstrate that there is much
support for the neurologically based theory when examining
individuals with psychopathy.
Cognitive theory. Another perspective to consider when
examining the psychopathic personality is cognitive
theories. Cognitive theories focus on the concept of an
independent self, decision making and thinking, the stored
repertoires that have been learned during early
development, and the extent to which children are
influenced by immediate gratification as opposed to longterm consequences (Farrington, 2005).
Kegan (1986) used the work of Piaget and Kohlberg to
explain how psychopathy reflects a failure of cognitive
development. Prior to adolescence, a child possesses a
concept of an independent self and is capable of
recognizing others’ needs and take their role but are
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unable to coordinate his/her own needs and feelings with
those of another (Kegan, 1986). Right actions meet one’s
own needs and the child fails to experience guilt as
internal self-punishment (Kegan, 1986). Kegan (1986)
suggests within this preadolescent stage, which corresponds
with Piaget’s concrete operational stage and Kohlberg’s
preconventional stage, individuals with psychopathy have a
developmental delay. During this stage, moral and selfserving values are not differentiated (Kegan, 1986). The
disturbance in typical developmental growth, according to
Kegan (1986), results from a lack of familial and peer
group support for development beyond this stage. This
theory appears to limit its explanation of psychopathy in
that it is uncertain whether lower moral development could
be completely responsible for the prominent psychopathic
characteristics (Blackburn, 2006).
Beck’s (1976) theory views psychopathy as cognitive
distortion which closely relates to Lazarus’s (1991) more
recent theory that suggests cognitive appraisal of the
situation determines both the arousal and experience of
emotion. During a rapid, preconscious appraisal process,
evaluation of the situation for meaning occurs, defined by
the relation of the situation to the individual’s personal
beliefs or expectations and goals (Lazarus, 1991). Beck
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(1976) argues for specific emotions as the consequence of
definite cognitive appraisal about the influence of events
on one’s personal domain or schema. Specifically, the
psychopath, views the self as a strong, autonomous loner,
who possesses core beliefs to look out for oneself, avoid
victimization by being the aggressor, and break social
rules because they are entitled to while others are viewed
as exploitative and deserve exploitation in return or as
weak and vulnerable to be preyed upon (Beck, 1976). These
attributes are mediated by dysfunctional schemas concerning
the self, the world, and the future that continue to be
maintained through selective, confirmatory experiences
(Beck, 1976).
Newman and colleagues’ (Gorenstein, 1991; Gorenstein &
Newman, 1980; Newman, 1998; Patterson & Newman, 1993)
response modulation theory focuses on the impulsivity and
lack of restraint characteristics of the psychopath and
argues that cognitive processing deficits impair
individuals with psychopathy from accommodating the meaning
of contextual cues when involved in goal-directed
behaviors. Response set modulation consists of a system
that uses automatic attentional processes to initiate selfregulation (Vitale et al., 2005) or a relatively automatic
shift of attention from the execution of a dominant
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response to relevant secondary and/or contextual cues that
might be used to modify ongoing response (Newman, 1998).
Failure in response set modulation results in disinhibited
behaviors, including passive avoidance tasks (Vitale et
al., 2005). Individuals with psychopathy demonstrate
difficulty in response set modulation in terms of passive
avoidance tasks (Farrington, 2005). In particular,
individuals with psychopathy display impairment in their
abilities to avoid tasks for which they are punished for
(Farrington, 2005).
The Dysfunctional Fear Hypothesis assumes that moral
socialization is achieved through the use of punishment
(Eysenck & Gudjonsson, 1989; Trasler, 1978). According to
moral socialization, a healthy individual is frightened by
punishment and associates fear with an action that resulted
in punishment, making it less likely to engage in the
action in future (Eysenck & Gudjonsson, 1989; Trasler,
1978). Because of less aversive arousal to punishment,
individuals with psychopathy create weaker cognitive
associations and thus are more likely to engage in the
punished action in the future (Eysenck & Gudjonsson, 1989;
Trasler, 1978).
The Behavior Inhibition System (BIS), a unitary fear
system, generates autonomic responses to punished stimuli
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(through classical conditioning) and inhibits responding
following punishment (through instrumental conditioning)
(Blair et al., 2005). The problem with the both BIS and
DFH, according to Blair and colleagues (2005) is the claim
that a unitary fear system exists; however, research
strongly suggests that this is not the case. No single fear
system exists but rather there is a series of partially
separable neural systems engaged in the specific forms of
processing that are subsumed under the term fear (Blair et
al., 2005). Additionally, fear theories may not predict the
very high level of antisocial behavior shown by individuals
with psychopathy (Blair et al., 2005).
The Violence Inhibition Mechanism model is another
cognitive theory. The activation of this system by distress
cues, such as sad and fearful expressions of others,
results in increased autonomic activity, attention, and
activation of the brainstem threat response system, often
resulting in a freezing response (Blair et al., 2005;
Blair, 2001; Blair, 1995). Many social animals find the
distress experiences of conspecifics (organisms belonging
to the same species of another organism) aversive and will
make instrumental responses to terminate unpleasant
occurrences to similar species (Blair et al., 2005). Most
humans are also predisposed to find the distress of
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conspecifics (other human species) aversive and are
punished by signals of another human’s sadness or fear,
which reduces the probability of an individual engaging in
such actions (Blair, 1995; Blair et al., 1997). According
to the VIM, moral socialization occurs via the pairing of
the activation of the mechanism to distress cues and the
acts which caused the distress cues, such as moral
transgressions (Blair, 2001). Classical conditioning then
establishes the representations of moral transgressions as
the triggers to the violence inhibition mechanism (Blair,
2001). Blair (2001) suggests that dysfunction exists in the
mechanism of individuals with psychopathy in that the
representations of harm do not become triggers for the VIM,
hypothesizing the signal to the learning systems
responsible for emotionally aversive stimuli is not
activated (Blair, 2001). Basically, the unconditioned
stimulus signal is weakened impairing the ability to form
the unconditioned stimulus – conditioned stimulus
associations (Blair, 2001). The sad or fearful facial
expressions of others do not pair with the triggering of
the violence inhibition mechanism. The VIM offers another
perspective from which to understand individuals with
psychopathy.
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Current Study Theory
The current study recognizes that one theory will not
explain the development of individuals with psychopathy and
that many theories explain facets of the psychopathic
personality disorder in viable and significant methods. The
current study draws from the personality, developmental,
and cognitive perspectives of psychopathy. It is the
position of this paper that individuals with psychopathy
are born with a predisposition and temperament that
interacts with it’s environment in a way that typical moral
socialization processes including empathy development are
impaired, which further damages the individuals ability to
continue through the development processes of learning
positive interactions and cognitive processes thus
influences future decision making and actions. The
individual begins a cycle of reinforcement of negative
behaviors and cognitions through the person’s lack of
empathy and inaccurate evaluations of the consequences of
his or her negative behaviors.
Specific Components of Psychopathy in Children
Factor analyses demonstrate the emergence of two
psychopathic factors in a sample of 160 clinic-referred
children (Frick et al., 1994) and three (Frick et al.,
2000) dimensions of psychopathy in a community sample of
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1,136 elementary school-age. The three factors in the
community sample included callous-unemotional traits,
narcissistic traits, and impulsive behaviors (Frick et al.,
2000). While the clinic-referred sample also demonstrated
callous-unemotional traits, less evidence surfaced for a
discrepancy between the narcissism and impulsivity
dimensions (Frick, et al., 1994). The factors found to be
most related to psychopathic traits in adults and in
children included the impulsivity/conduct problems factor
and the callous-unemotional factor (Frick et al., 1994).
Other studies have also shown that in both clinic-referred
children (Christian et al., 1997) and adjudicated
adolescents (Caputo, Frick, & Brodsky, 1999), the
narcissism and impulsivity dimension do not differentiate
within severely antisocial youth. Due to the inconsistency
in findings concerning the dimensions of psychopathy in
youth, the current study utilizes the three-factor model
identified by Frick and colleagues (2000) including the
impulsivity/conduct problems, callous-unemotional traits,
and narcissism traits in order to further identify
psychopathic characteristics in a sample of aggressive
community youth.
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Impulsivity/Conduct Problems
The behaviors associated with psychopathy include
impulsivity and antisocial behaviors and relate to Factor 2
in Hare’s two-factor model of psychopathy (Hare, 1993). In
children, factor analysis reveals the impulsivity/conduct
problems factor includes impulsivity, poor impulse control,
and delinquent behaviors (Frick et al., 1994). The
understanding of impulsivity suffers from poor
operationalizing and measurement of the construct (Loeber
et al., 2001). The Pittsburgh Youth Study attempted to
improve both of these areas with a multisource and
multimethod approach to impulsivity (Loeber et al., 2001).
The study found that impulsivity does not exist as a
unidimensional construct and can be broken down into two
correlated but distinct types, cognitive impulsivity and
behavioral impulsivity (Loeber et al., 2001). Behavioral
impulsivity includes a lack of behavioral control,
disinhibited, and undercontrolled behavior (Loeber et al.,
2001). Cognitive impulsivity consists of effortful and
planful cognitive performance, specifically, mental control
and mental effort to change adaptively between mental sets
(Loeber et al., 2001). Loeber and colleagues (2001) found
both types of impulsivities to be significantly and
positively related to conduct problems in adolescents, with
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behavioral impulsivity having a stronger relationship with
conduct problems. Cognitive and behavioral impulsivity
accounts for 16% of conduct problems when controlling for
both IQ and SES (Loeber et al., 2001). Loeber and
colleagues (2001) argue that the relation between
behavioral impulsivity and conduct problems implies that
children with poor self-control may be more likely to
display externalizing behaviors. Subsequently, behaviorally
undercontrolled individuals may steal and fight on the spur
of the moment when the rewards associated with a behavior
appear large and the potential of negative consequences in
the future seem small (Loeber et al., 2001).
Another view of impulsivity includes its relation to a
deficit in the section of the brain associated with
executive functioning. It has been hypothesized that
psychopathic behavior may be a result of underactivity in
the neurobiological system that is receptive to cues of
punishment and “frustrative reward” (Loney, Frick,
Clements, Ellis, & Kerlin, 2003). Interestingly, children
with psychopathic traits demonstrate behavioral and
neurocognitive profiles similar to those of adults (Viding,
2004). Researcher demonstrates psychopaths’ executive
functions of the brain to be impaired (Gorenstein, 1982).
These functions control an individual’s ability to plan,
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sustain attention, concentrate, and inhibit inappropriate
or impulsive behaviors (Gorenstein, 1982), which may offer
insight into the development of the impulsivity/conduct
problem facet of the psychopathic personality.
Antisocial behaviors or conduct problems encompass the
second component of Factor 2 (impulsivity/conduct problems)
in children with psychopathic traits (Frick et al., 1994).
Conduct problems include such behaviors as aggressive
conduct that causes harm or threatens physical harm to
others, nonaggressive behaviors that causes property loss
or damage, serious violations of rules, bullying,
threatening, intimidating, frequent physical fights,
physical cruelty to people, mugging, armed robbery, etc.
(DSM-IV; APA, 1994). Conduct problems do not distinguish
individuals with psychopathy from other individuals
demonstrating antisocial behavior, except that individuals
with psychopathy evidence greater patterns of proactive or
instrumental aggression as discussed earlier in this
chapter (Cornell et al., 1996).
Symptoms of both ADHD (not including the inattentive
type) and Conduct Disorder include those of impulsivity and
antisocial behaviors, which are the basis for defining
Factor 2 psychopathy in youth. The impulsivity related to
externalizing disorders includes a difficulty in inhibiting
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activated responses and acting without considering
consequences (Fowles & Dindo, 2006). Researchers argue that
the combination of early-onset Oppositional Defiant
Disorder or Conduct Disorder, hyperactivity or ADHD (not
including inattentive type) and neuropsychological deficits
often develops into adult psychopathy (Lynam, 1998;
Moffitt, 1993; Moffitt & Caspi, 2001; Moffitt & Lynam,
1994).
Callous/Unemotional Trait
The second component of psychopathy consists of the
personality dimension, which corresponds with Factor 1 of
Hare’s two factor model. The main trait associated with
psychopathy in children is the callous-unemotional (CU)
factor (Frick et al., 1994). According to factor analysis,
the callous-unemotional factor includes components such as
a lack of guilt, lack of empathy, and superficial charm
(Frick et al., 1994). Antisocial youth in juvenile forensic
facilities (Caputo et al., 1999), outpatient mental health
clinics (Christian et al., 1997; Frick et al., 1994), and
in school-based samples (Frick et al., 2003) who
demonstrate elevated levels of the CU factor appear to
display a particularly severe, aggressive, and stable
pattern of conduct problems (Frick & Marsee, 2006).
Specifically, clinic-referred children with conduct problem
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diagnoses demonstrated a more severe and varied pattern of
conduct problems when evidencing elevated CU traits
compared to clinic-referred children with conduct problems
who did not demonstrate elevated levels of CU traits
(Christian et al., 1997). Nonreferred community children
with both conduct problems and CU traits showed more
aggression overall and were more likely to demonstrate
proactive and instrumental patterns of aggression than
children with conduct problems, not evidencing CU traits
(Frick et al., 2003).
A longitudinal study demonstrated that children who
exhibit both CU traits and conduct problems have a greater
number and variety of conduct problems after one year than
those children with only conduct problems (Frick, Cornell,
Barry, Bodin, & Dane, 2003a). The children with CU traits
and conduct problems demonstrated higher levels of selfreported delinquency and aggression, particularly proactive
aggression (Frick et al., 2003a). Children with both
conduct problems and CU traits exhibit significantly more
conduct problems and a greater variety of conduct problems
than those children with conduct problems alone (Christian
et al., 1997). The children that exhibit both conduct
problems and CU traits also tend to engage in more thrillseeking behavior, are less sensitive to punishment cues
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when there is the possibility of reward, and react less to
threatening and emotionally distressing stimuli than
children without CU traits (Frick et al., 2003a).
In order to fully understand the callous-unemotional
traits in children exhibiting psychopathic characteristics,
it is vital to investigate the models explaining how this
trait develops. There are multiple explanations of the
preference for novel and dangerous activities, lack of
emotional responsiveness to negative emotional material,
and lack of sensitivity to cues to punishment found in the
CU trait (Frick & Marsee, 2006) including low fearfulness
(Rothbart & Bates, 1998), low behavioral inhibition (Kagan
& Snidman, 1991), low harm avoidance (Cloninger, 1987), or
high daring (Lahey & Waldman, 2003); however, these
explanations, seem to bypass the basic developmental
process underlying their theories: empathy development.
Empathy has been defined in various ways including
simply cognitive, simply affective, and a combination of
cognitive and affective factors. Cognitively, empathy
includes an ability to understand the affective and
cognitive state of another individual (Borke, 1971; 1973).
The individual is aware of and understands another person’s
feelings and can discern another’s thoughts (Borke, 1971;
1973). The affective definition states that empathy is a
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vicarious matching of an emotional response, feeling the
same emotions of another and feeling sympathetic or
compassionate toward another (Feshbach & Roe, 1968). The
combination of the cognitive and affective definition is
conceptualized as: (a) the interaction between an awareness
of another’s feelings, thoughts, and intentions and the
vicarious response of others (Hoffman, 1977), (b) a process
that causes a person to have feelings that are more
congruent with another’s situation than with his/her own
(Hoffman, 2000), and (c) the individual’s emotional
response that stems from another’s emotional state that is
congruent with the other individual’s emotional
state/situation; the empathic reaction can be a response to
an overt cue of another’s emotional state such as a facial
expression or an indirect cue such as the features of
another’s situation (Eisenberg & Strayer, 1987).
There are a number of ways to describe emotional
development. The following description outlines how empathy
develops when examining empathy through the affective
definition. From this perspective there are four steps to
empathy development (Hoffman, 1984), beginning with
emotional expression or the intensity of the experienced
and displayed emotion (Hoffman, 1984). Positive affect or
emotional expression leads to appropriate behavior whereas
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negative affect (fear, sad, etc) leads to less favorable
behavior (Hoffman, 1984). Increased levels of negative
affect can affect an individual’s empathetic response with
decreased levels of emotional expression relating to low
levels of empathy and moderate levels of emotional
expressivity relating to greater empathetic responding
(Hoffman, 1984). The second phase in affective empathy
development is emotional insight, defined as the
recognition that one’s own emotions directly influence the
ability to display empathy (Hoffman, 1984). During this
phase, an increased level of accuracy in the reflection of
others develops when the other people respond positively to
a child’s emotions (Hoffman, 1984). This stage focuses on
self introspection concerning one’s own emotions than
examining others. The third step of role-taking contributes
directly to an individual’s ability to understand someone
else’s emotions (Hoffman, 1984). This ability should have a
positive impact on empathy development, increasing the
individual’s empathetic responding (Hoffman, 1984). Roletaking influences a person’s prosocial behavior in that it
augments empathy rather than directly motivating prosocial
behavior (Hoffman, 1984). Emotion regulation comprises the
final phase of affective empathy development (Hoffman,
1984). Emotional regulation determines whether a response
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leads to sympathy or distress in an individual (Hoffman,
2005). Sympathy allows a person to feel sorrow or concern
for another based on the perception of another’s emotional
state (Hoffman, 1984). Personal distress consists of a
self-focused aversive emotional response that results from
apprehension of another’s emotional state (Hoffman, 1984).
Examples of an emotional response include a raised brow,
licking one’s lips, touching one’s face, and increased
heart rate (Hoffman, 1984).
Research demonstrates aggressive and antisocial
behavior correlates with dysfunctional parenting and low
intelligence more strongly for aggressive children without
CU traits than those with CU traits (Loney, Frick, Elis &
McCoy, 1998; Wootton et al., 1997). This difference between
aggressive children with and without CU traits may lend
support to the argument that a different developmental
pathway or process underlies their aggressive and
antisocial behavior (Frick, Cornell, Bodin, Dane, Barry, &
Loney, 2003b). Consequently then these studies indicate
that children who are aggressive and antisocial that do not
exhibit CU traits may have difficulty regulating their
behaviors and emotions related to high levels of emotional
reactivity (Frick et al., 2003b). Poor emotional regulation
can result from a number of factors such as poor
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socialization, low intelligence which may make it more
difficult to delay gratification and anticipate
consequences, or problems with response inhibition due to
temperamental troubles (Frick et al., 2003b). Emotional
regulation difficulties can lead to impulsive and
aggressive acts that the child has difficulty controlling
but for which he or she does show remorse for afterward
(Frick et al., 2003b). Children who exhibit CU traits lack
the remorse for their actions that children who are
aggressive but without CU traits are capable of
demonstrating.
Frick and colleagues (2003b) examined children from
the community who demonstrated conduct problems with and
without the presence of CU traits and their relationship
with emotional and behavioral dysregulation. They found
that children with conduct problems excluding CU traits
demonstrated evidence of emotional and behavioral
regulation (Frick et al., 2003b). The children who
exhibited both conduct problems and CU traits scored the
highest on measures of impulsivity-hyperactivity, which the
researchers termed behavioral dysregulation (Frick et al.,
2003b). These same children also demonstrated a lack of
behavioral inhibition in that they showed a preference for
novel and dangerous activities and a decreased sensitivity
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to punishment cues when a reward response set was
formulated (Frick et al., 2003b). This study claimed to be
the first to show that children demonstrating CU traits
without conduct problems also exhibited characteristics
associated with behavioral inhibition, specifically in
terms of the reward dominant response style (Frick et al.,
2003b). Frick and colleagues (2003b) suggested that this
finding may indicate that the connection between CU traits
and low behavioral inhibition may not be unique to a
certain crowd of severely antisocial children.
Interestingly, this study concluded the combination of
emotional and behavioral dysregulation and conduct problems
did not designate children as similar to adult psychopaths
(Frick et al., 2003b). However, the presence of CU traits
joined with emotional and behavioral inhibition and conduct
problems distinguished a group of children sharing
characteristics most similar to the adult psychopath (Frick
et al., 2003b). The researchers only found an association
between CU traits and low emotional reactivity in young
children (Frick et al., 2003b). They offered several
explanations for this finding. First, older children with
conduct problems may be more heterogeneous regarding the
developmental process which led them to demonstrate
antisocial behaviors including age of onset (Frick et al.,
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2003b). Second, it is possible that a deficit in behavioral
inhibition exists that may be related to a cognitive
deficit in children with CU traits where they have
difficulty shifting their goal-oriented response set (Frick
et al., 2003b).
Cognitive empathy involves the individual’s awareness
that an event is happening to another person, an
examination of the causal attributions of an event, and the
impact that has on another person (Hoffman, 1984). There
are 3 developmental stages to cognitive empathy development
(Hoffman, 1984). During the first stage of person
permanence, children become aware of another person’s
physical existence as completely separate from the self
(Hoffman, 1984). At approximately six months of age,
children internally reproduce images of objects (Hoffman,
1984). By eighteen months, object permanence develops and
by one year of age, children can keep a mental image of
another person in their head (Hoffman, 1984). The second
stage is perspective taking during which a child is able to
understand the internal states of others with increased
complexity (Hoffman, 1977, 2000). At approximately two or
three years old, children begin to sense that they are
physically distinct from others and are capable of
attributing simple internal states to others (Hoffman,
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1984). The final phase of cognitive empathy development
occurs around three years of age (Hoffman, 1984). During
this time, children are able to put themselves into another
person’s shoes, demonstrating the ability to put themselves
in another person’s place and imagine how he/she feels
(Hoffman, 1984).
The CU factor specifically states that individuals
with psychopathy demonstrate a lack of empathy; it is
unknown at this point exactly how empathy development
becomes impaired. Research demonstrates individuals with
psychopathy demonstrate detached patterns of social
interaction and poor ability to identify emotions in others
(Soderstrom et al., 2002). Many models have attempted to
address the CU trait including previously mentioned
amygdala dysfunction, the dysfunctional fear hypothesis,
and the violence inhibition mechanism (Blair, Mitchell, &
Blair, 2005). One model suggests a connection between the
elements of the CU trait and lower scores on measures of
conscience development (Asendorpf & Nunner-Winkler, 1992;
Kochanska, 2002). This model leads theorists to suggest
that a temperamental style including the lack of emotional
responsiveness to negative stimuli, preference for novel
and dangerous activities, and the lack of sensitivity to
cues to punishment may be involved with conscience
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development (Frick & Morris, 2004). Research suggests that
low behavioral inhibition in children may place the child
at risk for poor conscience development in that the child
may demonstrate deficiency in the early signs of empathetic
concern involving emotional arousal brought about by the
misfortune of others (Loney et al., 2003). The child then
could be insensitive to forbiddance or approval of parents
or other caregivers (Loney et al., 2003). Possibly
resulting in the child developing an interpersonal style
concentrated on the potential rewards contained in
aggressive or antisocial acts toward others with the
disregard for the prospective harm to himself/herself or
others (Loney et al., 2003).
Kochanska and colleagues (1993, 1995, 1997; Kochanska,
2002) proposed a specific model focusing on emotional
arousal as a vital component to conscience development.
This model suggests an optimal arousal for moral
socialization is achieved through interactions of the
child’s temperament and parenting received (Kochanska,
2002). Studies demonstrate that children with fearfulness
obtain higher scores on conscience development measures if
they had experienced gentle, consistent, and nonpower
assertive parenting; conversely, children displaying
fearlessness did not obtain improved scores on measures of
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conscience development when they experienced the same type
of parenting (Kochanska, 2002). Another model suggests that
the development of a negative arousal to punishment is
dependent on the development of moral socialization and
internalizing parental and societal norms (Kagan, 1998).
Children with such temperaments that do not associate guilt
or anxiety with anticipated or actual wrongdoing will
experience a lack of anxiety which would typically inhibit
their negative behavioral response (Kagan, 1998).
Research suggests that adults with psychopathic traits
demonstrate difficulty processing emotional stimuli
(Patrick, 1994). This finding extends to adolescents as
well (Loney et al., 2003). Specifically, children
exhibiting antisocial behavior and CU traits did not
process affective stimuli similarly to those children
evidencing only antisocial behavior (Loney et al., 2003).
The adolescents with CU traits demonstrated a lack of
facilitation to emotional words, which the researchers
suggest implies a diminished reactivity to emotional
stimuli in comparison to their peers with antisocial
behaviors alone (Loney et al., 2003). This implies that
children with both conduct problems and CU traits may
display temperamental styles that have low emotional
reactivity to aversive stimuli which can be identified
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through physiological underactivity and poor responsiveness
to punishment cues (Kagan & Snidman, 1991). Research
demonstrates that antisocial and delinquent youth who also
exhibit CU traits are less distressed by their behaviors’
negative effects on others, have more impaired empathetic
concern and moral reasoning, expect more instrumental gain
from their negative behaviors, and are more predatory in
their violence than antisocial youth who do not display CU
traits (Pardini et al., 2003). Aggressive children without
CU traits tend to be highly reactive to emotional and
threatening stimuli (Loney et al., 2003) and tend to react
more strongly in social situations when provoked (Pardini
et al., 2003).
Although many different perspectives have attempted to
explain the CU trait found in individuals with psychopathy,
there appears to be general agreement that low levels of
fearful inhibitions can impair empathy development, moral
socialization, and the development of conscience (Frick &
Marsee, 2006). These theories have been demonstrated in
research examining children who exhibit both conduct
problems and CU traits (Frick & Marsee, 2006). For example,
children with CU traits and conduct problems compared to
children with only conduct problems tend to be less
responsive to typical parental socialization practices
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(Oxford, Cavell, & Hughes, 2003; Wootton et al., 1997), are
less distressed by the negative effects of their behaviors
on others (Blair, 1999; Frick et al., 1999; Pardini et al.,
2003), are more impaired in moral reasoning and empathic
concern for others (Blair, 1999; Pardini et al., 2003), and
are less able to recognize facial and vocal expressions of
sadness of other children (Blair et al., 2001).
Narcissism
A third characteristic thought to be associated with
the psychopathic personality is narcissism. As stated
previously, this characteristic has been evidenced in a
community sample of youth evidencing psychopathic traits
(Frick et al., 2000) and less so in clinic-referred samples
demonstrating psychopathic traits (Frick et al., 1994).
Although this characteristic has appeared in these samples,
research has not focused on it as a main characteristic but
has recognized the quality as a condition for a subtype of
psychopathy (Poythress & Skeem, 2006). Narcissistic
personality disorder regularly loads on the first factor of
psychopathy in adults (Harpur et al., 1989). Narcissistic
characteristics that are found on the first factor include
such traits as a grandiose sense of self-importance,
arrogant self-appraisal, lack of empathy, an unwillingness
to recognize or identify with feelings or needs of others,
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and interpersonal exploitation (Widiger, 2006). Although
similarities exist, there are a number of key differences
between the narcissistic personality disorder and
antisocial personality disorder, under which the DSM-IV
includes psychopathy (Widiger, 2006). First, those with a
narcissistic personality disorder are often more grandiose
while those with antisocial personality disorder are more
exploitative, have a superficial value system, and engage
in a recurrent pattern of antisocial behavior (Ronningstam,
1999). Further, the exploitiveness found in those with
antisocial personality disorder tends to be more of a
conscious choice related to material or sexual gain
compared to the more passive and self-image serving
tendency found in those with narcissistic personality
disorder (Ronningstam, 1999). One of the most important
differences to recognize is that those with a narcissistic
personality disorder demonstrate the ability to feel guilt
and remorse; whereas those with psychopathic
characteristics lack these emotions (Kernberg, 1998).
Possibly, instead of considering these two disorders as
separate or one in the same, they should be conceptualized
as disorders on a continuum (Kernberg, 1998), which may
explain why narcissistic characteristics are sometimes
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evidenced and sometimes vacant in children with
psychopathic traits.
To summarize, research has found evidence for the
extension of the adult conceptualization of the
psychopathic personality in children and more specifically
have identified two predominant characteristics found in
most samples of children including the impulsivity/conduct
problems trait and the callous/unemotional characteristic.
Multiple explanations have been offered to explain the
development of the psychopathic traits in children such as
temperament, poor parenting, amygdala dysfunction, and low
fearfulness. This paper offers a supplemental explanation
for the development of psychopathic characteristics, in
particular that social-information/cognitive processing
deficits relates to the development and/or maintenance of
the psychopathic characteristics.
Social-Cognitive Processes
The Center for Disease Control (2005) identified
social cognitive deficits as a risk factor for increasing
the probability of violence during adolescence and young
adulthood. Social cognitive processes are defined as the
mechanisms that lead to social behaviors that are the basis
of social adjustment evaluations made by others (Crick &
Dodge, 1994). Researchers argue that examining social
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cognitions of children will help explain the construct of
psychopathy in youth. That is, impaired social cognition
offers a possible explanation for the evidence of
persistent conduct problems of children with significant
psychopathic, or in terms consistent with Frick and
colleagues’ (1994) work, callous/unemotional (CU) traits.
Pardini et al., (2003) demonstrated children high on CU
traits had significant difficulty in modifying their social
cognitions for goal-driven behavior when punished.
Specifically, they concluded this group of children may
have trouble considering the probability of various
outcomes, particularly when outcomes are negative, of their
antisocial behavior (Pardini et al., 2003). Further, some
research shows individuals with significant psychopathic
traits demonstrate adequate intellect (e.g., cognitive
abilities) (Loney et al., 1998; Newman & Wallace, 1993),
are free from symptoms of a thought disorder yet frequently
fail to utilize good judgment in decision-making (Newman &
Wallace, 1993). Second, research consistently finds errors
made in social-information processing in the development
and maintenance of delinquent behavior in antisocial
children who are not evidencing psychopathy (Dodge,
Lochman, Harnish, Bates, & Pettit, 1997). Thus, a more
complete understanding of the factors shown to be
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associated with psychopathy traits in youth is needed.
Specifically how each factor (callous/unemotional,
impulsivity and conduct problems, and narcissism) is
related to social-information processing is underdeveloped.
The following is a discussion of Crick and Dodge’s
(1994) popular social cognitive process and research
examining the connection between the processes and
individuals demonstrating aggressive and psychopathic
characteristics. Crick and Dodge (1994) have developed a
five step social cognitive process. The five steps
including encoding, interpretation of cues, clarification
of goals, response access or construction, and finally,
response decision (Crick & Dodge, 1994).
Steps 1 and 2
In steps one and two, encoding and interpretation of
cues, social cues and schemas play an integral role. During
these steps, children develop a mental representation of
the social situation confronting them (Crick & Dodge,
1994). They focus on particular cues in a situation, encode
the cues, and then interpret them (Crick & Dodge, 1994).
Any relevant knowledge from past experiences is recalled
from memory and used as a guide for interpreting and
understanding the present situation (Crick & Dodge. 1994).
Children utilize schemata, which are memory structures that
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organize information in a way that facilitates
comprehension (Gerrig, 1988). Research demonstrates that
individuals who are confronted with overwhelming stimulus
information often relay on cognitive heuristics in order to
simplify the cognitive tasks involved in processing that
information (Crick & Dodge, 1994). Although the
simplification process may make processing more efficient,
it can also result in judgment and reasoning errors
(Kahneman & Tversky, 1973). Perhaps for some children, the
reliance on particular heuristics or schemata contributes
to the display of problematic behavior and resulting social
maladjustment (Crick & Dodge, 1994).
Tomlin (1987) showed that aggressive children are more
likely than non-aggressive kids to base interpretations on
their schemata (information that was not a part of the
social stimuli presented). There exists a higher
probability that aggressive children base their
interpretations on social cues that occurred at the end of
the social interaction and were less likely to recall cues
that occurred at the beginning of the interaction (Tomlin,
1987). Gouze (1987) found that aggressive boys attended to
more aggressive social cues than non aggressive boys. Dodge
and Newman (1981) found that aggressive boys used less
social cues of any type than peers. Theories drawn from
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these findings include: 1) maladjusted children have memory
deficits that don’t allow them to store or recall presented
social information adequately; 2) maladjusted children may
selectively attend to particular social cues; 3) may have
well-developed schemata for social interaction that
interfere with ability/motivation to process and use
immediate social cues because they feel that they already
have it figured out so they do not need more info or
because the schema evoked strong emotional reaction that
preempted further processing of immediate cues (Crick &
Dodge, 1994).
It is important then to examine children’s causal
attributions to events when examining how they will process
the information during encoding and interpretation. Causal
attributions, defined as inferences made by individuals
about the reasons why specific social events have occurred
(Weiner & Graham, 1984), allow an individual to judge the
motivations for social events, which is necessary
information when attempting to understand or learn the
connections between actions and reactions in social
contexts (Crick & Dodge, 1994). Additionally, causal
attributions aid in goal construction and response access
and selection (Weiner & Graham, 1984). Research
demonstrates socially adjusted kids create attributions
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that lead to positive self-evaluations whereas maladjusted
kids are more likely to have external attribution for
positive social outcomes (Ames, Ames, & Garrison, 1977).
The external attributions may keep the maladjusted kids
from developing a positive social efficacy or competence
even when they experience social success (Crick & Dodge,
1994). However, research states that rejected children make
internal attributions (Crick & Dodge, 1994). Crick and
Dodge (1994) conclude that the evidence does not provide
enough support for the connection between attributional
styles and aggressive patterns.
Another vital aspect to steps one and two includes an
individual’s attributions of intent. Attributions of intent
initiate with children’s moral development, progressing
into their social and aggressive behavior (Crick & Dodge,
1994). Researchers hypothesize retaliatory aggressive
behavior with peers relates to hostile attributions of
peers intent, labeled “Hostile Attribution Bias” by Nasby,
Hayden, and DePaule in 1979 (Crick & Dodge, 1994). During
these interactions, aggressive behavior serves as a defense
or retaliation against an act by a peer that is seen as
intentionally harmful (Crick & Dodge, 1994). Several
studies found evidence of hostile attribution bias in
aggressive boys living in residential treatment centers

100

(Nasby, Hayden & DePaule, 1979), hyperactive-aggressive
children in outpatient clinics (Milich & Dodge, 1984),
school-based populations (McClaskey, 1988), incarcerated
adolescent boys with undersocialized conduct disorder
(Dodge, Price, Bachorowski, & Newman, 1990), and adolescent
offenders in jail for violent acts (Slaby & Guerra, 1988).
Crick and Dodge (1994) conclude it is likely hostile
attribution biases antecede aggressive behavior and peer
status but the reciprocal could be true as well (Crick &
Dodge, 1994).
During the encoding and interpretation steps, children
evaluate the accuracy of their outcome expectation and
self-efficacy predictions that they made during previous
interactions with peers (Crick & Dodge, 1994). Children may
compare the predicted outcome with the outcome that was
actually obtained (Crick & Dodge, 1994). These evaluations
may lead to the strengthening of the children’s initial
beliefs or the development of new beliefs (Crick & Dodge,
1994).
Step 3
Step three of the social cognitive process includes
the clarification of goals (Crick & Dodge, 1994). The goals
focus on arousal states that function as orientations
toward producing or wanting to produce specific outcomes
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(Crick & Dodge, 1994). Social situation goals may include
internal (feel happy, regulate negative feeling, etc.) or
external (first in line etc.) states or outcomes (Crick &
Dodge, 1994). Children bring goal orientations/tendencies
to peer situations but can revise goals and construct new
goals in response to the immediate social stimuli (Crick &
Dodge, 1994). Interpretations of the immediate social
stimuli or internal/external cues influence their goal
orientations (Crick & Dodge, 1994). Sources of goal
orientation include feelings, temperament, adult
instruction, cultural or subcultural norms, and media
(Crick & Dodge, 1994). Subsequent response accessing and
behavior also influence goal orientations (Crick & Dodge,
1994). Research demonstrates that children who construct or
pursue inappropriate goals are more likely to become
socially maladjusted (Dodge, Asher & Parkhurst, 1989).
Step 4
The fourth step of information processing, according
to Crick and Dodge’s (1994) model, is the response access
or construction phase. During this step, children access
behavioral responses from their long term memory. Some
responses consist of strategies for attaining the goal and
others are responses to social stimuli that are not clearly
goal driven (Crick & Dodge, 1994). Children’s choices for

102

social responses include their ideas about how they could
behavior in a specific social situation (Crick & Dodge,
1994).
Three aspects create children’ s response access 1)
the number of behaviors generated in response to social
stimuli (response repertoire) 2) the actual content of the
responses and 3) the order in which children access
particular types of responses (Crick & Dodge, 1994).
Children who demonstrate aggressive behaviors access a
fewer number of responses to social situations than peers
(Asarnow & Callan, 1985; Dodge et al., 1986). Additionally,
these children access responses that are more aggressive
and less prosocial than peers for provocation, group entry,
object acquisition, and friendship initiation situations
(Asarnow & Callan, 1985; Dodge et al., 1986). Research
shows, the response repertoires of aggressive kids are
maladaptive across a broad range of social contexts (Crick
& Dodge, 1994). Even when aggressive children can access an
initial prosocial response, subsequent responses include
more aggressive than nonaggressive peers and therefore, it
appears that the responses available to children
demonstrating aggressive behaviors at the response decision
step includes many aggressive acts (Crick & Dodge, 1994).
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Step 5
During the final information processing step, response
decision, children engage in response evaluation (Crick &
Dodge, 1994). Response evaluation consists of children’s
assessments of the quality of social behaviors with respect
to a specified, evaluative dimension (Crick & Ladd, 1990).
The evaluation depends on the children’s moral rules or
values (Crick & Dodge, 1994) Remember, individuals with
psychopathy demonstrate difficulty developing moral
socialization (Blair, Mitchell, & Blair, 2005). Favorable
evaluations of a response are positively related to the
subsequent behavioral enactment of that response (Crick &
Dodge, 1994). Children who are socially maladjusted engage
in maladaptive social behaviors partly because they
evaluate the maladaptive behaviors favorably (Asarnow &
Callan, 1985; Dodge et al., 1986).
Outcome expectancies also play a role in children’s
response decisions (Crick & Dodge, 1994). Outcome
expectancies are defined as children’s ideas about what is
likely to occur in a social interaction after the enactment
of a designated social response (Crick & Ladd, 1990). The
expectation of a favorable or desired outcome for a
particular behavior positively relates to enactment of the
behavior (Crick & Dodge, 1994). Outcome expectancies serve
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as an excitatory or an inhibitory function depending on
whether the outcome expected is positive or negative,
respectively (Crick & Dodge, 1994). Research demonstrates
favorable expectations for an outcome of physical and
verbal aggression is positively related to the display of
observed, peer assessed, and self-reported aggressive
behavior (Crick & Dodge, 1994). Importantly, this relation
may be specific to children who use instrumental aggression
(Crick & Dodge, 1992). Conversely, children who display
aggressive behavior tend to expect less positive outcomes
than peers who are not aggressive for prosocial behavior
(Crick & Dodge, 1989; Dodge et al., 1986).
A tendency to respond frequently to reward stimuli and
decrease avoidance of punishment stimuli when presented
with conditions for both reward and punishment is the
theory of reward dominance (Quay, 1992). Antisocial
individuals will be more likely than non-antisocial
individuals to persist in responding to stimuli that had
previously been rewarded even if the punishment for the
stimuli increased (O’Brien & Frick, 1996). Consistent with
the reward-dominant response theory, studies show
psychopathic offenders will continue to choose previously
rewarded stimuli, such as choosing cards, even when the
stimuli no longer produced rewards (Kosson & Newman, 1986).
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In regards to adolescents, O’Brien and Frick (1996) found
the reward-dominant response style was evident in a
distinct subgroup of children with conduct problems and
this subgroup closely resembled the construct of
psychopathy. Pardini et al. (2003) found higher CU traits
to be associated with higher expectation and values
associated with positive consequences of aggression and
decreased expectations and values related to the negative
consequences of deviant behavior. Interestingly, no
significant relationship existed between CU traits and
using aggression against a provocative peer to prevent
future conflicts (Pardini et al., 2003). Children with CU
traits did have lower expectancies and values concerning
inhibiting aggression even with the threat of punishment
(Pardini et al., 2003). The researchers explained this
result coincides with the idea that children with CU traits
tend to experience less fear when punished for their
negative behavior (Pardini et al., 2003).
Another aspect of the response decision is a selfefficacy evaluation, defined as the degree to which
individuals believe that they can successfully perform
behaviors that are necessary for achieving the desired
outcomes (Bandura, 1978). To select a generated response
for enactment, children must first feel confident that they
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can produce the behavior or interest (Crick & Dodge, 1994).
Research demonstrates that children who engage in
aggressive behavior feel more efficacious than peers about
performing physically and verbally aggressive behaviors
(Crick & Dodge, 1989; D.G. Perry et al., 1986). Again, this
may be specific to children engaging in instrumental or
proactive aggressive (Crick & Dodge, 1994).
Finally, a response is selected during which children
select the most positively evaluated response to enact
(Crick & Dodge, 1994). Children considered socially
maladjusted are more likely to make response decisions that
involve aggression or nonnormative behaviors and are less
likely to make decisions involve friendly behaviors (Pettit
et al., 1988). The types of behavior children considered
socially maladjusted evaluate favorably are the same
behaviors that they choose to enact (Crick & Dodge, 1994).
Children’s response decisions are predictive of behaviors
actually exhibit in peer interactions (Crick & Dodge,
1994).
Dodge and colleagues (1997) hypothesized that social
information processing patterns may distinguish between
proactive and reactive aggression. To review, Bandura
(1978) explained aggression as a goal-driven and
instrumental behavior dependent on the expectation of
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external rewards or reinforcement. Instrumental or
proactive aggression occurs when the acquisition of a goal
or external reward is more important than the individual
who may be injured in the process of obtaining it
(Woodworth & Porter, 2002). Reactive aggression involves
impulsive, immediate, and emotion-driven reactions when an
individual perceives to be threatened or in danger
(Woodworth & Porter, 2002). Building off previous research
which suggested that the early stages of cue-related
processing patterns related to reactive aggressive and
later stages of outcome-related processing related to
proactive aggression, Dodge and colleagues (1997) believed
that a child’s failure to attend to social cues,
interpreting peers’ interactions as hostile, and a tendency
to react aggressively to supposed provocations would more
often lead to retaliatory aggression rather than proactive
aggression. Subsequently, outcome-related processing that
perceived positive consequences of aggressive behavior
would be more correlated with proactive than reactive
aggression (Dodge et al., 1997). The results were
inconsistent in terms of the attention to social cues where
the reactively aggressive group demonstrated more
difficulty attending to relevant social cues than the
proactively aggressive and non-aggressive groups (Dodge et
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al., 1997). As predicted, the group of elementary students
classified as proactively aggressive anticipated more
positive intrapersonal consequences for aggression than the
reactive aggression or non-aggression groups (Dodge et al.,
1997). The proactively aggressive group also indicated that
it would be easier for them to engage in aggressive
behavior than the non-aggressive group (Dodge et al.,
1997).
Other research found that youth displaying reactive
aggressive demonstrate a bias at early stage of socialinformation processing; whereas children engaging in
proactive/predatory aggression demonstrate social
information processing deficits at a later stage and expect
significantly more positive expectations of their
aggressive behavior than children demonstrating reactive
aggression and also evaluate themselves as skilled in
responding to others with aggression (Matthys, Cuperus, &
Van Engeland, 1999), which leads to the use of aggression
to obtain objects from others or establish social dominance
over them (Connor, 2002).
From the research discussed on social cognitive
processes, one can conclude that children who engage in
antisocial and aggressive acts demonstrate impairment in
the social information processes. Interestingly, many
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deficits in social information processing are witnessed in
those children demonstrating instrumental or proactive
aggression, a characteristic also evident in individuals
with psychopathy. With the exception of a few studies,
research is lacking that specifically addresses social
cognitive processes and psychopathic traits in youth.
Purpose of the Current Study
The purpose of the current study was to expand
previous research conducted by Pardini and colleagues in
2003. Pardini and colleagues examined the definition of
psychopathy in a sample of adjudicated youth as well as the
relation of social-cognitive processes and psychopathic
traits. The current study sought to clarify how the
findings from an incarcerated sample of youth who exhibit
various levels of psychopathy are comparable to youth who
require treatment for aggression outside of the scope of
services typically provided by a student’s home school
district but who do not require incarceration. Much of the
research on psychopathy utilizes incarcerated psychopaths
for practical reasons such as the availability of the
criminals (Kirkman, 2002). However, not all psychopaths are
recidivist criminals in incarcerated settings (Cleckley,
1976; Hare, 1993). Some psychopaths have no criminal record
at all and are doctors, lawyers, and store owners in our
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own neighborhoods; therefore, it is essential to study
those psychopaths who are able to avoid the prisons and
jails in order to fully understand psychopathy (Hare, 1993;
Kirkman, 2002). Additionally, clinic-referred and forensic
samples make it unclear whether the callous/unemotional
traits found in antisocial children who exhibit these
traits are also characteristic of all children
demonstrating callous/unemotional traits or only those who
demonstrate serious antisocial behavior and are thus
adjudicated (Frick, et al. 2003b). By studying psychopathy
in the community, there is not only the opportunity to
expand the depth and breadth of knowledge in this area but
also to assist in learning about the conditions in the
social environment that creates or hinder the development
of such a disorder (Kirkman, 2002). Additionally, if
children with psychopathic traits can be correctly
identified, then the social environment of a school would
be an excellent place to study the functioning of the
psychopaths who are, according to Lynam (1997), the “truly
successful or noninstitutionalized people” and it’s
possible that by studying those that show evidence of
psychopathic traits but whose behavior has not reached the
level for incarceration, we can eventually classify the
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traits that are specific to psychopathy and those simply
related to criminality (Kirkman, 2002; Lynam, 1997).
The current study examined psychopathy, via
callous/unemotional traits, impulsivity/conduct problems,
and narcissistic traits as they related to social-cognitive
processes (e.g., values and outcome expectations) on a
range of social interactions/events in a community sample
of children with behavioral and emotional difficulties. The
narcissism factor was included in this study as a
preliminary investigation of the psychopathy factor
structure in the current community sample due to the
investigation which identified narcissism as a distinct
factor in a community sample of 1,136 elementary school-age
children (Frick et al., 2000).
Research Questions and Hypotheses
The first research question investigated how much
variance the callous/unemotional factor explained in both
emotional (personal distress and empathic concern) and
cognitive (perspective taking) empathy and likewise, how
much variance the impulsivity/conduct problems factor
explained in both emotional (personal distress and empathic
concern) and cognitive (perspective taking) empathy and how
much variance the narcissism factor explained in both
emotional (personal distress and empathic concern) and
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cognitive (perspective taking) empathy? The current study
hypothesized that the callous/unemotional trait would
predict emotional and cognitive empathy; however, the
impulsivity/conduct problems factor would not. Because the
narcissism factor has been found to load on Factor 1 of
Hare’s two factor model (1993) as does the
callous/unemotional factor (Harpur et al., 1989), it was
hypothesized that the narcissistic factor could share
variance with the callous/unemotional trait in predicting
emotional and cognitive empathy. However, in the one study
where the narcissism factor emerged in the community
sample, the narcissism traits were more closely related to
measures of impulsivity/conduct problems (Frick et al.,
2000). Therefore, it was also possible that the narcissism
factor, similar to the hypothesis concerning the
impulsivity/conduct problems factor, would not predict
cognitive or emotional empathy.
The second research question examined whether the
impulsivity/conduct problems factor predicted dysregulated
behaviors (behavioral, cognitive, and emotional), the
callous/unemotional factor predicted dysregulated behaviors
(behavioral, cognitive, and emotional), and the narcissism
factor predicted dysregulated behaviors (behavioral,
cognitive, and emotional)? It was hypothesized that
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impulsivity/conduct problems would explain variance in the
dysregulated behaviors variables including behavioral,
emotional, and cognitive dysregulation; however, the
callous/unemotional factor would not. Again, previous
findings were unclear concerning the narcissistic factor;
therefore, it was unclear whether the narcissism factor
would explain variance in dysregulated behaviors, as
hypothesized with the impulsivity/conduct problems factor,
or would not, as hypothesized with the callous/unemotional
factor.
The third research question investigated how much
variance in behavioral inhibition or fearfulness was
uniquely explained by the callous/unemotional,
impulsivity/conduct problems factors, and narcissism
factor? It was hypothesized that the callous/unemotional
trait would not explain variance within the behavioral
inhibition or fearfulness variable and in fact would
demonstrate a negative relationship; whereas, the
impulsivity/conduct problems factor would predict
behavioral inhibition/fearfulness. Again, previous findings
were unclear concerning the narcissistic factor; therefore,
it was unclear whether the narcissism factor would explain
variance in behavioral inhibition, as hypothesized with the
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impulsivity/conduct problems factor, or would not, as
hypothesized with the callous/unemotional factor.
Finally, did callous/unemotional traits,
impulsivity/conduct problems, and narcissistic traits
independently predict social-cognitive processes in
community youth displaying aggressive behaviors? It was
hypothesized that the callous/unemotional factor, but not
the impulsivity/conduct problems factor would predict a
higher value placed on aggressive acts and a disregard for
the negative consequences of aggressive behavior. More
specifically, the callous/unemotional factor would predict
increased expectations and values associated with the
positive outcomes of aggressive behavior and decreased
expectations and values associated with the negative
consequences for aggressive behavior. It was expected that
the impulsivity/conduct problems factor would not be
related to the outcome expectations or values. Again,
previous findings were unclear concerning the narcissism
factor; therefore, it was unclear whether the narcissism
factor would explain variance in social cognition, as
hypothesized with the callous/unemotional factor, or would
not, as hypothesized with the impulsivity/conduct problems
factor.
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CHAPTER 3
METHOD
General Purpose
The purpose of the current study was to expand
previous research conducted by Pardini and colleagues in
2003. Pardini and colleagues (2003) examined the definition
of psychopathy in a sample of adjudicated youth as well as
the relationship between social-cognitive processes and
psychopathic traits. The current study examined if the
findings from an incarcerated sample were similar to a
community sample of youth who require treatment for
aggression outside of their home school district but who do
not require incarceration. The current study examined
psychopathy, via callous/unemotional traits,
impulsivity/conduct problems, and narcissism. The threefactor structure was examined due to inconsistent findings
of the psychopathy construct in children with two-factors
(impulsivity/conduct problems and callous/unemotional
traits) being found with clinic-referred sample (Frick et
al., 1994) and three-factors (impulsivity/conduct problems,
callous/unemotional traits, and narcissism) emerging with a
community based sample (Frick et al., 2000). Further, as
examined in the incarcerated sample, the role of socialcognition (e.g., values and outcome expectations) when
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presented with a range of social interactions/events was
examined.
The current chapter 3 contains the methodology of the
study including a description of the setting, instruments
utilized, recruitment of participants, participants in
general, procedures, research design, and the statistical
analysis.
Method
Setting
The current study took place at an alternative
education school in a metropolitan area as part of a
school-wide program evaluation process. The school was
conducting program evaluations that examine academic,
behavioral and personality variables in order to examine
the efficacy of the treatment programs set up in this
alternative education center. The current study was
permitted the use of a portion of the data collected during
this school-wide program evaluation. The school services
approximately 19 school districts in the surrounding
metropolitan area from grades 5 through 12. Students at the
school had been removed from their home school districts
for a variety of reasons including behavioral and emotional
concerns. Examples of behavioral concerns include truancy,
physical aggression with teachers or peers, verbal
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aggression, defiance, and rule-breaking behaviors.
Emotional concerns include emotional dysregulation or
behavioral reactions that are not consistent with normative
developmental expectation. Some students presented with
formal mental health diagnoses such as bipolar disorder,
schizophrenia, and other severe emotional disturbances.
Many, but not all of the students, also demonstrate poor
academic progress in various areas. Length of stay at this
alternative school is highly variable and determined by the
needs of the individual students and how they were referred
for attendance.

For example, some of the students attend

the school for 45 days as an alternative placement as a
result of specific concerns or suspensions (e.g., weapon or
drug violations) when attending their home school district.
These students are evaluated at the end of the 45 day
placement to determine which setting is required for their
academic and social success. As such, there are students
who have been attending this school for months or years
because this setting is the least restrictive setting that
allows them to benefit from the educational environment.
Some students may remain in this setting until they
graduate due to their inability to prosper from a general
education environment.
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The majority of the classrooms have a student to
teacher ratio of approximately 15:1. Each classroom also
provides a behavior specialist who assists the teacher in
monitoring the students’ behaviors and providing support to
work through concerns that may arise. There are
approximately 140 total students attending the alternative
school. The students follow a typical school day schedule.
The school provides curriculum for grades 5 through 12;
however, each grade is not necessarily represented by its
own classroom. The students are placed in a specific
classroom based on academic, behavioral, and emotional
concerns. Much effort is made, especially in the mainstream
classrooms, to create classrooms that encompass students
from the same grade level.
There are 5 mainstream classrooms with a general
science, social studies, english, math, and reading
teacher. These students, while demonstrating emotional and
behavioral difficulties, have been determined to be capable
of coping with a more typical daily school schedule. The
students from these classrooms change classes after each
period among the 5 possible teachers. These students also
participate in a gym class and attend a lunch period. The
majority of the students enrolled at this school are
involved in these classrooms.
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There are two semi-self contained classrooms with
students who are typically enrolled at a high school grade
level. These classrooms do not switch classes with the
mainstream classrooms; however, they do switch between each
other. The two teachers for these classrooms divide the
general academic areas they specialize in. These students
also engage in a gym period and attend a lunch time. The
students in these classrooms tend to demonstrate more
severe emotional and behavioral concerns and have been
determined to need a more structured school day with less
opportunity for an unstructured school environment.
There are three additional semi-self contained
classrooms that include students who are enrolled in lower
grades such as middle school to the beginning of high
school. However, there are less specific criteria for being
placed in these classrooms compared to the previously
mentioned semi-self contained rooms. The group is more
heterogeneous and these students show more instability in
their behavioral and emotional states and their academic
functioning is much slower. These students may switch
classrooms among the three rooms for some but not all
subjects. The five semi-self contained classrooms mentioned
comprise approximately 40 to 50 students. Finally, the
school runs a life skills program, for children diagnosed

120

with mental retardation, where there are approximately 5-10
students at any given time. This classroom is selfcontained and follows a standardized life-skills
curriculum. That is, an extremely structured environment
with more adaptive and life-based curriculum. Many students
in these rooms present with multiple disabilities including
a diagnosis of mental retardation.
As noted, the information collected in this study was
gathered as part of a comprehensive school-wide program
evaluation. The examiner for the current study participated
in data collection as part of the school team. This author
served as a school psychology practicum student for the
school. As an employee/practicum student, this author was
asked to generate the packet of instruments to be utilized
per the objective of the school’s program evaluation, which
included an examination of various behaviors and
personality traits of their students. The current study was
a separate data analyses that was conducted with the
permission of the school, and utilized specific elements of
the existing school-wide data set. It should noted that
data collection did not change or alter the students’
educational environment/placement.
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Instruments
The instruments utilized in the data collection were
standardized measures used to examine behavioral and
personality characteristics in children. There were a total
of eight instruments; however, for the purposes of this
study, some subscales on each measure were not utilized.
The rationale for using each measure, is provided in
subsequent sections.
Demographic Questionnaire. This questionnaire gathered
demographic information. Participants were asked to provide
information that is detailed in their student files
including sensitive personal information that is collected
by school personnel. Of the data collected the following
was used in this study: date of birth, age, ethnicity,
gender, participation in gang activity, and history of
incarceration. Other demographic information gathered
through record review included participants’ IQ, current
educational program, and current diagnosis.
Antisocial Process Screening Device (APSD; Frick &
Hare, 2001).

The APSD is a 20-item behavior rating scale

with each item scored either 0 (Not at all true), 1
(Sometimes true), or 2 (Definitely true).

It was adapted

from Hare’s Psychopathy Checklist-Revised (Hare, 1991) in
order to measure psychopathic traits in youth. A factor
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analysis revealed the APSD included three dimensions: a 7item Narcissism dimension, a 5-item Impulsivity dimension,
and a 6-item Callous-Unemotional dimension that can
identify community, clinic-referred and incarcerated
samples of children (Frick, Bodin, & Barry, 2000). The
impulsivity/conduct problems factor and the narcissism
dimension were utilized in the current study. Due to the
inconsistency in the research identifying two-factors in
clinic-referred children (Frick et al., 1994) and threefactors in community sample children (Frick et al., 2000),
the narcissism factor was included in this study, although
it was not included in the Pardini et al (2003)
investigation. There is substantive support for the
validity of the APSD for designating a distinct subgroup of
antisocial youth with more severe and aggressive behavior
and who show characteristics similar to adults with
psychopathy (Frick et al., 2003; Frick et al., 1999).
Although the published version of the APSD was designed to
be completed by parents and teachers, the current study
utilized the newly developed self-report version that has
been used in research studies. Although there is less data
on the self-report version of the APSD,

it is comprised of

the same three factor structure (Vitacco, Rogers, &
Neumann, 2003), it has been shown to designate a more
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severe, chronic, and violent juvenile offender

(Caputo, et

al., 1999; Kruh, Frick, & Clements 2005), with deficits in
emotional functioning (Kimonis et al., 2004; Loney et al.,
2003) and who are insensitive to punishment in social
situations (Pardini et al., 2003). Additionally, research
suggests that the validity of self-report increases from
childhood to adolescence when assessing most types of
psychopathology, while the validity of parent and teacher
ratings decreases (Kamphus & Frick, 1996). Thus, the selfreport version was selected for use with the current
sample.
Internal consistency for the self-report version of
the total APSD are reported at .78 - .81, which is
comparable to the parent reports (.85 - .89) (Munoz &
Frick, personal communication, February 21, 2006). The
coefficient alpha’s for the subscales of the self-report
APSD are reported in the modest range from .50 to .68;
whereas the internal consistency of the parent report was
in the modest range: callous-unemotional = .72-.76,
narcissism = .79 - .82, and impulsivity = .65-.75 (Munoz &
Frick, personal communication, February 21, 2006). Due to
modest internal consistency in the APSD self-report, item
statistics were computed (Munoz & Frick, personal
communication, February 21, 2006). Item statistics revealed
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that item-total correlations across scales and time periods
exceeded .20 with one item falling below .10; however,
eliminating items did not demonstrate substantial increases
in alpha for the subscales (Munoz & Frick, personal
communication, February 21, 2006). Stability estimates for
the self-report APSD total score was between .70 and .72
for one year intervals and .64 across two years (Munoz &
Frick, personal communication, February 21, 2006).
Estimates were somewhat lower for subscales with one-year
estimates ranging from .49 (Narcissism) to .63
(Impulsivity) and two year estimates from .43 (Narcissism)
to .58 (Impulsivity) with all p’s < .01 (Munoz & Frick,
personal communication, February 21, 2006).
Predictive utility was also investigated for the APSD
self-report and future antisocial behavior. Researchers
found that both the parent and self-report versions of the
APSD predicted antisocial behavior two years later (Munoz &
Frick, personal communication, February 21, 2006). However,
for both versions, the least predictive scale was the
callous-unemotional scale (Munoz & Frick, personal
communication, February 21, 2006). In order to address the
psychometric limitations of the callous-unemotional
subscale, Frick (2003) developed a measure specifically
addressing that single construct, the Inventory of Callous-
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Unemotional Traits. The current study conducted a
correlation in order to examine the relationship between
the callous-unemotional trait from the APSD and the ICU in
order to assure validity and reliability of the ICU
measure. The measure with the highest reliability was
included in the current study. Logic predicts that the ICU
would produce greater reliability for the
callous/unemotional construct due to the increase in items
and will be the measure of the callous/unemotional trait in
the current study.
Inventory of Callous-Unemotional Traits (ICU; Frick,
2003). The ICU was based on the six-item CU scale found on
the Antisocial Process Screening Device (APSD; Frick &
Hare, 2001). This scale was created in order to provide a
more comprehensive assessment of the callous-unemotional
trait by addressing the small number of items available on
the APSD that examined the callous-unemotional factor, the
limited 3-point scale ratings, and the dominate positively
directed wording of the callous-unemotional APSD subscale
(Essau, Sasagawa, & Frick, in press). The four items found
to load consistently on the CU scale (i.e., “Is concerned
about how well he/she does school or work”, “Feels bad or
guilty when he/she does something wrong”, “Is concerned
about the feelings of others”, “Does not show feeling or
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emotions”) in both community and clinical samples were the
foundation in creating the ICU (Frick et al., 2000). Three
positively (e.g. “Easily admits to being wrong”) and three
negatively worded (e.g. “Shows no remorse when he/she has
done something wrong) items were developed from each
original item which led to the creation of a 24-item scale
with equal numbers of both positively and negatively worded
items (Essau et al., in press). In order to further
differentiate ICU traits, the rating scale for the items
was expanded to a four point Likert scale ranging from “0”
(“Not at all true”) to “3” (Definitely true”). Before
calculating the total scores, the twelve positively worded
items (items 1, 3, 5, 8, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 19, 23, 24)
required reverse scoring (Essau et al., in press). Factor
analysis found that the ICU described three dimensions of
behavior including callousness, uncaring, and unemotional
(Essau et al., in press). The callousness factor depicted
an aspect of behavior that included lack of empathy, guilt,
and remorse for misdeeds (Essau et al., in press). The
uncaring factor captured a dimension of behavior that
included a lack of caring about ones performance in tasks
and for the feelings of other people (Essau et al., in
press). The third factor, unemotional, depicted an element
of behavior that focused on an absence of emotional
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expression (Essau et al., in press). A confirmatory factor
analysis found that the 3-factors loaded onto a higherorder factor representing the “callous-unemotional”
dimension and therefore, provided the best fit (Essau et
al., in press). Although parent, teacher, and self-report
versions of the ICU exist, the current study only used the
self-report version. The current study utilized the entire
measure.
Internal consistency for the entire ICU scale has been
reported as good, with a coefficient alpha of .77 and a
Guttman Split half reliability of .70 (Essau et al., in
press). Internal consistency of the three subscales was
also determined to be good for two out of the three with a
coefficient alpha of .70 for the callousness factor, .73
for the uncaring factor, and a marginal coefficient alpha
of .55 for the unemotional factor (Essau et al., in press).
Item-total correlation and coefficient alpha did not
propose the deletion of any item would significantly
increase the internal consistency of the scale (Essau et
al., in press). The three scales demonstrated moderate
inter-correlation with the callousness scale correlating
with the unemotional scale at .21 (p < .001) and uncaring
scale at .31 (p < .001) and the uncaring scale correlating
with the unemotional scale at .20 (p < .001). Additionally,
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construct validity was supported by the association of the
ICU and the Big Five personality dimensions (Essau et al.,
in press).
Gender affects have been evidenced with this measure
with significant main effects found for the total ICU
scores (F (1, 1282) = 218.36, p < .001), as well as the
callousness (F (1, 1340) = 152.23, p < .001), uncaring (F
(1, 1413)= 84.48, p < .001), and unemotional (F (1, 1384)=
139.81, p < .001) subscales (Essau et al., in press). In
every case, the girls demonstrated significantly lower
rates of callous-unemotional traits than boys (Essau et
al., in press).
Abbreviated Dysregulation Inventory (Mezzich et al.,
1997). The Abbreviated Dysregulation Inventory is a selfreport measure designed to assess various types of
dysregulation in adolescents including behavioral,
emotional, and cognitive. Participants rate each item on a
4-point scale (0 = “never true” to 3 = “always true”).
Scale items are summed and then averaged, thus higher
scores indicate increased levels of the dysregulation
construct assessed. Adequate internal consistency
coefficients were found for each subscale in previous
studies (Mezzich et al., 1997). An internal consistency of
.80 was previously found for the behavioral dysregulation
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subscale (Pardini et al., 2003). The current study utilized
all three dysregulation measures including behavioral (e.g.
“I get very fidgety after a few minutes if I am supposed to
sit still”), emotional (e.g. “I easily become emotionally
upset when I am tired”), and cognitive (e.g. “I develop a
plan for all my important goals”).
Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI; Davis, 1983). The
IRI is a 28-item, self-report measure designed to measure
cognitive and affective dispositions related to empathy.
Four subscales comprise the IRI including perspective
taking which “reflect(s) a tendency or ability of the
respondent to adopt the perspective or point of view of
other people” (e.g. “I try to look at everybody’s side of a
disagreement before making a decision”), fantasy which
measures “a tendency of the respondent to identify strongly
with fictitious characters in books, movies or plays” (e.g.
“When I watch a good movie, I can very easily put myself in
the place of a leading character”), empathic concern which
measures “a tendency for the respondent to experience a
feeling of warmth, compassion, and concern for others
undergoing negative experiences” (e.g. “I often have tender
concerned feelings for people less fortunate than me”), and
personal distress which “indicate(s) the respondent
experience(s) feelings of discomfort and anxiety when
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witnessing the negative experiences of others (e.g. “Being
in a tense emotional situation scares me) (Davis, 1980, p.
4). The perspective taking scale comprises the cognitive
component of empathy where empathic concern, fantasy, and
personal distress scales comprise the affective components
of empathy (Davis, 1980). In an attempt to more closely
extend the findings of the previous study, the fantasy
scale was excluded from the current study consistent with
the Pardini et al., (2003) investigation. It should be
noted that researchers (Davis & Franzoi, 1991) have found
that the construct personal distress decreases during
adolescence due to it measuring an early and egocentric
precursor to empathy, similar to sympathy.
Items on the IRI were rated on a 5-point Likert type
scale (1 = “does not describe me well” to 5 = “describes me
very well). Scale items are summed and then averaged, thus
higher scores indicate increased levels of the construct
assessed. Acceptable internal consistency and predictive
and convergent validity were displayed in previous studies
(Davis, 1983; Davis & Franzoi, 1991). Adequate test-retest
reliability was found (ranging from .62 - .71) in Davis’
(1980) initial presentation of the measure while working
with college students. Internal reliabilities are reported
to range from .71 to .77 (Davis, 1980). Good convergent and
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discriminate validity were also reported through
correlation of the IRI and existing tests of empathy and
other studies, demonstrating good construct validity (Davis
& Franzoi, 1991).
Early Adolescent Temperament Questionnaire- Revised:
Short Form (EATQ-R; Capaldi & Rothbart, 1992). The EATQ-R
short form is a self-report measure designed to assess
temperament in early adolescence. The measure includes 12
temperament scales including activation control,
affiliation, attention, fear, frustration, surgency/high
intensity pleasure, inhibitory control, perceptual
sensitivity, pleasure sensitivity, shyness, aggression, and
depressive mood. Only the seven-item fearfulness subscale
was utilized in the current study as a measure of
behavioral inhibition. The fear dimension of temperament is
described as unpleasant affect related to anticipation of
distress (Capaldi & Rothbart, 1992). Items consist of
general statements (e.g. “I am nervous of some of the youth
at school who push people into lockers and throw your books
around”) followed by a 5-point Likert scale inquiring how
true each statement was for the participant (1 = “almost
always untrue of you” to 5 = “almost always true of you”).
Items are summed and then averaged, thus higher scores
indicate increasing levels of temperamental fear. Adequate
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internal consistency and convergent validity have been
found for this measure with participants aged 11 - 24 years
(Capaldi & Rothbart, 1992). Coefficient alpha’s for the
scales ranged from .65 - .82 in previous examinations
(Capaldi & Rothbart, (1992); Putnam, Ellis, & Rothbart,
1992). Specifically, the fear subscale evidenced a
coefficient alpha of .74 and a test-retest correlation of
.81 (Capaldi & Rothbart, 1992).
Outcome Expectancy Questionnaire (OEQ; Perry et al.,
1986). This version of the OEQ consisted of eight brief
vignettes designed to measure juveniles’ expectations that
aggressive behavior against a same-sex peer would produce
various outcomes. In half of the vignettes, participants
imagine using aggressive behavior to obtain tangible
rewards from a same-sex peer (e.g. physically threatening a
peer to get his/her money) and in the other half,
participants were asked to imagine using aggression to
retaliate against aversive treatment (e.g. kicking a person
in the leg because he/she kicked you). After
reading/hearing each vignette, participants were asked to
rate the likelihood that various outcomes would occur on a
4-point Likert scale (1 = “very sure the outcome would not
occur” to 4 = “very sure the outcome would occur). For
vignettes describing the use of aggression to obtain a
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tangible reward, participants were asked to rate the
likelihood that they would successfully obtain the desired
outcome, be punished for their actions, feel bad about
their actions, make the peer feel bad, and gain a sense of
dominance over the peer. Equivalent questions were asked
for vignettes depicting the use of aggression in
retaliation against aversive behavior, except that
participants rated the likelihood they would be successful
in reducing the aversive treatment rather than obtain
tangible rewards. Items on the scales are summed and
averaged, higher scores indicate increased expectations
that a particular outcome would occur. All scales were
utilized in the current study. Studies utilizing similar
measures were able to discriminate antisocial youth from
controls (Hall et al., 1998; Perry et al., 1990).
Reliability estimates for the outcome expectancy subscales
have been variable (α = .56 - .83) (Hall et al., 1998;
Pardini et al., 2003; Perry et al., 1990).
Outcome Values Questionnaire (OVQ; Boldizar et al.,
1989). This version of the OVQ consists of eight brief
vignettes designed to assess the values that children place
on the outcomes of aggression against a same-sex peer. The
format of the stories followed that of the OEQ. The
participants were presented with four vignettes depicting
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the use of aggression to obtain tangible rewards and four
vignettes describing the use of aggression in retaliating
against aversive behaviors. Participants were asked to rate
how much they would care if specific outcomes occurred as a
result of their behaviors on a 4-point Likert scale (1 =
“not care at all” to 4 = “really care a lot”). Participants
were asked to rate how much they cared about obtaining a
tangible reward, reduce the aversive treatment of a
provocative peer, being punished for their actions, feeling
bad about what he/she did, feeling bad about making the
peer feel bad, and gaining a sense of dominance over the
peer. Items for each scale were averaged, with higher
scores indicating increased importance being placed on the
outcome. The entire measure was utilized in the current
study. Similar measures have discriminated between
aggressive and non-aggressive youth (Hall et al., 1998).
Reliability estimates for the outcome values subscales have
been variable (α = .56 - .91) (Hall et al., 1998; Pardini
et al., 2003; Perry et al., 1990).
Recruitment
Assessment occurred during the 2004-2005 and 2005-2006
school years. The assessment was conducted as a school-wide
program evaluation process used to gather information
concerning the students’ behaviors and personalities.
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Participants were recruited by school personnel and then
tested by trained school psychology practicum students
working at the alternative education center in partial
fulfillment of the requirements of their doctoral training
program. The goal of the school-wide data collection
project was to assess every student in the school capable
of completing the battery of tests. Students in the life
skills classroom could not be included in the assessment
due to limited ability to complete the measures. All
remaining students were assigned to complete the
assessments. Of the approximate 130 remaining students,
approximately 100 were able to complete the testing
battery. Those who did not complete the assessments did not
do so because of chronic absenteeism, or refusal to
participate.
Although required by the school, examiners recruited
participants by coordinating times with the teachers and
going from class to class asking for volunteers to
participate in the project. The administrators limited the
number of students per testing period to no more than 8
participants, with no minimum number. During this
recruitment phase in the classrooms, the researchers
explained that participation was voluntary and that they
would be completing a lengthy battery of surveys that would
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take approximately 1 ½ to 2 hours to complete. At this
time, the students were informed that they would receive a
candy bar of their choice as well as Kool-aid and/or pop
along with the opportunity to participate.

Those who

agreed to learn more about participating followed the
administrators to the designated classroom which was
isolated from surrounding rooms to minimize
distractibility. The steps taken once the students were
within the classroom are described in the procedures
section.
Participants
As previously stated, all attempts were made to
include the entire school population that was capable of
completing the battery, which included approximately 100
students. The approximate 140 students at the school
comprise both community adolescents and adolescents who
live in residential placements (approximately 5% of the
students live in residential placement). The purpose of the
current study was to examine characteristics of the
community based students and therefore, the adolescents
living in residential placement were not included in the
sample examined for this study. The school hosts
approximately 32% female and 68% male students. The current
study sample consisted of approximately 76 community based
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participants (57 males and 19 females) with an age range of
10 to 19 years old (mean = 15.36; SD = 1.69). The majority
of participants for the current study were African American
(approximately 63%), with the remainder identifying as
Caucasian (approximately 17%) and multiracial groups (e.g.,
African American and Caucasian, Hispanic and African
American, Hispanic, African American, and Caucasian,
Indian, African American, and Caucasian, among others
(approximately 20%). The racial make-up of the sample was
representative of the entire school’s racial composition.
Client file information revealed the participants’
average Full-Scale IQ fell within the Low Average Range
(68% of participants: mean = 86, SD = 13.78). However, it
should be noted that Intelligence Quotient scores were not
available for all students due to missing file information
or because the student was involved in regular education
and thus, had never been administered a cognitive ability
measure. Approximately, 13% of participants identified
themselves as gang involved. Approximately, 36% of
participants reported a history of incarceration.
Procedure
Participants were first presented with an assent form
which explained the purpose of the data collection and
their role in the process. Because information collected
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was to be used in aggregate form, any single students
individual answers would not be evaluated thus
confidentiality was assured; the participants were
instructed that their names would only appear on the assent
form. The questionnaires were all numbered to protect their
identities. Assent forms were separated from questionnaires
following the administration. Participants were informed
that participation was voluntary, would not affect grades
or status at the educational placement, and they could
discontinue administration at any time. Participants were
informed that after completing the assessment, they would
receive a candy bar. Breaks to stretch and walk around the
room as well as Kool-aid/Soda were provided throughout the
testing session on an as needed basis determined by the
participant.
The administrators of the test battery included two
doctoral level graduate students trained in test
administration. The test battery was administered in a
group format (maximum of 8 participants in a session).
Although there were no more than 8 participants at a time,
there were occasions that only one or two participants
engaged in the test battery per testing session. Each
participant was given the complete test battery, including
the assent form and nine measures, when they agreed to
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participate. Each test packet was arranged in the same
order. However, a minority of participants would choose to
skip certain measures and complete them in a different
order. Test administrators were available at all times
during the assessment period to assist all participants who
needed help in reading some or all of the questionnaires or
to answer questions regarding vocabulary, etc. Participants
were encouraged to ask questions if they did not understand
an item or could not read an item. The administrators
continuously walked around the room assisting participants
as needed and assuring that the participants were reading
and taking their times with the test battery.
Research Design and Statistical Analysis
The following section is a description of the research
designs/statistical analyses utilized in this study
including a priori analysis, descriptive statistics, ttests, and a series of multiple regressions.
An a priori statistical analysis was conducted to
determine the number of participants needed to achieve
adequate power and high power with medium and high effect
sizes using three predictors. The GPower Program – Version
2.0 developed by Franz Faul and Edgar Erdfelder (1992) was
utilized in this analysis.

140

Table 3
A priori Statistical Analysis
___________________________________________________________
Effect Size

Alpha

Power

Predictors

N

___________________________________________________________
.15

.05

.80

3

77

.15

.05

.95

3

119

.35

.05

.80

3

36

.35

.05

.95

3

54

___________________________________________________________
Because of the limited research in this area, a
conservative approach was used with the power analysis.
Assuming a medium effect size, at the .05 level, a priori
analysis results suggested a sample size of between 77 and
100 participants would be needed to detect differences.
Demographic data, utilized to further describe the
sample, showed age, IQ, ethnicity, current educational
program, current diagnosis, prior incarceration, and gang
affiliation for the current sample.
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Table 4
Descriptive Statistics
___________________________________________________________
Descriptor

Mean

SD

Percent

___________________________________________________________
Age

15.36

1.69

Gender
Male

75%

Female

25%

IQ

85.87

13.78

Ethnicity
African American

63%

Caucasian

17%

Multi

20%

Educ. Program
Regular

29%

Learning

20%

Emotional

51%

Diagnosis
None

24%

LD

11%

ED

37%

MR

3%

LD/ED

7%
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Table 4 (continued).
___________________________________________________________
Descriptor

Mean

SD

Percent

___________________________________________________________
Other

13%

Prior Incarc.

36%

Gang Affil.

13%

___________________________________________________________
Note. These calculations are based on the current number of
participants (N = 76).
Two-tailed independent samples t tests were conducted
to investigate gender differences between male and female
participants on the demographic variables listed above in
an attempt to further describe the sample.
The main research design of the current study utilized
a series of multiple regressions. The general purpose of
multiple regression is to learn more about the relationship
between several independent or predictor variables and a
dependent or criterion variable (StatSoft, Inc. 1984-2003).
Multiple regression is widely used in the social and
natural sciences (StatSoft, Inc. 1984-2003). Multiple
regression allows the researcher to ask the general
question "what is the best predictor of ..." (StatSoft,
Inc. 1984-2003). The current study asked which of the
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psychopathic traits (callous/unemotional,
impulsivity/conduct problems, or narcissism) best predicted
level of empathy, dysregulation, behavioral inhibition, and
social-cognitive processes in a sample of aggressive
children. Multiple regression allows for the further
clarifying of the predictor constructs and clarified these
constructs in the current study sample. Additionally, the
use of multiple regression in the current study was
consistent with the Pardini et al. (2003) investigation
from which the current study extended findings.

When deciding to run a multiple regression, it is
important to recognize the problem of multicollinearity.
Multicollinearity occurs when moderate to high
intercorrelations exist among the predictors (Stevens,
2002). This is a problem for three reasons: 1) the
predictors are accounting for much of the same variance,
limiting the size of R, 2) due to the correlations among
the predictors, it is difficult to determine the importance
of each predictor, 3) it increases the variances of the
regression coefficients, producing a more unstable
prediction equation (Stevens, 2002). Multicollinearity was
investigated through an examination of the simple
correlations among the predictors and an examination of the
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variance inflation factors for the predictors (Stevens,
2002). If multicollinearity was expected, three methods
could assist in combating it: 1) combining predictors that
are highly correlated, 2) using a principal components
analysis to reduce the number of predictors if there is a
large set, 3) utilizing a technique called ridge regression
(Stevens, 2002).

There were a number of selection models to choose
from when entering variables for a multiple regression
analysis, including simultaneous, forward, backward, and
stepwise. In simultaneous selection all predictors are
entered into the analyses at the same time. With forward
selection, the model begins with no predictors entered
(Stevens, 2002). The researcher enters the predictor with
the highest correlation into the analysis first followed by
the predictor that increases the R² (variance accounted for
in the dependent variable) the most (Stevens, 2002). This
process continues until all the predictors are entered or
the increase in the R² is no longer significant (Stevens,
2002). In backward selection, the model begins with all the
predictors entered (Stevens, 2002). The predictor that
contributes the least to the R² is removed first (Stevens,
2002). This process is continued until the R² is reduced to
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a point that it is no longer statistically significant
(Stevens, 2002). Stepwise selection utilizes both the
forward and backward selection methods (Stevens, 2002).
Stepwise begins utilizing the forward selection method;
however, through that method, predictors can be removed if
they no longer demonstrate significance in the model
(Stevens, 2002). This model allows for the constant
assessment of each predictors importance (Stevens, 2002).
The current study utilized the stepwise selection method
when possible. This method was appropriate for the current
study in that it allowed for each predictor,
callous/unemotional, impulsivity/conduct problems, and
narcissism, to be entered in the model in terms of their
correlations and then removed when they did not contribute
to the variance in the dependent variable being examined
for the particular question. When the stepwise selection
method yielded no significant results, the variables were
entered simultaneously for explanatory purposes.
Before examining the predictor variables and the
dependent variables, the interaction of gender and the
predictor variables was examined. If gender served as a
moderator to the predictor variables, it would have been
included in each of the multiple regression analyses as an
interaction variable. Each dependent variable was
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independently regressed on to the C/U, I/CP, and narcissism
factors for the purpose of examining the unique relation
between each factor of psychopathy and various constructs.
The β values reported for the C/U, I/CP, and narcissism
factors represent the unique relationship between each
factor of psychopathy and the dependent variable after
controlling for the effects of the other factor. The
overall R² reported represents the total variance the I/CP,
C/U, and narcissism factor accounted for in the dependent
variable. After conducting the primary regression analysis,
post hoc tests would be conducted to determine whether the
significant effects remained after controlling for
demographic information including gender, minority status,
intellectual abilities (Full Scale IQ), and the severity of
the participants’ criminal behavior (i.e. prior
incarceration, gang involvement).
The following table summarizes the research questions,
corresponding variables, whether the variable is a
predictor or a dependent variable, and the instruments
utilized in measuring the variables.
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Table 5
Clarification of Variables
___________________________________________________________
Question

Variable

Predictor/DV

Instrument

___________________________________________________________
1-4

CU factor

Predictor

ICU

1-4

ICP factor

Predictor

APSD

1-4

Narcissism

Predictor

APSD

1

Empathic

DV

IRI

DV

IRI

DV

IRI

DV

ADI

DV

ADI

DV

ADI

Concern
1

Perspective
Taking

1

Personal
Distress

2

Behavioral
Dysregulation

2

Emotional
Dysregulation

2

Cognitive
Dysregulation

3

Fearfulness

DV

EAT-Q

4

Tangible

DV

OEQ

Rewards
4

Reduction of

OVQ
DV
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OEQ

Table 5 (continued).
___________________________________________________________
Question

Variable

Predictor/DV

Instrument

___________________________________________________________
Aversive TX
4

Punishment

OVQ
DV

OEQ
OVQ

4

Dominance

DV

OEQ
OVQ

___________________________________________________________
Four research questions were investigated in the
current study.
Research Questions
Question 1. How much variance does the
callous/unemotional factor explain in both emotional and
cognitive empathy and likewise, how much variance does the
impulsivity/conduct problems factor explain in both
emotional and cognitive empathy, and how much variance does
the narcissism factor explain in both emotional and
cognitive empathy?
Hypothesis. The current study hypothesized that the
callous/unemotional trait would predict emotional and
cognitive empathy; however, the impulsivity/conduct
problems factor would not. Because the narcissism factor
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has been found to load on Factor 1 of Hare’s two factor
model (1993) as does the callous/unemotional factor (Harpur
et al., 1989), it was hypothesized that the narcissistic
factor may share variance with the callous/unemotional
trait in predicting emotional and cognitive empathy.
However, in the one study where the narcissism factor
emerged in the community sample, the narcissism traits were
more closely related to measures of impulsivity/conduct
problems (Frick et al., 2000). Therefore, it may also be
that the narcissism factor, similar to the hypothesis
concerning the impulsivity/conduct problems factor, would
not predict cognitive or emotional empathy.
Statistical Method. Stepwise Multiple Regression (3
multiple regressions were run, each examining the three
predictors and one DV at a time). Predictors included:
Callous/unemotional factor, Impulsivity/conduct problems
factor, and Narcissism factor. Dependent Variables
included: Cognitive Empathy (Perspective Taking) and
Emotional Empathy (Empathic Concern and Personal Distress).
Why Selected? Multiple regression is utilized in
identifying constructs that can predict or explain the
variance in other constructs. The purpose of this
investigation was to further explain the construct of
psychopathy. Multiple regression allows the factors of
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psychopathy to be clarified by investigating how much they
explain variables often associated with the psychopathy
construct. In particular for Question 1: the emotional
(empathic concern and personal distress) and cognitive
(perspective taking) variables were regressed onto the
callous/unemotional trait, impulsivity/conduct problems,
and narcissism factors in order to demonstrate the unique
and shared variance these factors explain in empathy.
Assumptions. There are four main assumptions that
apply to multiple regression analyses. 1) Linearity:
assumes that the relationship between variables is linear.
Practically, this assumption can almost never be confirmed;
fortunately, multiple regression procedures are not greatly
affected by minor deviations from this assumption
(StatSoft, Inc., 1984-2003). However, examining a bivariate
scatterplot of the variables is suggested (StatSoft, Inc.,
1984-2003). If curvature in the relationships is evident,
the researcher can either transform the variables, or
explicitly allow for nonlinear components, 2) Normality:
assumes that the residuals (predicted minus observed
values) are distributed normally. Even though most tests
(specifically the F-test) are quite robust with regard to
violations of this assumption, a review of the
distributions of the major variables in the form of
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histograms for the residuals and normal probability plots
is suggested (StatSoft, Inc., 1984-2003), 3) Independence:
assumes that errors are independent, that participants are
responding independently of one another (Stevens, 2002),
4)Homoscedasticity: assumes the residuals (errors in
prediction) are evenly spread around the regression line or
the variance of errors across all values of the predictors
is constant (Stevens, 2002). This assumption can be
assessed by examining the residual plots (Stevens, 2002).
Question 2. Does the impulsivity/conduct problems
factor predict dysregulated behaviors (behavioral,
emotional, and cognitive), does the callous/unemotional
factor predict dysregulated behaviors (behavioral,
emotional, and cognitive), and does the narcissism factor
predict dysregulated behaviors (behavioral, emotional, and
cognitive)?
Hypothesis. It was hypothesized that
impulsivity/conduct problems would explain variance in the
dysregulated behaviors variables including behavioral,
emotional, and cognitive dysregulation; however, the
callous/unemotional factor would not. Again, previous
findings were unclear concerning the narcissistic factor;
therefore, it was unclear whether the narcissism factor
would explain variance in dysregulated behaviors, as
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hypothesized with the impulsivity/conduct problems factor,
or would not, as hypothesized with the callous/unemotional
factor.
Statistical Method. Stepwise Multiple Regression (3
multiple regressions were run, each examining the three
predictors and one DV at a time). Predictors included:
Callous/unemotional factor, Impulsivity/conduct problems
factor, and Narcissism factor. Dependent Variables
included: Dysregulated Behaviors (Emotional, Behavioral,
and Cognitive).
Why Selected? Multiple regression is utilized in
identifying constructs that can predict or explain the
variance in other constructs. The purpose of this
investigation was to further explain the construct of
psychopathy. Multiple regression allows the factors of
psychopathy to be clarified by investigating how much they
explain variables often associated with the psychopathy
construct. In particular for Question 2: the behavioral,
emotional, and cognitive variables were regressed onto the
callous/unemotional trait, impulsivity/conduct problems,
and narcissism factors in order to demonstrate the unique
and shared variance these factors explain in dysregulation.
Assumptions. There are four main assumptions that
apply to multiple regression analyses. Refer to question 1.
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Question 3. How much variance in behavioral inhibition
or fearfulness is explained by the callous/unemotional,
impulsivity/conduct problems, and narcissism factors?
Hypothesis. It was hypothesized that the
callous/unemotional trait would not explain variance within
the behavioral inhibition or fearfulness variable and in
fact would demonstrate a negative relationship; whereas,
the impulsivity/conduct problems factor would predict
behavioral inhibition/fearfulness. Again, previous findings
were unclear concerning the narcissistic factor; therefore,
it was unclear whether the narcissism factor would explain
variance in behavioral inhibition, as hypothesized with the
impulsivity/conduct problems factor, or would not, as
hypothesized with the callous/unemotional factor.
Statistical Method. Stepwise Multiple Regression (1
multiple regression was run, each examining the three
predictors and one DV at a time). Predictors included:
Callous/unemotional factor, Impulsivity/conduct problems
factor, and Narcissism factor. Dependent Variable included:
Behavioral Inhibition (fear).
Why Selected? Multiple regression is utilized in
identifying constructs that can predict or explain the
variance in other constructs. The purpose of this
investigation was to further explain the construct of
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psychopathy. Multiple regression allows the factors of
psychopathy to be clarified by investigating how much they
explain variables often associated with the psychopathy
construct. In particular for Question 3: the fear variable
was regressed onto the callous/unemotional trait,
impulsivity/conduct problems, and narcissism factors in
order to demonstrate the unique and shared variance these
factors explain in behavioral inhibition.
Assumptions. There are four main assumptions that
apply to multiple regression analyses. Refer to question 1.
Question 4. Do callous/unemotional traits,
impulsivity/conduct problems, and narcissistic traits
predict social-cognitive processes in community youth
displaying aggressive behaviors?
Hypothesis. It was hypothesized that the
callous/unemotional factor, but not the impulsivity/conduct
problems factor would predict a higher value placed on
aggressive acts and a disregard for the negative
consequences of aggressive behavior. More specifically, the
callous/unemotional factor would predict increased
expectations and values associated with the positive
outcomes of aggressive behavior and decreased expectations
and values associated with the negative consequences for
aggressive behavior. It was expected that the
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impulsivity/conduct problems factor would not be related to
the outcome expectations or values. Again, previous
findings were unclear concerning the narcissism factor;
therefore, it was unclear whether the narcissism factor
would explain variance in social cognition, as hypothesized
with the callous/unemotional factor, or would not, as
hypothesized with the impulsivity/conduct problems factor.
Statistical Method. Stepwise Multiple Regression (8
multiple regressions were run with the three predictors and
each of the 8 DVs). Predictors included:
Callous/unemotional factor, Impulsivity/conduct problems
factor, and Narcissism factor. Dependent Variables
included: Outcome Expectancy (tangible rewards, reduction
of aversive treatment, punishment, and dominance) and
Outcome Value (tangible rewards, reduction of aversive
treatment, punishment, and dominance).
Why Selected? Multiple regression is utilized in
identifying constructs that can predict or explain the
variance in other constructs. The purpose of this
investigation was to further explain the construct of
psychopathy. Multiple regression allows the factors of
psychopathy to be clarified by investigating how much they
explain variables often associated with the psychopathy
construct. In particular for Question 4: the social-
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cognition (tangible reward, reduction of aversive
treatment, punishment, and dominance) variables were
regressed onto the callous/unemotional trait,
impulsivity/conduct problems, and narcissism factors in
order to demonstrate the unique and shared variance these
factors explain in social cognition.
Assumptions. There are four main assumptions that
apply to multiple regression analyses. Refer to question 1.
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CHAPTER 4
RESULTS
The results section is organized as follows.
Descriptive statistics present information concerning all
variables in this study including predictors and dependent
variables. Following descriptive statistics, pre-analyses
investigate correlations and significant differences among
the variables in this study. Statistical assumptions for
each research question are then examined in order to assure
the appropriateness of running the main analyses for each
research question. Lastly, the statistical results for each
research question are offered.
Before examining the descriptive statistics, the
callous/unemotional construct must be addressed. The
current study examined the relationship between the
callous-unemotional trait from the APSD and the ICU in
order to determine the ICU measure could be used instead of
the c/u scale on the APSD. The measure with the highest
reliability was included in the current study. Because the
ICU was created and expanded from the exact items found on
the APSD, it would appear that the ICU would be a more
thorough measure to examine the callous/unemotional trait.
A pre-analysis examined the relationship between the APSD
callous/unemotional factor and the ICU callous/unemotional
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construct. The APSD callous/unemotional scale and the ICU
measure were significantly positively correlated (r = .664,
p < .001) at the p < .01 level which is indicative of
moderate to strong criterion related validity or
demonstrates that the ICU callous/unemotional measure
demonstrates validity when compared to a previously
established measure of callous/unemotional trait, the c/u
scale on the APSD. Cronbach’s alpha indicates the current
sample reliability of the APSD c/u scale was .397 and .760
for the ICU. Therefore, it was determined from previous
research discussed in chapter 3 concerning the construction
of the ICU and the current correlation and reliability
measures that the ICU appears to be the better measure for
this study and will be utilized throughout all analyses
when addressing the callous/unemotional traits.
Descriptive Statistics
Descriptive statistics describe and summarize data.
The descriptive statistics utilized included means,
standard deviations, and internal consistency for each
variable in the study. Descriptive statistics were run with
the predictors: callous/unemotional traits,
impulsivity/conduct problems, and narcissism. Results are
presented in Table 6.
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Table 6
Descriptive Statistics for Predictor Variables
___________________________________________________________
Predictor

Mean

Standard
Deviation

Cronbach’s
Alpha

___________________________________________________________
C/U

31.947

8.806

.760

I/CP

.888

.330

.441

N

.718

.396

.645

___________________________________________________________
Note. C/U = callous/unemotional, I/CP = impulsivity/conduct
problems, N = narcissism.
The C/U scores range from 0 to 72 with a higher number
representing more callous/unemotional traits. The current
sample reported callous/unemotional traits at a slightly
lower level (mean = 31.947) than the middle range of the
scale (middle = 36). The I/CP scale ranges from a total
converted score (total raw score divided by number of scale
items [5]) of 0 to 2 with a higher number representing more
impulsivity/conduct problems reported. The current sample
reported scores slightly lower (mean = .888) than the middle
(middle=1) of the I/CP total converted scale range or on
average the students reported median levels of
impulsivity/conduct problems. The low reliability of the
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I/CP variable should be considered when examining the
results of this study. The N scale ranges from a total
converted score (total raw score divided by number of scale
items [7]) of 0 to 2 with a higher number representing more
narcissism traits reported. The current sample reported
scores somewhat lower (mean = .718) than the middle (middle
= 1) of the N total converted scale range.
Descriptive statistics were also run for the dependent
variables in the study. Results are presented in Table 7.
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Table 7
Descriptive Statistics for Dependent Variables
___________________________________________________________
Dependent Variable

Mean

Standard
Deviation

Cronbach’s
Alpha

___________________________________________________________
Empathic Concern

1.948

.656

.358

Personal Distress

1.719

.641

.278

Perspective Taking

1.821

.630

.207

Behavioral Dysregulation

1.243

.560

.817

Emotional Dysregulation

1.381

1.190

.795

Cognitive Dysregulation

1.520

.584

.816

Behavioral Inhibition

2.413

.7099

.520

Tangible

2.918

.686

.582

Aversive Tx

2.568

.834

.612

Punishment

.437

.673

.792

Dominance

2.819

.672

.819

Tangible

2.023

.815

.681

Aversive Tx

2.220

.902

.734

Punishment

2.950

.759

.905

Dominance

2.168

.845

.885

Outcome Expectancy

Outcome Value

___________________________________________________________
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The Empathic Concern scale ranged from a total
converted (total raw score divided by number of scale items
[6]) scale score of 0 to 4 with higher values indicating
more empathic concern for others. The current sample
reported scores slightly lower (mean = 1.948) than the
middle (middle = 2) of the empathic concern total converted
scale range or on average the students reported close to
median levels of empathic concern. The low reliability of
the variable empathic concern should be considered when
interpreting the results of this study. The Personal
Distress scale ranged from a total converted (total raw
score divided by number of scale items [7]) scale score of
0 to 4 with higher values indicating more feelings of
personal distress. The current sample reported scores
slightly lower (mean = 1.719) than the middle (middle = 2)
of the personal distress total converted scale range or on
average the students reported close to median levels of
empathic concern. The low reliability of the variable
personal distress should be considered when interpreting
the results of this study. The Perspective Taking scale
ranged from a total converted (total raw score divided by
number of scale items [7]) scale score of 0 to 4 with
higher values indicating more reported perspective taking.
The current sample reported scores slightly lower (mean =
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1.821) than the middle (middle = 2) of the perspective

taking total converted scale range or on average the
students reported close to median levels of perspective
taking. The low reliability of the variable perspective
taking should be considered when interpreting the results
of this study.
The Behavioral Dysregulation scale ranged from a total
converted (total raw score divided by number of scale items
[10]) scale score of 0 to 3 with higher values indicating
more reported behavioral dysregulation. The current sample
reported scores slightly lower (mean = 1.243) than the
middle (middle = 1.5) of the behavioral dysregulation total
converted scale range or on average the students reported
close to median levels of behavioral dysregulation. The
Emotional Dysregulation scale ranged from a total converted
(total raw score divided by number of scale items [10])
scale score of 0 to 3 with higher values indicating more
reported emotional dysregulation. The current sample
reported scores slightly lower (mean = 1.381) than the
middle (middle = 1.5) of the emotional dysregulation total
converted scale range or on average the students reported
close to median levels of emotional dysregulation. The
Cognitive Dysregulation scale ranged from a total converted
(total raw score divided by number of scale items [10])
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scale score of 0 to 3 with higher values indicating more
reported cognitive dysregulation. The current sample
reported scores (mean = 1.520) at the middle (middle = 1.5)
of the cognitive dysregulation total converted scale range
or on average the students reported median levels of
cognitive dysregulation.
The Behavioral Inhibition (fear) scale ranged from a
total converted (total raw score divided by number of scale
items [6]) scale score of 1 to 5 with higher values
indicating more behavioral inhibition or fear. The current
sample reported scores somewhat lower (mean = 2.413) than
the middle (middle = 3) of the behavioral inhibition total
converted scale range or on average the students reported
somewhat lower than median levels of behavioral inhibition
or fear.
The Outcome Expectancy measure was composed of four
subscales including tangible (expectation of gaining a
tangible reward by engaging in the negative behavior),
aversive treatment (expectation of reducing future aversive
treatment by engaging in the negative behavior), punishment
(expectation of being punished or getting in trouble for
actions by engaging in the negative behavior), and
dominance (expectation of demonstrating dominance or
showing who is in charge/the boss by engaging in the
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negative behavior). The Outcome Expectancy Tangible scale
ranged from a total converted (total raw score divided by
number of scale items [4]) scale score of 1 to 4 with
higher values indicating more expectation of gaining a
tangible reward. The current sample reported scores
slightly higher (mean = 2.918) than the middle (middle =
2.5) of the tangible total converted scale range or on
average the students reported slightly higher than median
levels of expectation of gaining a tangible reward by
engaging in the negative behavior. The Outcome Expectancy
Aversive Treatment scale ranged from a total converted
(total raw score divided by number of scale items [4])
scale score of 1 to 4 with higher values indicating more
expectation of gaining a tangible reward. The current
sample reported scores (mean = 2.568) at the middle (middle
= 2.5) of the aversive treatment total converted scale
range or on average the students reported median levels of
expectation of reducing future aversive treatment by
engaging in the negative behavior. The Outcome Expectancy
Punishment scale ranged from a total converted (total raw
score divided by number of scale items [8]) scale score of
1 to 4 with higher values indicating more expectation of
being punished or getting in trouble for the negative
behavior. The current sample reported scores (mean = .437)
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at the lower end of the aversive treatment total converted
scale range or on average the students reported low levels
of expectation of being punished or getting in trouble for
engaging in the negative behavior. The Outcome Expectancy
Dominance scale ranged from a total converted (total raw
score divided by number of scale items [8]) scale score of
1 to 4 with higher values indicating more expectation of
demonstrating dominance or showing who is in charge/the
boss by engaging in the negative behavior. The current
sample reported scores slightly higher (mean = 2.819) than
the middle (middle = 2.5) of the aversive treatment total
converted scale range or on average the students reported
slightly higher than the median level expectation of
demonstrating dominance or showing who is in charge/the
boss by engaging in the negative behavior.
The Outcome Value measure was composed of four
subscales including tangible (the value placed in or how
much the student cares about gaining a tangible reward by
engaging in the negative behavior), aversive treatment (the
value placed in or how much the student cares about
reducing future aversive treatment by engaging in the
negative behavior), punishment (the value placed in or how
much the student cares about being punished or getting in
trouble for actions by engaging in the negative behavior),
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and dominance (the value placed in or how much the student
cares about demonstrating dominance or showing who is in
charge/the boss by engaging in the negative behavior). The
Outcome Value Tangible scale ranged from a total converted
(total raw score divided by number of scale items [4])
scale score of 1 to 4 with higher values indicating more
value placed in gaining a tangible reward. The current
sample reported scores slightly lower (mean = 2.023) than
the middle (middle = 2.5) of the tangible total converted
scale range or on average the students reported slightly
lower than median levels of value placed in gaining a
tangible reward by engaging in the negative behavior. The
Outcome Value Aversive Treatment scale ranged from a total
converted (total raw score divided by number of scale items
[4]) scale score of 1 to 4 with higher values indicating
more expectation of gaining a tangible reward. The current
sample reported scores slightly lower (mean = 2.220) than
the middle (middle = 2.5) of the aversive treatment total
converted scale range or on average the students reported
slightly lower than median levels of value placed in
reducing future aversive treatment by engaging in the
negative behavior. The Outcome Value Punishment scale
ranged from a total converted (total raw score divided by
number of scale items [8]) scale score of 1 to 4 with
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higher values indicating more value placed in being
punished or getting in trouble for the negative behavior.
The current sample reported scores somewhat higher (mean =
2.950) than the middle (middle = 2.5) of the aversive

treatment total converted scale range or on average the
students reported somewhat higher than median levels of
value being placed in being punished or getting in trouble
for engaging in the negative behavior. The Outcome Value
Dominance scale ranged from a total converted (total raw
score divided by number of scale items [8]) scale score of
1 to 4 with higher values indicating more value being
placed in demonstrating dominance or showing who is in
charge/the boss by engaging in the negative behavior. The
current sample reported scores slightly lower (mean = 2.168)
than the middle (middle = 2.5) of the aversive treatment
total converted scale range or on average the students
reported slightly lower than the median level of value
placed in demonstrating dominance or showing who is in
charge/the boss by engaging in the negative behavior.
Preliminary Statistical Analyses
The first pre-analysis examined the differences, if
any, between male (N = 57) and female (N = 19) participants
on demographic variables. This analysis was conducted in
order to further describe the sample. Independent sample t-
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tests were conducted with the continuous demographic
variables; whereas, chi-square analyses investigated noncontinuous demographic variables. Results are presented in
Tables 8 (continuous demographic variables) and 9 (noncontinuous demographic variables). The results of the preanalyses examining gender differences should be interpreted
with caution due to the difference in number of males to
females. If no significant gender differences are evident,
it is possible the lack of females compared to males did
not allow for a true comparison between genders.
Table 8
Gender Differences on Continuous Demographic Variables
___________________________________________________________
Levene’s Test

t-test for Equality of Means

For Equality of
Variances
___________________________________________________________
F

Sig.

t

df

Sig.

Mean Diff

Age

.454

.503

-1.619

74

.110

-.772

IQ

.040

.842

1.948

50

.057

8.600

___________________________________________________________
Note. These statistics are those assuming equal variances.
Degrees of freedom are listed as less than 74 when
demographic data was missing from some participants.
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The mean age for females was 16 with a standard
deviation of 1.706. The mean age for males was 15.325 with
a standard deviation of 1.817. The mean IQ for females was
79.25 with a standard deviation of 13.692. The mean IQ for
males was 87.85 with a standard deviation of 13.337. T-test
results indicate no significant gender differences on the
continuous demographic variables of age and IQ. These
results should be interpreted with caution due to the
difference in the number of males (N = 57) and females (N =
19) in this study.
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Table 9
Gender Differences on Non-Continuous Demographic Variables
___________________________________________________________
%Males

%Females

Value

df

Asymp.Sig
(2-sided)

___________________________________________________________
Educ. Prog.
Regular

24.6

42.1

Learning

19.3

21.1

Emotional 56.1

36.8

Ethnicity
Afr.Amer. 64.9

57.9

Caucasian 15.8

21.1

Mixed

21.1

19.3

Diagnosis
No Diag.

20.8

38.9

LD

15.1

0.0

ED

41.5

33.3

MR

1.9

5.6

LD & ED

9.4

0.0

Other

11.3

22.2

Incar.
Previous

42.1

16.7

No Prev.

57.9

83.3
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2.572

2

.276

.364

2

.834

-8.162

5

.148

-3.842

1

.050

Table 9 (continued).
___________________________________________________________
%Males

%Females

Value

df

Asymp.Sig
(2-sided)

___________________________________________________________
Gang

1.193
Involved

16.4

5.9

Not Inv.

83.6

94.1

1

.275

___________________________________________________________
Note. Pearson chi-square analyses are utilized. Afr.Amer. =
African American. No Diag. = no diagnosis. LD = learning
disability. ED = emotional disturbance. MR = mentally
retarded. LD & ED = learning disability and emotional
disturbance. Incar. = incarceration. No Prev. = no previous
incarceration. Not Inv. = not involved.
Results indicate no significant gender differences
between genders on the non-continuous demographic variables
of education program, ethnicity, diagnosis, prior
incarceration, and gang involvement. These results should
be interpreted with caution due to the difference in the
number of males (N = 57) and females (N = 19) in this
study.
The second pre-analysis examined gender differences on
the three predictor variables. If gender differences exist,
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gender will be included in the multiple regression analyses
as an interaction variable. Independent samples t-tests
were utilized to investigate this difference. Results are
presented in Table 10.
Table 10
Gender Differences on Predictor Variables
___________________________________________________________
Levene’s Test

t-test for Equality of Means

For Equality of
Variances
___________________________________________________________
F

Sig.

t

df

Sig.

Mean

C/U

1.501

.224

1.769

74

.081

4.070

I/CP

.302

.584

.830

74

.409

.073

N

.110

.741

1.610

74

.112

.167

Diff

___________________________________________________________
Note. These statistics are those assuming equal variances.
Results indicate no significant differences between
genders among the three predictor variables,
callous/unemotional traits, impulsivity/conduct problems,
and narcissism. Therefore the interaction of gender and any
of the three predictors will not need to be included as an
interaction variable in the multiple regression analyses.
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These results should be interpreted with caution due to the
difference in the number of males (N = 57) and females (N =
19) in this study.
The third pre-analyses for this study included the
investigation of any demographic variables that are
significantly associated with the predictor variables.
Demographic variables were examined in order to determine
if any demonstrated possible covariate status for the main
analyses, meaning the demographic variable was found to be
significantly correlated with a predictor variable.
Demographic variables considered consisted of Sex (male or
female), Age, Race (African American, Caucasian, Hispanic,
Mixed/Multi-racial, Other), Intelligence Quotient (IQ),
Education Program (Regular Education, Learning Support,
Emotional Support, or Both Learning Support and Emotional
Support), Diagnosis (no diagnosis, learning disability,
emotional disturbance, mental retardation, both learning
disability and emotional disturbance, and other), Prior
Incarceration, and Gang Affiliation. Pearson correlation
analysis was utilized with the variables age and IQ due to
their continuous variable status. Sex, prior incarceration,
and gang affiliation are all dichotomous variables thus
requiring the Pearson correlation method. Correlation
results are presented in Table 11. Race, educational
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program, and diagnosis are all variables with more than two
groups; therefore, one-factor ANOVAs were utilized to
examine whether these variables are related to the
continuous independent variables. ANOVA results are
presented in Table 12.
Table 11
Correlation Matrix of Demographics and Predictor Variables
___________________________________________________________
Demographics
______________________________________________________
Age

Sex

IQ

Incar

Gang

______________________________________________________
PVs
___________________________________________________________
C/U

-.155

-.201

.331*

-.019

-.354**

I/CP

-.241*

-.096

.277*

.076

-.236**

N

-.361*

-.184

.423**

.074

-.165

___________________________________________________________
Note. * p < .05 ** p < .01
Results indicate significant relationships at the p =
.05 level between age of participant and
impulsivity/conduct problems (r = -.241) and narcissism (r
= -.361). This relationship indicates that as the age of
the participants increase, they report less
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impulsivity/conduct problems and less narcissism.
Significant relationships were also found between all three
predictors and IQ of participants, which indicates that as
IQ increases so does the participants’ reporting of
callous/unemotional traits, impulsivity/conduct problems,
and narcissism. Gang involvement was significantly
negatively correlated with both callous/unemotional traits
and impulsivity/conduct problems. The students indicating
gang involvement also indicated less callous/unemotional
traits and less impulsivity/conduct problems.
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Table 12
ANOVA Results for Demographics and Predictor Variables
___________________________________________________________
Demographics
______________________________________________________
Race

Educ. Prog.

Diagnoses

______________________________________________________
PVs
___________________________________________________________
C/U

.371

.446

.425

I/CP

.171

.936

.652

N

.747

.579

.100

___________________________________________________________
Note. PVs = predictor variables. Values listed are the p
(significance) values found in the ANOVA summary table.
Results indicate no significant ANOVA analyses. This
indicates the groups were not significantly different and
therefore related with each independent variable.
A fourth pre-analysis examines the relationship among
the predictor variables, callous/unemotional traits,
impulsivity/conduct problems, and narcissism. Although it
is important for predictor variables to be related in
multiple regression analyses, a moderate or high
relationship could result in multicollinearity.
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Correlations are examined among the predictor variables and
results are presented in Table 13.
Table 13
Correlations among the Predictor Variables
___________________________________________________________

C/U

C/U

I/CP

N

---

.361**

.389**

---

.396**

I/CP
N

---

___________________________________________________________
Note. ** p < .01
Results indicate that all three predictor variables
are significantly correlated at a low to moderate level.
Thus, multicollinearity will be investigated during these
analyses by considering the correlations found above and
investigating the variance inflation factors of the
predictors.
Assumptions and Main Analyses
The following section reports the results of the tests
of assumptions and the main analyses for each of the four
research questions.
Research Question 1
The first research question examined the amount of
variance each predictor, the callous/unemotional factor,

179

impulsivity/conduct problems, and narcissism explained in
both emotional and cognitive empathy. Three separate
multiple regression analyses were utilized in this research
question to examine how psychopathic characteristics in
youth were related to levels of empathy. The predictor
variables consisted of the callous/unemotional factor,
impulsivity/conduct problems factor, and the narcissism
factor. The dependent variables for this study were
emotional (empathic concern & personal distress) and
cognitive (perspective taking) empathy.
Before running the main multiple regression analyses,
the tests of assumptions were examined. These results are
for all three of the multiple regressions examined in the
first research question. First, the independence assumption
is considered and determined not to be violated based on
the design of the study and the administration of the tests
to small groups of students seated randomly and distanced
from one another. It is also suggested to examine the
Durbin-Watson statistic to examine the independence
assumption in order to examine the autocorrelation of
errors over the sequence of cases (Tabachnick & Fidell,
2007). Values should be between 1.5 and 2.5. The DurbinWatson statistic was examined for all three multiple
regression analyses in the first research question. All
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values were found to be between the suggested 1.5 and 2.5
and therefore, any correlation among the residuals is
acceptable or the cases are found to be independent.
Second, the test of normality was investigated
utilizing histograms and normal probability plots for each
dependent variable. The results indicate that all dependent
variables followed a normal distribution based on the
histogram graph and the cumulative probability graphs
follow a straight line on the normal probability plots.
Skewness and Kurtosis were also examined to investigate the
normality assumption. Two methods were utilized to examine
whether the skewness and kurtosis were skewed. Both methods
utilized the skewness values obtained from SPSS. The first
method suggested comparing the skewness/kurtosis value with
twice the standard error of skewness/kurtosis including the
range from +/- twice the standard error of
skewness/kurtosis (Price, 2000). If the value for
skewness/kurtosis fell within this range, the
skewness/kurtosis is considered not seriously violated
(Price, 2000). For example, the skewness value for the
variable empathic concern was -.544 and the standard error
was .276. Two times the standard error (2 * .276) equals
.552. So the range that the skewness value should fall
between to not be considered seriously violated is -.552 to
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.552, which is does and therefore skewness is not seriously
violated. The second method to investigate whether or not
skewness and kurtosis were violated involved dividing the
skewness and kurtosis SPSS values by the corresponding
standard error to obtain a z-score. If the z-score fell
outside the +/- 3 range, it was determined that the
skewness or kurtosis was violated. Skewness was found to be
within the expected range for all three dependent
variables. Kurtosis for perspective taking and personal
distress was found to be within the expected range.
Kurtosis for empathic concern was found to be outside of
the expected range for the first method, however, not
significantly. Using an alpha level of .001 is considered
conventional but conservative to evaluate the significance
of skewness and kurtosis with small to moderate samples
(Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007). The kurtosis for empathic
concern was 1.907 outside of the -1.09 to 1.09 range (zscore = 3.50 outside of the +/-3 range); however, the
Shapiro-Wilk test of normality found this to be non
significant at the .001 alpha level (p = .002). Therefore,
the normality assumption was not violated for all three
dependent variables.
Third, the test of linearity was investigated in order
to determine whether the relationship between the
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independent and dependent variables were linear. This was
accomplished through the examination of plots that
displayed the residuals versus the predicted dependent
variable. Each dependent variable was examined. All three
dependent variables evidenced points scattered randomly
around the line originating from the mean of the residuals
and therefore, do not violate the assumption of linearity.
Fourth, the assumption of homoscedasticity was examined by
looking at the residual scatter plots and whether or not
the points scatter evenly about the line originating from
the mean of the residuals. The examination of the scatter
plots of each of the dependent variables indicated points
evenly scattered and therefore, there is no violation of
homoscedasticity. Finally, multicollinearity was assessed
due to the moderate correlation among the independent
variables. The Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) was examined
for this purpose. The VIF for the independent variables
were all below 10 and therefore, multicollinearity is not
an issue. No assumptions were violated for the three
multiple regressions and therefore all three multiple
regression main analyses can be run.
Demographic statistics and the correlation matrix for
all three predictor variables and dependent variables for
research question 1 are presented in Table 14.
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Table 14
Correlation Matrix and Descriptive Statistics: Three
Predictors and Dependent Variables (Empathic Concern,
Personal Distress, Perspective Taking)
___________________________________________________________
Mean

SD

1

2

3

Emp. Conc.

1.948

.656

-.577***

-.210*

-.357**

Per. Dist.

1.719

.641

-.107

.000

-.107

Pers. Tak.

1.820

.630

-.324*

-.102

-.106

1. C/U

31.947

8.806

---

2. I/CP

.888

.330

3. Narcissism

.718

.396

Predictor Var.
.361***

.389***

---

.396***
---

___________________________________________________________
Note. N = 76. Emp. Conc. = Empathic Concern; Per. Dist. =
Personal Distress; Pers. Tak. = Perspective Taking.
*** p < .001 ** p = .002 * p < .05
Results indicate empathic concern was significantly
negatively correlated with all independent variables.
Perspective taking was significantly negatively correlated
with callous/unemotional traits.
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Each dependent variable was independently regressed
onto the three predictor variables. Results are presented
separately in Tables 14-18.
The first regression analysis for the first research
question examined the independent variables
(callous/unemotional traits, impulsivity/conduct problems,
and narcissism) and the dependent variable empathic concern
(a measure of emotional empathy). Stepwise analyses were
utilized for this multiple regression. Results are
presented in Table 15.
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Table 15
Stepwise Regression Analysis Summary for Independent
Variables Predicting Empathic Concern
___________________________________________________________
Model

B

β

SEB

t

Sig.

___________________________________________________________
1
C/U

-.043

.007

-.577

-6.072

.000

-.022

.983

-1.532

.130

Excluded IVs
I/CP
Narc.

___________________________________________________________
Note. Predictors in the Model: (Constant),
callous/unemotional. Dependent Variable: empathic concern.
R² = .333, F (1,74) = 36.874, p < .001.
Stepwise analyses indicate Model 1 to include the
independent variable callous/unemotional. The variables
impulsivity/conduct problems and narcissism were removed
from the model due to insignificant contribution to the
variance of empathic concern (emotional empathy). This
model explains 33.3% of the variance in emotional empathy.
Results indicate Model 1 (including only the
callous/unemotional variable) significantly predicts
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empathic concern (F = 36.874, p < .001).
Callous/unemotional traits explain 33.3% of variance in
empathic concern. This suggests the higher level of
callous/unemotional traits significantly predicts lower
levels of empathic concern for others or emotional empathy.
Results of this analysis should be interpreted with caution
due to the low reliability found for the variable empathic
concern (Cronbach’s Alpha = .358). Additionally, although
the regression analysis did not identify narcissism as a
significant predictor variable, it should not be ruled out
as important in explaining empathic concern due to its
significant relationship/effect size (-.357, p = .002) with
this dependent variable.
The second regression analysis examined the
independent variables and the dependent variable personal
distress (a measure of emotional empathy). Stepwise
analyses were attempted but did not produce any significant
models. Enter analyses were then attempted with all three
independent variables. Results are presented in Table 16.
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Table 16
Multiple Regression Analysis Summary for Independent
Variables Predicting Personal Distress
___________________________________________________________
Model

B

β

SEB

t

Sig.

___________________________________________________________
1
C/U

-.007

.010

-.095

-.727

.470

I/CP

.142

.254

.073

.560

.577

-.160

.215

-.099

-.745

.459

N

___________________________________________________________
Note. R² = .021, F (3,72) = .507, p = .679.
Again, stepwise analyses were attempted but did not
produce any significant models. Enter analyses were then
attempted with all three independent variables. All three
variables entered into the regression analyses resulted in
insignificant results (F = .507, p = .679). The model
explains an insignificant 2.1% of the variance in personal
distress (emotional empathy). This suggests any model of
callous/unemotional traits, impulsivity/conduct problems,
and narcissism did not significantly predict personal
distress or one measure of emotional empathy. Results of
this analysis should be interpreted with caution due to the

188

low reliability found for the variable personal distress
(Cronbach’s Alpha = .278).
The third regression analysis examined the independent
variables and the dependent variable perspective taking
(cognitive empathy). Stepwise analyses were utilized.
Results are presented in ..
Table 17
Stepwise Regression Analysis Summary for Independent
Variables Predicting Perspective Taking
___________________________________________________________
Model

B

β

SEB

t

Sig.

___________________________________________________________
1
C/U

-.023

.008

-.324

-2.945

.004

I/CP

.017

.142

Narc.

.023

.195

Excluded IVs

__________________________________________________________
Note. Predictors in the Model: (Constant),
callous/unemotional. Dependent Variable: perspective
taking. R² = .105, F (1,74) = 8.675, p = .004.
As predicted, the callous/unemotional trait
significantly negatively correlated with perspective taking
(Table 13; r = -.324).
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Stepwise analyses indicate Model 1 to include the
independent variable callous/unemotional. The variables
impulsivity/conduct problems and narcissism were removed
from the model due to insignificant contribution to the
variance of perspective taking (cognitive empathy). This
model explains 10.5% of the variance in cognitive empathy.
Results indicate Model 1 (including only the
callous/unemotional variable) significantly predicts
perspective taking (F = 8.675, p = .004). This model
suggests higher levels of callous/unemotional traits
significantly predicts lower levels of perspective taking
or cognitive empathy. Results of this analysis should be
interpreted with caution due to the low reliability found
for the variable perspective taking (Cronbach’s Alpha =
.207).
Research Question 2
The second research question examined if the
callous/unemotional factor, impulsivity/conduct problems
factor, and narcissism factor predict dysregulated
behaviors (behavioral, emotional, and cognitive. The
predictor variables were callous/unemotional factor,
impulsivity/conduct problems factor, and narcissism factor.
The dependent variables were behavioral dysregulation,
emotional dysregulation, and cognitive dysregulation. Three
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multiple regression analyses were run with the three
predictors and each dependent variable separately.
Before running the main multiple regression analyses,
the test assumptions were examined. First, the independence
assumption is considered and determined not to be violated
based on the design of the study and the administration of
the tests to small groups of students seated randomly and
distanced from one another for all three dependent
variables. It is also suggested to examine the DurbinWatson statistic to examine the independence assumption in
order to examine the autocorrelation of errors over the
sequence of cases (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007). Values
should be between 1.5 and 2.5. The Durbin-Watson statistic
was examined for all three multiple regression analyses in
the second research question. All values were found to be
between the suggested 1.5 and 2.5 and therefore, any
correlation among the residuals is acceptable or the cases
are found to be independent.
Second, the test of normality was investigated
utilizing histograms and normal probability plots for each
dependent variable. The results indicate that the dependent
variables behavioral dysregulation and cognitive
dysregulation followed a normal distribution based on the
histogram graph and the cumulative probability graphs
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follow a straight line on the normal probability plots.
Skewness and Kurtosis were also examined to investigate the
normality assumption. Two methods were utilized to examine
whether the skewness and kurtosis were skewed. Both methods
utilized the skewness values obtained from SPSS. The first
method suggested comparing the skewness/kurtosis value with
twice the standard error of skewness/kurtosis including the
range from +/- twice the standard error of
skewness/kurtosis (Price, 2000). If the value for
skewness/kurtosis fell within this range, the
skewness/kurtosis is considered not seriously violated
(Price, 2000). For example, the skewness value for the
variable empathic concern was -.544 and the standard error
was .276. Two times the standard error (2 * .276) equals
.552. So the range that the skewness value should fall
between to not be considered seriously violated is -.552 to
.552, which is does and therefore skewness is not seriously
violated. The second method to investigate whether or not
skewness and kurtosis were violated involved dividing the
skewness and kurtosis SPSS values by the corresponding
standard error to obtain a z-score. If the z-score fell
outside the +/- 3 range, it was determined that the
skewness or kurtosis was violated. Skewness and kurtosis
were found to be within the expected range for the
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dependent variables: behavioral dysregulation and cognitive
dysregulation. These results indicate no violation of the
normality assumption for the dependent variables of
behavioral dysregulation and cognitive dysregulation.
The assumption of normality was found to be violated
with the dependent variable of emotional dysregulation.
Examination of the histogram graph and cumulative
probability graphs indicate the presence of an outlier.
Skewness (5.132) and kurtosis (36.792) were found to be
outside of the expected range. According to the first
method of examining skewness and kurtosis, the skewness was
outside of the expected -.552 to .552 range and the
kurtosis was outside of the expected -1.09 to 1.09 range.
According to the second method of examining skewness and
kurtosis, the skewness z-score (18.594) was outside the +/3 range and the kurtosis z-score (67.508) was also outside
the +/- range.
There are many suggestions to correct violations of
normality such as removing outlier cases and transforming
variables (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007). It was determined
that the most efficient way to correct this violation would
be to remove the outlier case (case 30). Removing this case
resulted in the correction of the normality assumption. The
dependent variable emotional dysregulation followed a
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normal distribution based on the histogram graph and the
cumulative probability graphs follow a straight line on the
normal probability plots. With the removal of case 30,
skewness and kurtosis were found to be within the expected
ranges with both methods for emotional dysregulation.
Third, the test of linearity was investigated in order
to determine whether the relationship between the
independent and dependent variables were linear. This was
accomplished through the examination of plots that
displayed the residuals versus the predicted dependent
variable. Each dependent variable was examined. All three
dependent variables evidenced points scattered randomly
around the line originating from the mean of the residuals
and therefore, do not violate the assumption of linearity.
Fourth, the assumption of homoscedasticity was
examined by looking at the residual scatter plots and
whether or not the points scatter evenly about the line
originating from the mean of the residuals. The examination
of the scatter plots of the dependent variables behavioral
and cognitive dysregulation indicated points evenly
scattered and therefore, there is no violation of
homoscedasticity for those two dependent variables.
Homoscedasticity was found to be violated for the dependent
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variable emotional dysregulation. The removal of the
outlier case corrected this violation.
Multicollinearity was also assessed due to the
moderate correlation among the independent variables. The
Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) was examined for this
purpose. The VIF for the independent variables were all
below 10 and therefore, multicollinearity is not an issue.
No assumptions were violated for two of the multiple
regressions behavioral and cognitive dysregulation and
therefore multiple regression main analyses can be run. The
normality and homoscedasticity assumptions were violated
for the dependent variable emotional dysregulation.
Removing the outlier case resulted in correction of these
violations and therefore, the multiple regression main
analyses will be run minus the one outlier case.
Demographic statistics and the correlation matrix for
all three predictor variables and dependent variables for
research question 2 are presented in Table 18.
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Table 18
Correlation Matrix and Descriptive Statistics: Three
Predictors and Dependent Variables (Behavioral
Dysregulation, Emotional Dysregulation, and Cognitive
Dysregulation)
___________________________________________________________
Mean

SD

1

2

3

Beh. Dys.

1.243

.560

.134

.134

.130

Emot. Dys.

1.266

.647

.018

.118

.072

Cog. Dys.

1.519

.584

.277*

.108

-.079

1. C/U

31.947

8.806

---

.361***

.389***

2. I/CP

.888

.330

---

.396***

3. Narcissism

.718

.396

Predictor Var.

---

___________________________________________________________
Note. N = 76 for behavioral dysregulation and cognitive
dysregulation. N = 75 for emotional dysregulation. Beh.
Dys.= Behavioral Dysregulation; Emot. Dys.= Emotional
Dysregulation; Cog. Dys.= Cognitive Dysregulation.
*** p < .001 * p < .05
Results indicate cognitive dysregulation was
significantly correlated with callous/unemotional traits.
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The first regression analysis examined the independent
variables and the dependent variable behavioral
dysregulation. Stepwise analyses were attempted but did not
produce any significant models. Enter analyses were then
attempted with all three independent variables. Results are
presented in Table 19.
Table 19
Multiple Regression Analysis Summary for Independent
Variables Predicting Behavioral Dysregulation
___________________________________________________________
Model

B

β

SEB

t

Sig.

___________________________________________________________
1
I/CP

.132

.221

.078

.599

.551

C/U

.005

.008

.079

.607

.546

N

.097

.187

.069

.520

.604

___________________________________________________________
Note. R² = .030, F (3,72) = .741, p = .531.
Again, stepwise analyses were attempted but did not
produce any significant models. Enter analyses were then
attempted with all three independent variables. All three
variables entered into the regression analyses resulted in
no significance (F = .741, p = .531). The model explains an
insignificant 3% of the variance in behavioral
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dysregulation. Callous/unemotional traits,
impulsivity/conduct problems, and narcissism do not
significantly predict behavioral dysregulation.
The second regression analysis examined the
independent variables (callous/unemotional traits,
impulsivity/conduct problems, and narcissism) and the
dependent variable emotional dysregulation. As previously
mentioned, the one outlier case was removed from the main
regression analysis.
Stepwise analyses were attempted but did not produce
any significant models. Enter analyses were then attempted
with all three independent variables. Results are presented
in Table 20.
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Table 20
Multiple Regression Analysis Summary for Independent
Variables Predicting Emotional Dysregulation
___________________________________________________________
Model

B

β

SEB

t

Sig.

___________________________________________________________
1
I/CP

.396

.254

.204

1.559

.123

C/U

-.005

.010

-.062

-.473

.638

N

.026

.216

.016

.118

.906

___________________________________________________________
Note. R² = .038, F (3,71) = .941, p = .426.
Again, stepwise analyses were attempted but did not
produce any significant models. Enter analyses were then
attempted with all three independent variables. All three
variables entered into the regression analyses resulted in
no significance (F = .941, p = .426). The model explains an
insignificant 3.8% of the variance in emotional
dysregulation. Callous/unemotional traits,
impulsivity/conduct problems, and narcissism do not
significantly predict emotional dysregulation.
The third regression analysis examined the independent
variables (callous/unemotional traits, impulsivity/conduct
problems, and narcissism) and the dependent variable
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cognitive dysregulation. Stepwise analyses were utilized.
Results are presented in Table 21.
Table 21
Stepwise Regression Analysis Summary for Independent
Variables Predicting Cognitive Dysregulation
___________________________________________________________
Model

B

β

SEB

t

Sig.

___________________________________________________________
1
C/U

.018

.007

.277

2.484

.015

.070

.945

-1.848

.069

Excluded IVs
I/CP
Narc.

___________________________________________________________
Note. Predictors in the Model: (Constant),
callous/unemotional. Dependent Variable: cognitive
dysregulation. R² = .077, F (1,74) = 6.170, p = .015.
Stepwise analyses indicate Model 1 to include the
independent variable callous/unemotional. The variables
impulsivity/conduct problems and narcissism were removed
from the model due to insignificant contribution to the
variance of cognitive dysregulation. This model explains
7.7% of the variance in cognitive dysregulation. Results
indicate Model 1 (including only the callous/unemotional
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variable) significantly predicts cognitive dysregulation (F
= 6.170, p = .015). Higher levels of callous/unemotional
traits significantly predict higher levels of cognitive
dysregulation.
Interpretation of the three previous regression
analyses should consider the low reliability of the I/CP
variable (Cronbach’s Alpha = .441) and the affect this may
have had on its predictive relationship with the dependent
variables.
Research Question 3
The third research question investigated how much
variance in behavioral inhibition or fearfulness is
explained by the callous/unemotional, impulsivity/conduct
problems, and narcissism factors. One multiple regression
analysis was run to examine whether the predictor variables
(callous/unemotional, impulsivity/conduct problems,
narcissism) explained a low level of fear or behavioral
inhibition (dependent variable) in community aggressive
youth.
Before running the main multiple regression analyses,
the test assumptions were examined. First, the independence
assumption is considered and determined not to be violated
based on the design of the study and the administration of
the tests to small groups of students seated randomly and
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distanced from one another. It is also suggested to examine
the Durbin-Watson statistic to examine the independence
assumption in order to examine the autocorrelation of
errors over the sequence of cases (Tabachnick & Fidell,
2007). Values should be between 1.5 and 2.5. The DurbinWatson statistic was examined for all three multiple
regression analyses in the second research question. All
values were found to be between the suggested 1.5 and 2.5
and therefore, any correlation among the residuals is
acceptable or the cases are found to be independent.
Second, the test of normality was investigated
utilizing histograms and normal probability plots for each
dependent variable. The results indicate that the dependent
variable followed a normal distribution based on the
histogram graph and the cumulative probability graphs
follow a straight line on the normal probability plots.
Skewness and kurtosis were also investigated to examine the
assumption of normality. Two methods were utilized to
examine whether the skewness and kurtosis were skewed. Both
methods utilized the skewness values obtained from SPSS.
The first method suggested comparing the skewness/kurtosis
value with twice the standard error of skewness/kurtosis
including the range from +/- twice the standard error of
skewness/kurtosis (Price, 2000). If the value for
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skewness/kurtosis fell within this range, the
skewness/kurtosis is considered not seriously violated
(Price, 2000). For example, the skewness value for the
variable empathic concern was -.544 and the standard error
was .276. Two times the standard error (2 * .276) equals
.552. So the range that the skewness value should fall
between to not be considered seriously violated is -.552 to
.552, which is does and therefore skewness is not seriously
violated. The second method to investigate whether or not
skewness and kurtosis were violated involved dividing the
skewness and kurtosis SPSS values by the corresponding
standard error to obtain a z-score. If the z-score fell
outside the +/- 3 range, it was determined that the
skewness or kurtosis was violated. Skewness and kurtosis
for the dependent variable behavioral inhibition or fear
were found to be within the expected range. These results
indicate no violation of the normality assumption.
Third, the test of linearity was investigated in order
to determine whether the relationship between the
independent and dependent variables were linear. This was
accomplished through the examination of plots that
displayed the residuals versus the predicted dependent
variable. The dependent variable evidenced points scattered
randomly around the line originating from the mean of the
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residuals and therefore, did not violate the assumption of
linearity.
Fourth, the assumption of homoscedasticity was
examined by looking at the residual scatter plot and
whether or not the points scatter evenly about the line
originating from the mean of the residuals. The examination
of the scatter plot of the dependent variable indicated
points evenly scattered and therefore, there is no
violation of homoscedasticity. Finally, multicollinearity
was also assessed due to the moderate correlation among the
independent variables. The Variance Inflation Factor (VIF)
was examined for this purpose. The VIF for the independent
variables were all below 10 and therefore,
multicollinearity is not an issue. No assumptions were
violated for the multiple regression and therefore the main
analysis can be run.
Demographic statistics and the correlation matrix for
all three predictor variables and the dependent variable
for research question 3 are presented in Table 22.
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Table 22
Correlation Matrix and Descriptive Statistics: Three
Predictors and Dependent Variable (Fear/Behavioral
Inhibition)
___________________________________________________________
Mean
Fear/Beh. Inh. 2.413

SD

1

2

3

.709

-.376***

-.063

-.050

---

.361***

.389***

---

.396***

Predictor Var.
1. C/U

31.947

8.806

2. I/CP

.888

.330

3. Narcissism

.718

.396

---

___________________________________________________________
Note. N = 76. Fear/Beh. Inh.= Fear/Behavioral Inhibition.
*** p < .001
Results indicate fear/behavioral inhibition was
significantly negatively correlated with
callous/unemotional traits.
The multiple regression analysis for the third
research question examined the independent variables
(callous/unemotional traits, impulsivity/conduct problems,
and narcissism) and the dependent variable fear (behavioral
inhibition). Stepwise analyses were utilized for this
multiple regression. Results are presented in Table 23.
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Table 23
Stepwise Regression Analysis Summary for Independent
Variables Predicting Fear (Behavioral Inhibition)
___________________________________________________________
Model

B

β

SEB

t

Sig.

___________________________________________________________
1
C/U

-.039

.009

-.376

-3.490

.001

I/CP

.084

.725

Narc.

.967

.337

Excluded IVs

___________________________________________________________
Note. Predictors in the Model: (Constant),
callous/unemotional. Dependent Variable: fear/behavioral
inhibition. R² = .141, F (1,74) = 12.183, p = .001.
Stepwise analyses indicate Model 1 to include the
independent variable callous/unemotional. The variables
impulsivity/conduct problems and narcissism were removed
from the model due to insignificant contribution to the
variance of fear or behavioral inhibition. This model
explains 14.1% of the variance in fear/behavioral
inhibition. Results indicate Model 1 (including only the
callous/unemotional variable) significantly predicts
empathic concern (F = 12.18, p = .001). Callous/unemotional
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traits explain 14.1% of variance in empathic concern.
Higher levels of callous/unemotional traits significantly
presents lower levels of behavioral inhibition or fear.
Research Question 4
The final research question examined whether the
predictors callous/unemotional traits, impulsivity/conduct
problems, and narcissistic traits predict social-cognitive
processes in community youth displaying aggressive
behaviors. The dependent variable social-cognitive
processes were defined further into outcome expectancies
and outcome values. Each of these two variables were broken
into 4 subcategories including gaining tangible rewards,
reducing aversive treatment, receiving punishment for
his/her actions, and demonstrating who is the boss or in
charge. Therefore, eight multiple regression analyses were
run with three predictors and all eight dependent variables
examined separately.
Before running the main multiple regression analyses,
the test assumptions were examined. The results of the test
assumptions for the first four multiple regressions
concerning the outcome expectancy variables are discussed
here. First, the independence assumption is considered and
determined not to be violated based on the design of the
study and the administration of the tests to small groups
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of students seated randomly and distanced from one another.
It is also suggested to examine the Durbin-Watson statistic
to examine the independence assumption in order to examine
the autocorrelation of errors over the sequence of cases
(Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007). Values should be between 1.5
and 2.5. The Durbin-Watson statistic was examined for all
four multiple regression analyses in the outcome expectancy
component of research question four. All values were found
to be between the suggested 1.5 and 2.5 and therefore, any
correlation among the residuals is acceptable or the cases
are found to be independent.
Second, the test of normality was investigated
utilizing histograms and normal probability plots for each
dependent variable. The results indicate that the dependent
variable followed a normal distribution based on the
histogram graph and the cumulative probability graphs
follow a straight line on the normal probability plots.
Skewness and kurtosis were also investigated to examine the
assumption of normality. Two methods were utilized to
examine whether the skewness and kurtosis were skewed. Both
methods utilized the skewness values obtained from SPSS.
The first method suggested comparing the skewness/kurtosis
value with twice the standard error of skewness/kurtosis
including the range from +/- twice the standard error of
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skewness/kurtosis (Price, 2000). If the value for
skewness/kurtosis fell within this range, the
skewness/kurtosis is considered not seriously violated
(Price, 2000). For example, the skewness value for the
variable empathic concern was -.544 and the standard error
was .276. Two times the standard error (2 * .276) equals
.552. So the range that the skewness value should fall
between to not be considered seriously violated is -.552 to
.552, which is does and therefore skewness is not seriously
violated. The second method to investigate whether or not
skewness and kurtosis were violated involved dividing the
skewness and kurtosis SPSS values by the corresponding
standard error to obtain a z-score. If the z-score fell
outside the +/- 3 range, it was determined that the
skewness or kurtosis was violated. Skewness and kurtosis
for the outcome expectancy dependent variables reduce
aversive treatment, being punished for his/her actions, and
showing who is in charge or the boss was found to be within
the expected range as well as kurtosis for the outcome
expectancy dependent variable gaining a tangible reward.
Skewness for the outcome expectancy dependent variable
gaining a tangible reward was found to be outside of the
expected range, however, not significantly. Using an alpha
level of .001 is considered conventional but conservative
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to evaluate the significance of skewness and kurtosis with
small to moderate samples (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007). The
skewness for the outcome expectancy gaining a tangible
reward was .588 outside of the -.552 to .552 range
according to the first method (z-score = 2.13 within the
+/- range according to the second method); however, the
Shapiro-Wilk test of normality found this to be non
significant at the .001 alpha level (p = .003). These
results indicate no violation of the normality assumption
for all four outcome expectancy dependent variables.
Third, the test of linearity was investigated in order
to determine whether the relationship between the
independent and dependent variables were linear. This was
accomplished through the examination of plots that
displayed the residuals versus the predicted dependent
variable. Each dependent variable was examined. The
dependent variables evidenced points scattered randomly
around the line originating from the mean of the residuals
and therefore, did not violate the assumption of linearity.
Fourth, the assumption of homoscedasticity was examined by
looking at the residual scatter plot and whether or not the
points scatter evenly about the line originating from the
mean of the residuals. The examination of the scatter plot
of the dependent variables indicated points evenly
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scattered and therefore, there is no violation of
homoscedasticity. Finally, multicollinearity was also
assessed due to the moderate correlation among the
independent variables. The Variance Inflation Factor (VIF)
was examined for this purpose. The VIF for the independent
variables were all below 10 and therefore,
multicollinearity is not an issue. No assumptions were
violated for the multiple regressions and therefore the
main analyses can be run.
Demographic statistics and the correlation matrix for
all three predictor variables and the dependent variables
for research question 4 are presented in Table 24.
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Table 24
Correlation Matrix and Descriptive Statistics: Three
Predictors and Outcome Expectancy Dependent Variables
(Tangible, Reduce Aversive Treatment, Trouble/Punished,
Boss/In Charge).
___________________________________________________________
Mean

SD

1

2

3

Tangible

2.918

.686

.151

.055

.120

Avers. Tx.

2.568

.834

.050

-.082

-.008

Trbl/Punish.

2.437

.673

.166

-.055

.113

Boss/In Charge 2.189

.672

.158

.121

.221*

---

.361***

.389***

---

.396***

Predictor Var.
1. C/U

31.947

8.806

2. I/CP

.888

.330

3. Narcissism

.718

.396

---

___________________________________________________________
Note. N = 76. Avers.Tx. = Aversive Treatment; Trbl/Punish =
Trouble/Punished. * p < .05 *** p < .001
Results indicate the outcome expectancy variable
showing who is the boss or in charge was positively
correlated with narcissism at the .05 level.
The first multiple regression analysis for the outcome
expectancy research question examined whether the
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independent variables (callous/unemotional traits,
impulsivity/conduct problems, and narcissism) predicts the
dependent variable gaining a tangible reward. Stepwise
analyses were attempted but did not produce any significant
models. Enter analyses were then attempted with all three
independent variables. Results are presented in Table 25.
Table 25
Multiple Regression Analysis Summary for Independent
Variables Predicting Outcome Expectancy: Obtaining a
Tangible Reward
___________________________________________________________
Model

B

SEB

β

t

Sig.

___________________________________________________________
1
C/U

.010

.010

.128

.986

.327

I/CP

-.046

.271

-.022

-.169

.867

N

.136

.229

.079

.505

.554

___________________________________________________________
Note. R² = .028, F (3,72) = .681, p = .567.
Again, stepwise analyses were attempted but did not
produce any significant models. Enter analyses were then
attempted with all three independent variables. All three
variables entered into the regression analyses resulted in
insignificance (F = .681, p = .567). The model explains an
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insignificant 2.8% of the variance in the expectancy of
obtaining a tangible reward (outcome expectancy: tangible).
Callous/unemotional traits, impulsivity/conduct problems,
and narcissism do not significantly predict the outcome
expectancy of gaining a tangible reward.
The second multiple regression analysis for the
outcome expectancy research question examined whether the
independent variables (callous/unemotional traits,
impulsivity/conduct problems, and narcissism) predict the
outcome expectancy dependent variable reducing aversive
treatment. Stepwise analyses were attempted but did not
produce any significant models. Enter analyses were then
attempted with all three independent variables. Results are
presented in Table 26.
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Table 26
Multiple Regression Analysis Summary for Independent
Variables Predicting Outcome Expectancy: Reducing Aversive
Treatment
___________________________________________________________
Model

B

SEB

β

t

Sig.

___________________________________________________________
1
C/U

.009

.012

.091

.695

.489

I/CP

-.292

.332

-.116

-.881

.381

N

.004

.280

.002

.015

.988

___________________________________________________________
Note. R² = .014, F (3,72) = .342, p = .795.
Again, stepwise analyses were attempted but did not
produce any significant models. Enter analyses were then
attempted with all three independent variables. All three
variables entered into the regression analyses resulted in
insignificance (F = .342, p = .795). The model explains an
insignificant 1.4% of the variance in the outcome
expectancy of reducing aversive treatment.
Callous/unemotional traits, impulsivity/conduct problems,
and narcissism did not significantly predict the outcome
expectancy of reducing aversive treatment.
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The third multiple regression analysis for the outcome
expectancy research question examined whether the
independent variables (callous/unemotional traits,
impulsivity/conduct problems, and narcissism) predict the
dependent variable outcome expectancy: getting in trouble
or being punished. Stepwise analyses were attempted but did
not produce any significant models. Enter analyses were
then attempted with all three independent variables.
Results are presented in Table 27.
Table 27
Multiple Regression Analysis Summary for Independent
Variables Predicting Outcome Expectancy: Getting in Trouble
or Punished
___________________________________________________________
Model

B

SEB

β

t

Sig.

___________________________________________________________
1
C/U

.014

.010

.184

1.432

.156

I/CP

-.334

.263

-.164

-1.273

.207

N

.181

.222

.107

.818

.416

___________________________________________________________
Note. R² = .052, F (3,72) = 1.311, p = .278.
Again, stepwise analyses were attempted but did not
produce any significant models. Enter analyses were then
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attempted with all three independent variables. All three
variables entered into the regression analyses resulted in
insignificance (F = 1.311, p = .278). The model explains an
insignificant 5.2% of the variance in the outcome
expectancy of getting in trouble or being punished.
Callous/unemotional traits, impulsivity/conduct problems,
and narcissism did not significantly predict the outcome
expectancy of getting in trouble or being punished.
The fourth multiple regression analysis for the
outcome expectancy research question examined whether the
independent variables (callous/unemotional traits,
impulsivity/conduct problems, and narcissism) predict the
dependent variable outcome expectancy: showing who is the
boss or in charge. Stepwise analyses were attempted but did
not produce any significant models. Enter analyses were
then attempted with all three independent variables.
Results are presented in Table 28.
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Table 28
Multiple Regression Analysis Summary for Independent
Variables Predicting Outcome Expectancy: Showing who is the
Boss or who’s in charge
___________________________________________________________
Model

B

β

SEB

t

Sig.

___________________________________________________________
1
C/U

.006

.010

.080

.623

.535

I/CP

.042

.261

.021

.160

.874

N

.309

.221

.182

1.398

.166

___________________________________________________________
Note. R² = .055, F (3,72) = 1.408, p = .247.
Again, stepwise analyses were attempted but did not
produce any significant models. Enter analyses were then
attempted with all three independent variables. All three
variables entered into the regression analyses resulted in
insignificance (F = 1.408, p = .247). The model explains an
insignificant 5.5% of the variance in the outcome
expectancy of showing who’s the boss or who’s in charge.
Callous/unemotional traits, impulsivity/conduct problems,
and narcissism do not significantly predict the outcome
expectancy of showing who the boss is or who is in charge.
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The next section of research question four examined
whether the predictors callous/unemotional traits,
impulsivity/conduct problems, and narcissistic traits
predict outcome value social-cognitive processes in
community youth displaying aggressive behaviors. The
outcome values variable was also broken down into 4
subcategories including gaining tangible rewards, reducing
aversive treatment, receiving punishment for his/her
actions, and demonstrating who is the boss or in charge.
Before running the main multiple regression analyses, the
test assumptions were examined. The results of the test
assumptions for the set of four multiple regressions
concerning the outcome values variables are discussed.
First, the independence assumption is considered and
determined not to be violated based on the design of the
study and the administration of the tests to small groups
of students seated randomly and distanced from one another.
It is also suggested to examine the Durbin-Watson statistic
to examine the independence assumption in order to examine
the autocorrelation of errors over the sequence of cases
(Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007). Values should be between 1.5
and 2.5. The Durbin-Watson statistic was examined for all
four multiple regression analyses in the outcome expectancy
component of research question four. All values were found
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to be between the suggested 1.5 and 2.5 and therefore, any
correlation among the residuals is acceptable or the cases
are found to be independent.
Second, the test of normality was investigated
utilizing histograms and normal probability plots for each
dependent variable. The results indicate that the outcome
values dependent variables of getting in trouble or
punished and showing who is the boss or in charge followed
a normal distribution based on the histogram graph and the
cumulative probability graphs follow a straight line on the
normal probability plots. The outcome values dependent
variables of tangible reward and reducing aversive
treatment evidenced non-normal distributions that appeared
slightly positively skewed. Skewness and kurtosis were also
investigated to examine the assumption of normality. Two
methods were utilized to examine whether the skewness and
kurtosis were skewed. Both methods utilized the skewness
values obtained from SPSS. The first method suggested
comparing the skewness/kurtosis value with twice the
standard error of skewness/kurtosis including the range
from +/- twice the standard error of skewness/kurtosis
(Price, 2000). If the value for skewness/kurtosis fell
within this range, the skewness/kurtosis is considered not
seriously violated (Price, 2000). For example, the skewness
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value for the variable empathic concern was -.544 and the
standard error was .276. Two times the standard error (2 *
.276) equals .552. So the range that the skewness value
should fall between to not be considered seriously violated
is -.552 to .552, which is does and therefore skewness is
not seriously violated. The second method to investigate
whether or not skewness and kurtosis were violated involved
dividing the skewness and kurtosis SPSS values by the
corresponding standard error to obtain a z-score. If the zscore fell outside the +/- 3 range, it was determined that
the skewness or kurtosis was violated. Skewness and
kurtosis for the outcome values dependent variables being
punished for his/her actions and showing who is in charge
or the boss was found to be within the expected ranges.
Kurtosis was within expected ranges for the outcome values
dependent variables gaining a tangible reward and reducing
aversive treatment; however, skewness for these two
variables was found to be significantly outside of the
expected range according to the first method of examining
skewness. Using an alpha level of .001 is considered
conventional but conservative to evaluate the significance
of skewness and kurtosis with small to moderate samples
(Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007). The skewness for the outcome
value gaining a tangible reward was .604 outside of the -
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.552 to .552 range for the first method (z-score=2.188
within the +/-3 range for the second method); the ShapiroWilk test of normality found this to be significant at the
.001 alpha level (p < .001). The skewness for the outcome
value reducing aversive treatment was .569 outside of the .552 to .552 range according to the first method (z-score =
2.062 within the +/-3 for the first method); the ShapiroWilk test of normality found this to be significant at the
.001 alpha level (p < .001).
There are many suggestions to correct violations of
normality such as removing outlier cases and transforming
variables (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007). Square root
transformations are suggested for positive skews that
differ moderately from normal (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007)
as is the case here. Square root transformations were
performed with both the outcome value dependent variables
of gaining a tangible reward and reducing aversive
treatment. For the outcome values dependent variable of
gaining a tangible reward, the new skewness was .256,
within the -.552 to .552 range (z-score = .928 within the
+/-3 range). For the outcome values dependent variable of
reducing aversive treatment, the new skewness was .284,
within the -.552 to .552 range (z-score = 1.029 within the
+/- 3 range). Both square root transformations were
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successful, reducing the skewness to within the expected
ranges.
Third, the test of linearity was investigated in order
to determine whether the relationship between the
independent and dependent variables were linear. This was
accomplished through the examination of plots that
displayed the residuals versus the predicted dependent
variable. Each dependent variable was examined. The
dependent variables evidenced points scattered randomly
around the line originating from the mean of the residuals
and therefore, did not violate the assumption of linearity.
Fourth, the assumption of homoscedasticity was examined by
looking at the residual scatter plot and whether or not the
points scatter evenly about the line originating from the
mean of the residuals. The examination of the scatter plots
of the dependent variables indicated points evenly
scattered and therefore, there is no violation of
homoscedasticity. Finally, multicollinearity was also
assessed due to the moderate correlation among the
independent variables. The Variance Inflation Factor (VIF)
was examined for this purpose. The VIF for the independent
variables were all below 10 and therefore,
multicollinearity is not an issue. In summary, assumptions
were not violated for the outcome values dependent
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variables of getting in trouble or being punished and
showing who is the boss or in charge. The normality
assumption was violated for both the outcome values
dependent variables of gaining a tangible reward and
reducing aversive treatment. Square root transformations
successfully corrected this violation. All other
assumptions for these two variables were not violated. Main
analyses are investigated below.
Demographic statistics and the correlation matrix for
all three predictor variables and the dependent variables
for research question 4 are presented in Table 29.
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Table 29
Correlation Matrix and Descriptive Statistics: Three
Predictors and Outcome Values Dependent Variables
(Tangible, Reduce Aversive Treatment, Trouble/Punished,
Boss/In Charge).
___________________________________________________________
Mean

SD

1

2

3

Tangible

1.394

.283

.287**

.187

.242*

Avers. Tx.

1.460

.299

.175

-.077

.027

Trbl/Punish.

2.950

.759

.372***

.134

.147

Boss/In Charge 2.168

.845

.010

.074

.048

---

.361***

.389***

---

.396***

Predictor Var.
1. C/U

31.947

8.806

2. I/CP

.888

.330

3. Narcissism

.718

.396

---

___________________________________________________________
Note. N = 76. Avers.Tx. = Aversive Treatment; Trbl/Punish =
Trouble/Punished. * p < .05 ** p < .01 *** p < .001
Results indicate callous/unemotional traits,
impulsivity/conduct problems, and narcissism were
significantly correlated with the outcome value dependent
variable of gaining a tangible reward. Callous/unemotional
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traits were also correlated with the outcome value
dependent variable of getting in trouble or being punished.
The first multiple regression analysis for the outcome
values research question examined whether the independent
variables (callous/unemotional traits, impulsivity/conduct
problems, and narcissism) predict the dependent variable
tangible reward. Stepwise analyses were utilized for this
multiple regression. Results are presented in Table 30.
Table 30
Stepwise Regression Analysis Summary for Independent
Variables Predicting Outcome Values: Obtaining a Tangible
Reward
___________________________________________________________
Model

B

β

SEB

t

Sig.

___________________________________________________________
1
C/U

.009

.004

.287

2.578

.012

I/CP

.805

.424

Narc.

1.276

.206

Excluded IVs

___________________________________________________________
Note. Predictors in the Model: (Constant),
callous/unemotional. Dependent Variable: outcome value:
tangible. R² = .082, F (1,74) = 6.647, p = .012.

226

Stepwise analyses indicate Model 1 to include the
independent variable callous/unemotional. The variables
impulsivity/conduct problems and narcissism were removed
from the model due to insignificant contribution to the
variance of outcome value: tangible. This model explains
8.2% of the variance in value of obtaining a tangible
outcome. Results indicate Model 1 (including only the
callous/unemotional variable) significantly predicts the
value of obtaining a tangible outcome (F = 6.647, p =
.012). Callous/unemotional traits explain 8.2% of variance
in the value of obtaining a tangible outcome. Higher levels
of callous/unemotional traits significantly predict higher
levels of value in obtaining a tangible outcome. Although
the regression analysis did not identify narcissism as a
significant predictor variable, it should not be ruled out
as important in explaining the outcome value of obtaining
tangible reward due to its significant relationship/effect
size (.242, p < .05) with this dependent variable.
The second multiple regression analysis for the
outcome values research question examined whether the
independent variables (callous/unemotional traits,
impulsivity/conduct problems, and narcissism) predict the
outcome values dependent variable: reducing aversive
treatment. Stepwise analyses were attempted but did not
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produce any significant models. Enter analyses were then
attempted with all three independent variables. Results are
presented in Table 31.
Table 31
Multiple Regression Analysis Summary for Independent
Variables Predicting Outcome Values: Reducing Aversive
Treatment
___________________________________________________________
Model

B

β

SEB

t

Sig.

___________________________________________________________
1
C/U

.008

.004

.233

1.812

-.074

I/CP

-.146

.117

-.161

-1.252

.215

N

.000

.098

.001

.004

.997

___________________________________________________________
Note. R² = .053, F (3,72) = 1.345, p = .267.
Again, stepwise analyses were attempted but did not
produce any significant models. Enter analyses were then
attempted with all three independent variables. All three
variables entered into the regression analyses resulted in
non significant results (F = 1.345, p = .267). The model
explains an insignificant 5.3% of the variance in the
outcome value of reducing aversive treatment.
Callous/unemotional traits, impulsivity/conduct problems,
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and narcissism do not significantly predict the outcome
value of reducing aversive treatment.
The third multiple regression analysis for the outcome
values research question examined whether the independent
variables (callous/unemotional traits, impulsivity/conduct
problems, and narcissism) predict the dependent variable
getting in trouble or being punished. Stepwise analyses
were utilized for this multiple regression. Results are
presented in Table 32.
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Table 32
Stepwise Regression Analysis Summary for Independent
Variables Predicting Outcome Values: Getting in
Trouble/Being Punished
___________________________________________________________
Model

B

β

SEB

t

Sig.

___________________________________________________________
1
C/U

.032

.009

.372

3.448

.001

I/CP

-.005

.996

Narc.

.020

.984

Excluded IVs

___________________________________________________________
Note. Predictors in the Model: (Constant),
callous/unemotional. Dependent Variable: outcome value:
getting in trouble/being punished. R² = .138, F (1,74) =
11.889, p = .001.

Stepwise analyses indicate Model 1 to include the
independent variable callous/unemotional. The variables
impulsivity/conduct problems and narcissism were removed
from the model due to insignificant contribution to the
variance of outcome value: getting in trouble/being
punished. This model explains 13.8% of the variance in the
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value of getting in trouble/being punished. Results
indicate Model 1 (including only the callous/unemotional
variable) significantly predicts the value of obtaining a
tangible outcome (F = 11.889, p = .001).
Callous/unemotional traits explain 13.8% of variance in the
value of getting in trouble/being punished. Higher levels
of callous/unemotional traits significantly predicted
higher outcome value of not caring about getting in trouble
or being punished.
The fourth multiple regression analyses for the
outcome values research question examined whether the
independent variables (callous/unemotional traits,
impulsivity/conduct problems, and narcissism) predict the
outcome values dependent variable: showing who’s the boss
or who’s in charge. Stepwise analyses were attempted but
did not produce any significant models. Enter analyses were
then attempted with all three independent variables.
Results are presented in Table 33.
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Table 33
Multiple Regression Analysis Summary for Independent
Variables Predicting Outcome Values: Showing who’s the boss
or who’s in Charge
___________________________________________________________
Model

B

β

SEB

t

Sig.

___________________________________________________________
1
C/U

-.003

.013

-.028

I/CP

.184

.337

.072

N

.064

.285

.030

-.210

.834

.544

.588

.224

.823

___________________________________________________________
Note. R² = .006, F (3,72) = .156, p = .926.
Again, stepwise analyses were attempted but did not
produce any significant models. Enter analyses were then
attempted with all three independent variables. All three
variables entered into the regression analyses resulted in
insignificance (F = .156, p = .926). The model explains an
insignificant .6% of the variance in the outcome value of
showing who’s the boss or who’s in charge.
Callous/unemotional traits, impulsivity/conduct problems,
and narcissism did not significantly predict the outcome
value of showing who the boss is or who is in charge.
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Follow-up Regression Analyses
Follow-up regression analyses originally proposed in
chapter 3 to be used to examine if the significant effects
remained after controlling for significantly related
demographic variables were not included do to the fact that
the number of participants with data including all three
significant demographic variables (age, IQ, and gang
involvement) decreased the sample size to 49 and with 4
predictor variables to enter into the regression analyses
it was determined that any results from these analyses
would be suspect.
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CHAPTER 5
DISCUSSION
Chapter 5 discusses the implications of the analyses
presented in chapter 4. Findings are compared to current
research. Limitations of the current study are discussed
including recommendations for future research.
Research Findings
As hypothesized, youth who reported more
callous/unemotional traits also reported significantly less
empathic concern for others and less perspective taking.
Callous/unemotional traits predicted these youth reporting
difficulty in relating to and understanding how another
person feels. These youth (reporting more
callous/unemotional traits) unexpectedly reported
significantly more cognitive dysregulation. Thus youth
reporting callous/unemotional traits reported difficulty
with such things as making a plan for important goals,
putting plans into action, and consider consequences of
behaviors. Further endorsing callous/unemotional traits did
significantly predict cognitive dysregulation contrary to
prediction. Additionally, as hypothesized, this group
evidencing more callous/unemotional traits reported
significantly less behavioral inhibition/fear and
unexpectedly, callous/unemotional traits significantly
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predicted behavioral inhibition/fear. Therefore, youth
reporting callous/unemotional traits also reported having
less fear in situations typical of inducing such a feeling
such as fear when driving with someone who is speeding or
fear when entering a darkened room.
Reporting all three characteristics (IVs)
callous/unemotional traits, impulsivity/conduct problems,
or narcissism did not significantly predict personal
distress (the second measure of emotional empathy), or
behavioral or emotional dysregulation. In other words,
these variables did not predict negative feelings in
distressing situations (personal distress), difficulty in
controlling one’s behaviors (behavioral dysregulation), or
difficulty in controlling one’s emotions (emotional
dysregulation).
Social-cognitive processes associated with increased
expectations and values associated with the positive
outcomes of aggressive behavior and decreased expectations
and values associated with the negative consequences for
aggressive behavior were examined in terms of psychopathic
traits. Reporting all three characteristics (IVs)
callous/unemotional traits, impulsivity/conduct problems,
and narcissism did not predict positive expectations for
the outcome of their behaviors (expecting to receive a
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tangible reward, expecting to reduce aversive treatment,
and expecting to demonstrate dominance) or decreased
expectations in terms of the negative consequences of their
aggressive behaviors (expecting to not get in trouble or
punished). However, youth reporting more
callous/unemotional traits did predict the value placed in
obtaining tangible rewards and not getting in trouble or
being punished by engaging in aggressive behaviors. These
youth (reporting callous/unemotional traits) cared about
being able to obtain the tangible reward as well as not
getting in trouble or punished for their aggressive
behaviors.
Results of the current study should be interpreted
with caution in terms of the low reliability of the
variables impulsivity/conduct problems (Cronbach’s Alpha =
.441), empathic concern (Cronbach’s Alpha = .358), personal
distress (Cronbach’s Alpha = .278), and perspective taking
(Cronbach’s Alpha = .207).
Additionally, the practical significance of the
narcissism variable in predicting or explaining variance in
both the empathic concern and outcome value of gaining a
tangible reward should be considered. Although regression
analyses for both of these variables did not identify
narcissism as a significant predictor, narcissism
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demonstrated a significant correlation with these variables
that could result in a meaningful effect if the sample size
had been larger.
Results Compared with Pardini et al. (2003) study
The current study was designed to extend the findings
reported by Pardini, Lochman, and Frick in 2003. The
current sample investigated aggressive adolescents who were
served in the community as compared to Pardini’s (2003)
sample examining adjudicated youth. All of the measures
used in the 2003 study were included in this study along
with several updates. For example, the current study used
the three factor model when examining psychopathic traits
including callous/unemotional traits, impulsivity/conduct
problems, and narcissism whereas the previous study used
the two factor callous/unemotional traits and
impulsivity/conduct problems. Also, the current study
examined three types of dysregulation including emotional,
behavioral, and cognitive as compared to the Pardini et al.
(2003) study, which included only the behavioral
dysregulation scale. Unique to the current study is an
updated ICU measure (Frick, 2003). These similarities and
differences are considered in the interpretation of
findings with the community-based adolescents (current
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study) and adjudicated adolescents in residential treatment
settings (previous study).
Several findings were consistent across the samples.
First, callous/unemotional traits and not
impulsivity/conduct problems (or narcissism) was
significantly negatively related to and predictive of both
empathic concern and perspective taking.
Callous/unemotional traits did not significantly relate or
predict behavioral dysregulation. The callous/unemotional
trait demonstrated a negative relationship with personal
distress; however, this relationship was not found to be
significant. Callous/unemotional traits insignificantly
related to less personal distress or less negative affect
when confronted with typically stress inducing situations
such as medical emergencies. Finally, callous/unemotional
traits were significantly negatively related to and
predictive of behavioral inhibition/fear. In other words,
youth reporting callous/unemotional traits also report a
lack of unpleasant affect in the anticipation of distress
(behavioral inhibition/fear).
In contrast, several findings were not consistent
across community and adjudicated samples.
Impulsivity/conduct problems were not significantly related
to or predictive of behavioral dysregulation. Unlike
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adjudicated youth, community youth reporting
impulsivity/conduct problems did not report significant
behavioral dysregulation or the inability to control
behaviors such as staying in their seat, remaining on-task,
and refraining from arguing with others. Unlike the Pardini
et al. (2003) study, neither callous/unemotional traits nor
impulsivity/conduct problems demonstrated a significant
relationship with personal distress and neither was
predictive of personal distress when entered into a
regression analysis.
Regression analyses concerning psychopathic traits and
social cognitive processes resulted in findings that are
inconsistent with the Pardini (2003) study. For example,
Pardini et al., (2003) found that callous/unemotional
traits were positively related to the outcome expectancy
variables gaining a tangible reward and showing who is the
boss or in charge and negatively related to getting in
trouble/punished. In the community sample, the
callous/unemotional factor was positively related to all
outcome expectancy variables but not significantly. In the
previous study, callous/unemotional traits significantly
predicted the outcome expectancy of gaining tangible
rewards, getting in trouble/punished, and demonstrating
dominance; however, none of these predictions were
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evidenced in the current study. Callous/unemotional traits
were not found to be significantly related to or predictive
of the expectation that aggression would reduce future
aversive treatment.
Consistent with the previous study,
impulsivity/conduct problems were not found to be
significantly related to or predictive of any of the
outcome expectation subscales in the current study.
In terms of the outcome values placed on aggressive
behaviors, the Pardini et al. (2003) study found
callous/unemotional traits to be positively related to
outcome values of tangible rewards and demonstrating
dominance and negatively related to values placed on
getting in trouble or being punished. The current study
found callous/unemotional traits to be significantly
positively related to and predictive of the outcome value
placed on obtaining tangible rewards and not getting in
trouble/being punished. It should be noted that the
interpretation of the findings from the community sample
and the adjudicated sample concerning the expectation of
getting in trouble or being punished was similar in that
both the adjudicated and community samples reporting
callous/unemotional traits placed more value in not getting
in trouble or being punished.
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Consistent with the Pardini and colleagues (2003)
study, the impulsivity/conduct problems was not
significantly related to or predictive of any of the four
outcome value subscales.
Results Compared to other Relevant Literature
These results contribute to the current literature
base discussed in chapter 2. First, the current study did
not appear to support the three factor model of
callous/unemotional traits, impulsivity/conduct problems,
and narcissism previously found with community samples of
elementary students (Frick et al., 2000). Neither the
impulsivity/conduct problems nor the narcissism trait
predicted any of the dependent variables. It is especially
important to note that the impulsivity/conduct problems
variable was not predictive of behavioral impulsivity as
found in past research (Loeber et al., 2001; Frick et al.,
1994). The narcissism variable had been included as an
exploratory variable in order to investigate how it related
to and/or predicted variables typically associated with
psychopathic traits. The narcissism variable did not result
in any significant predictions and even very few
significant relationships with the dependent variables;
therefore, from this study, it appears that the narcissism
factor alone does not distinguish psychopathic traits in
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this sample of community youth. Narcissism as defined by
this construct may have meaning for younger children but
not for adolescents. It may be that the narcissism factor
is more predictive when combined with the
impulsivity/conduct problems factor. Previous research
demonstrated difficulty in discriminating between the
impulsivity/conduct problems and narcissism variables
(Caputo et al., 1999; Christian et al., 1997; Frick et al.,
1994) and therefore, it is possible that separating the
narcissism and impulsivity/conduct problems in the current
study reduced the predictability of these constructs when
examined together. Further, it is possible that impulsivity
may manifest differently in younger community samples.
Second, consistent with previous research (Frick et
al., 2003; Soderstrom et al., 2002; Blair, 1999) the
current study found a relationship between less empathy and
callous/unemotional traits. Callous/unemotional traits were
found to predict low levels of both emotional and cognitive
empathy. Therefore, the current participants reporting more
callous/emotional traits also reported less of an ability
to understand the affective and cognitive state of another
individual as well as feel the same emotions of another
(Borke, 1971; 1973) and/or feeling sympathetic or
compassionate toward another (Feshbach & Roe, 1968). This
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demonstrates that aggressive community youth reporting
callous/unemotional traits demonstrate a similar
relationship with low levels of empathy as adjudicated
(Pardini et al., 2003), clinic-referred (Frick et al.,
1994) and community (Frick et al., 2003b) youth as well as
adults (Soderstrom et al., 2002; Hare, 1993). This
consistent finding has implications for both categorizing
and planning for interventions with aggressive youth.
Third, the current study found a connection between
callous/unemotional traits and cognitive dysregulation that
was not evidenced in previous research studies. Cognitive
dysregulation has been related to conduct problems (Loeber
et al., 2001), and found in both children with psychopathic
traits and adult psychopaths (Viding, 2004). Similarly,
researchers have also demonstrated impairments in adult
psychopaths’ executive functions which control an
individual’s ability to plan, sustain attention,
concentrate, and inhibit inappropriate or impulsive
behaviors (Gorenstein, 1982). However, cognitive
dysregulation/impulsivity has not specifically related to
the callous/unemotional trait alone. This finding could be
suggestive of how callous/unemotional traits are defined in
community youth. The separation of the impulsivity/conduct
problems and narcissism traits may have affected the

243

impulsivity/conduct problem variable’s ability to predict
cognitive dysregulation. Additionally, impulsivity/conduct
problems were not related to dysregulation as expected. In
previous research, the presences of both the
callous/unemotional trait and conduct problems when
compared with conduct problems alone predicted higher
levels of impulsivity-hyperactivity or behavioral
dysregulation (Frick et al., 2003b). The current study
lacked support for this finding with neither the
callous/unemotional trait or impulsivity/conduct problems
predicting behavioral dysregulation. In the current sample
of community aggressive youth, dysregulation related
differently than typically expected and warrants further
study.
Fourth, the current study’s finding concerning less
fear evidenced in those displaying callous/unemotional
traits is consistent with previous research (Frick et al.,
2003b; Rothbart & Bates, 1998; Kagan & Snidman, 1991) where
children evidencing callous/unemotional traits also
demonstrate less behavioral inhibition. Although not
examined specifically in this study, it is possible as
previously theorized (Frick & Morris, 2004; Loney et al.,
2003) that these community youth’s reported less
fear/behavioral inhibition affected their conscience
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development and/or their ability to develop empathy and
thus resulted in the reported callous/unemotional traits.
Finally, the current study findings offered
inconsistent evidence for a connection between psychopathic
traits and social cognitive processes. The current research
did not demonstrate the connection between
callous/unemotional traits and the expectation of reward as
found in previous research (O’Brien & Frick, 1996; Kosson &
Newman, 1986). However, consistent with previous research
(Pardini et al., 2003) callous/unemotional traits were
related to the youth reporting that they cared about
gaining the tangible reward as well as getting in trouble.
Interestingly, previous research has suggested that a lack
of behavioral inhibition may affect a child’s development
of empathy, leading to an interpersonal style focused on
the possible rewards of their aggressive acts rather than
the harm they may cause to themselves or others (Loney et
al., 2003). While the youth in this study reported a
relationship between callous/unemotional traits and
behavioral inhibition, they did not report an expectation
of obtaining a tangible reward. Therefore, the current
study may offer clarification for the previous research in
that community youth reporting callous/unemotional traits
may not “expect” to receive a tangible reward through their
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aggressive acts but may place a high value in obtaining the
reward. In other words, they may not assume they will get
the reward but they do really care about being able to
obtain the reward.
Limitations
As in all studies, the current study is not without
its limitations. One of the first limitations is the use of
self-report data. Rutter (2005) argues that self-report
measures draw on subjective judgments of their own
emotional concern and regard for another’s feelings. It is
unclear how similarly young people view themselves in
comparison with the way others view them (Rutter, 2005).
However, multivariate taxonic analyses suggest that youth
self-report were significantly more valid than parent and
teacher reports (Vasey, Kotov, Frick, & Loney, 2005).
Additionally, Loney and colleagues (2003) offer substantial
evidence supporting the use of self-report measures to
assess psychopathic features in adolescents. Evidence
suggests that there is actually an increase in the
reliability of child self-report data during adolescence on
most types of child psychopathology, whereas parent and
teacher report validity decreases (Kamphaus & Frick, 1996).
Second, accurate parent report is often unavailable due to
many out of home placements (Loney et al., 2003). Finally,
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self-report measures, such as the Antisocial Personality
Screening Device, have demonstrated success in
differentiating subgroups of juvenile offenders and
assessing psychopathic traits in adolescent and young adult
samples (Caputo et al., 1999; Kruh, Frick & Clements, 2005;
Loney et al., 2003; Silverthorn, Frick & Reynolds, 2002;
Lilienfeld & Andrews, 1996; Lynam et al., 1999; Salekin et
al., 2003).
Other cautions include sample considerations. First,
results can only be applied to community samples that are
placed in an alternative education setting. Caution should
be used when considering findings in relation to other
groups such as incarcerated or adjudicated youth or those
who live in the community but attend typical educational
settings. Finally, it should be acknowledge that none of
these samples are totally pure. That is, a student who is
now in the community may have been adjudicated or
incarcerated in the past. Relatedly, although the sample
size was adequate it was not large. A larger sample may
have provided stronger effect sizes. Further, a larger
sample size may have improved internal consistencies for
some of the variables. For example, impulsivity/conduct
problems, empathic concern, personal distress, perspective
taking, behavioral inhibition, and outcome expectancy of
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gaining a tangible reward were in the low ( < .60) range
which may have affected the reliability of these variables.
This sample included both males and females. While
there were no gender effects in the sample, researchers are
unclear how psychopathic traits look in females (Verona &
Vitale, 2006). Study results need to be interpreted with
the caution that there is lack of knowledge concerning
females and psychopathic traits, especially adolescent
females and psychopathic traits.
Finally, although psychopathy has been described as a
stable, unchangeable, and biologically based personality
trait that defines those that will be lifelong criminals
(Pardini et al, 2003). This is not a conclusion that should
be applied to the participants in this study. The existence
of psychopathic traits in the youth in this study should
not be used for diagnosis, adjudication, or sentencing
(Pardini et al., 2003). Alternatively, the information
obtained should be used as support for applying the
construct of psychopathy to youth that may contribute to
the maintenance of antisocial behavior of some aggressive
community adolescents.
Future Research
In the future, research focusing on larger samples of
community-based youth would allow for a more thorough
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understanding of psychopathic traits in this population.
Longitudinal studies with community populations would
greatly improve the understanding of psychopathic traits as
they manifest through development and allow for a
connection between the adult psychopathy literature and the
emerging literature focusing on youth who evidence similar
psychopathic traits.
The current study examined three factors including
callous/unemotional traits, impulsivity/conduct problems,
and narcissism. It would be important for future research
to extend the findings of the current study by examining
two factors, the callous/unemotional trait and the
combination of the impulsivity/conduct problems and
narcissism factors, with a community sample of youth
displaying aggressive behaviors who attend an alternative
education center in order to further define psychopathic
traits in this population.
Future research may benefit from examining the
relationship of psychopathic traits and each factor of
dysregulation including behavioral, emotional, and
cognitive with various samples in order to investigate if
the current findings are similarly evidenced in other
populations.
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Continuing to examine psychopathic traits as they
apply to youth will offer further understanding into the
nature of these traits in children and what implications
the findings may have for children demonstrating these
traits early in life. The more psychopathic traits are
understood throughout the lifespan, the more information
will be available to develop interventions that may prevent
or alter the effects these traits could have when developed
into adulthood.
Conclusion
To summarize, severe antisocial behavior affects many
facets of today’s society (Connor, 2002). Not only are
these behaviors being witnessed in adults but also their
roots are traced to childhood (Broidy, 2003; Loeber, 1982;
Waschbusch, 2002). Yet, simply downward extending adult
criteria to youth is problematic (Lynam, 1997; Salekin et
al., 2001). Not all antisocials will evidence the trait
patterns consistent with psychopathy (Gacono et al., 2001;
Hughes & Gacono, 2004). However, those who show
psychopathic traits also show severe and violent aggressive
behaviors, poor treatment outcomes and high rates of
recidivism (Hare, 1993; Salekin et al., 2004; Serin & Amos,
1995). In youth, conduct problems and callous/unemotional
characteristics are associated with characteristics of
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adulthood psychopathy (Loeber, 1982; Lynam, 1997; Porter et
al., 2001). This study adds to the developing literature
clarifying the construct of psychopathy in community
aggressive youth, including the nature of psychopathic
traits and the relationship to social-cognitive processes.

251

References
Achenbach, T. M., Conners, C. K., Quay, H. C., Verhultst,
F. C., & Howell, C. T. (1989). Replications of
empirically derived syndromes as a basis for taxonomy
of child/adolescent psychopathology. Journal of
Abnormal Child Psychology, 17, 299-323.
Achenbach, T. M., & Edelbrock, C. S. (1978). The
classification of child psychopathology: A review and
analysis of empirical efforts. Psychological Bulletin,
85, 1275-1301.
American Psychological Association (APA, 1994). Diagnostic
and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, 4th edition
(DSM-IV). Washington, DC: American Psychiatric
Association.
Ames, R., Ames, C. & Garrison, W. (1977). Children's
causal ascriptions for positive and negative
interpersonal outcomes. Psychological Reports, 41,
595-602.
Anderson, A. K., & Phelps, E. A. (2001). Lesions of the
human amygdala impair enhanced perception of
emotionally salient events. Nature, 411, 305-309.

252

Angrilli, A., Mauri, A., Palomba, D., Flor, H., Birhaumer,
N., Sartori, G., et al. (1996). Startle reflex and
emotion modulation impairment after a right amygdala
lesion. Brain, 119, 1991-2000.
Aniskiewicz, A. S. (1979). Autonomic components of
vicarious conditioning and psychopathy. Journal of
Clinical Psychology, 35, 60-67.
Asarnow, J. R., & Callan, J. W. (1985). Boys with peer
adjustment problems: Social cognitive processes.
Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology, 49,
323–330.
Asendorpf, J. B., & Nunner-Winkler, G. (1992). Children’s
moral motive strength and temperamental inhibition
reduce their immoral behaviour in real moral
conflicts. Child Development, 63, 1223-1235.
Atkins, M. S., & Stoff, D. M. (1993). Instrumental and
hostile aggression in childhood disruptive behavior
disorders. Journal of Abnormal Child Psychology, 21,
165-178.
Atkins, M. S., Stoff, D. M., Osborne, M. L., & Brown, K.
(1993). Distinguishing instrumental and hostile
aggression: Does it make a difference? Journal of
Abnormal Child Psychology, 21, 355-365.

253

Bandura, A. (1973). Aggression: a social-learning analysis.
Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.
Bandura, A. (1978). Social learning theory of aggression.
Journal of Communication (pre-1986), 28, 3-15.
Barratt, E. S. (1994). Impulsiveness and aggression. In J.
Monahan & H. Steadman (Eds.), Violence and Mental
Disorders: developments in risk assessment, (pp. 6179). Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
Barratt, E. S., Stanford, M. S., Dowdy, L., Liebman, M. J.,
& Kent, T. A. (1999). Impulsive and premeditate
aggression: a factor analysis of self-reported acts.
Psychiatry Research, 86, 163-173.
Bechara, A., Damasio, H., & Damasio, A. R. (2000). Emotion,
decision making and the orbitofrontal cortex. Cerebral
Cortex, 10, 295-307.
Beck, A. T. (1976). Cognitive therapy and the emotional
disorders. New York: International Universities Press.
Beck, A. T., & Freeman, A. (1990). Cognitive therapy of
personality disorders. New York: Guilford Press.
Bjorkqvist, K., Osterman, K., & Kaukiainen, A. (1992). The
development of direct and indirect aggressive
strategies in males and females. In K. Bjorkqvist & P.
Niemela (Eds.), Of mice and women: Aspects of female
aggression (pp.51-64). San Diego, CA: Academic Press.

254

Blackburn, R. (2006). Other theoretical models of
psychopathy. In C.J. Patrick (Ed.), Handbook of
Psychopathy (pp.35-57). New York: Guilford Press.
Blair, R. J. R. (1995). A cognitive developmental approach
to morality: investigating the psychopath. Cognition,
57, 1-29.
Blair, R. J. R. (1999). Responsiveness to distress cues in
the child with psychopathic tendencies. Personality
and Individual Differences, 27, 135-145.
Blair, R. J. R. (2001). Neuro-cognitive models of
aggression, the antisocial personality disorders and
psychopathy. Journal of Neurology, Neurosurgery and
Psychiatry, 71, 727-731.
Blair, R. J. R. (2003). Neurobiological basis of
psychopathy. British Journal of Psychiatry, 182, 5-7.
Blair, R. J. R. (2006). Subcortical brain systems in
psychopathy: the amygdala and associated structures.
In C. J. Patrick (Ed.), Handbook of Psychopathy
(pp.296-312). New York: Guilford Press.
Blair, R. J. R., Colledge, E., & Mitchell, D. G. (2001).
Somatic markers and response reversal: Is there
orbitofrontal cortex dysfunction in boys with
psychopathic tendencies? Journal of Abnormal Child
Psychology, 29, 499-511.

255

Blair, R. J. R., Colledge, E., Murray, L., & Mitchell, D.
G.(2001). A selective impairment in the processing of
sad and fearful expression in children with
psychopathic tendencies. Journal of Abnormal Child
Psychology, 29, 491-498.
Blair, R. J. R., Jones, L., Clark, F., & Smith, M. (1997).
The psychopathic individual: a lack of responsiveness
to distress cues? Psychophysiology, 34, 192-198.
Blair, R. J. R., Mitchell, D., & Blair, K. (2005). The
psychopath: Emotion and the brain. Malden, MA:
Blackwell Publishing.
Blair, R. J. R., Mitchell, D., Leonard, A., Budhani, S.,
Peschardt, K. S., & Newman, C. (2004). Passive
avoidance learning in individuals with psychopathy:
modulation by reward but not by punishment.
Personality and Individual Differences, 37, 1179-1192.
Blanchard, R. J., & Blanchard, D. C. (1984). Affect and
aggression: An animal model applied to human behavior.
In R.J. Blanchard & D.C. Blanchard (Eds.), Advances in
the study of aggression (pp.1-62). New York: Academic
Press.
Blanchard, R. J., Blanchard, D. C., & Takahashi, L. K.
(1977). Attack and defensive behaviour in the albino
rat. Animal behavior, 25, 197-224.

256

Boldizar, J. P., Perry, D. G., & Perry, L. C. (1989).
Outcome values and aggression. Child Development, 60,
571-579.
Borke, H. (1971). Interpersonal perception of young
children: Egocentrism or empathy? Developmental
Psychology, 5, 263-269.
Borke, H. (1973). The development of empathy in Chinese and
American children between three and six years of age:
A cross-culture study. Developmental Psychology,
9, 102-108.
Bowlby, J. (1969). Attachment and loss (Vol.1). New York:
Basic Books.
Broidy, L. M., Tremblay, R. E., Brame, B., Fergusson, D.,
Horwood, J. L., Laird, R., et al. (2003).
Developmental trajectories of childhood disruptive
behaviors and adolescent delinquency: a six-site,
cross-national study. Developmental Psychology, 39,
22-245.
Buss, D. M. (1999). Human nature and individual
differences: The evolution of human personality. In L.
A. Pervin & O. P. John (Eds.), Handbook of personality
theory and research (2nd ed., pp. 31-56). New York:
Guilford Press.

257

Capaldi, D. M., & Rothbart, M. K. (1992). Development and
validation of an Early Adolescent Temperament Measure.
Journal of Early Adolescence, 12, 153-173.
Caputo, A. A., Frick, P. J., & Brodsky, S. L. (1999).
Family violence and juvenile sex offending: Potential
mediating roles of psychopathic traits and negative
attitudes toward women. Criminal Justice and
Behavior, 26, 338-356.
Caspi, A. (2000). The child is father to the man:
Personality continuities from childhood to adulthood.
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 78, 158172.
Center for Disease Control (n.d.). Youth violence in NCICP
fact book, 2001-2002. Retrieved July 6, 2005., from
http://www.cdc.gov/ncipc/fact_book/31_Youth_Violence%2
0s.htm.
Christian, R. E., Frick, P. J., Hill, N. L., Tyler, L., &
Frazer, D. R. (1997). Psychopathy and conduct problems
in children: implications for subtyping children with
conduct problems. Journal of the American Academy of
Child & Adolescent Psychiatry, 36, 233-241.
Cleckley, H. (1941). The Mask of Sanity, (4th ed). New York:
Mosby Medical Library.

258

Cleckley, H. (1976). The Mask of Sanity, (5th ed). New York:
Mosby Medical Library.
Cloninger, C. R. (1987). A systematic method for clinical
description and classification of personality
variants. Archives of General Psychiatry, 44, 573-588.
Connor, D. F. (2002). Aggression and antisocial behavior
in children and adolescents: research and treatment.
New York: The Guilford Press.
Cook, D. J., & Michie, C. (2001). Refining the construct
of psychopathy: Towards a hierarchical model.
Psychological Assessment, 13, 171-188.
Cooke, D. J., Michie, C., Hart, S. D., & Clark, D. A.
(2004). Reconstructing psychopathy: Clarifying the
significance of antisocial and socially deviant
behavior in the diagnosis of psychopathic personality
disorder. Journal of Personality Disorders, 18, 337357.
Cools, R., Clark, L., Owen, A. M. & Robbins, T. W. (2002).
Defining the neural mechanisms of probabilistic
reversal learning using event-related functional
magnetic resonance imaging. Journal of Neuroscience,
22, 4563-4567.
Cornell, D. G., Warren, J., Hawk, G., Stafford, E., Oram,

259

G., & Pine, D. (1996). Psychopathy in instrumental and
reactive violent offenders. Journal of Consulting and
Clinical Psychology, 64, 783-790.
Crick, N. R., & Dodge, K. A. (1994). A review and
reformulation of social information processing
mechanisms in children’s social adjustment.
Psychological Bulletin, 115, 74-101.
Crick, N. R., & Dodge, K. A. (1996). Social-information
processing mechanisms in reactive and proactive
aggression. Child Development, 67, 993-1002.
Crick, N. R., & Grotpeter, J. K. (1995). Relational
aggression, gender, and social-psychological
adjustment. Child Development, 66, 710-722.
Crick, N. R., & Ladd, G. W. (1990).Children’s perceptions
of the outcomes of aggressive strategies: do the ends
justify being mean? Developmental Psychology, 26, 612620.
Crick, N. R., & Werner, N. E. (1998). Response decision
processes in relational and overt aggression. Child
Development, 69, 1630-1639.
Cruise, K. R., Colwell, L. H., Lyons, P. M., & Baker, M.
(2003). Prototypical analysis of adolescent
psychopathy: Investigating the juvenile justice
perspective. Behavioral Sciences & the Law, 21,

260

829-846.
Damasio, A. R., Tranel, D., & Damasio, H. C. (1990).
Individuals with sociopathic behaviour caused by
frontal damage fail to respond autonomically to social
stimuli. Behavioural Brain Research, 41, 81-94.
Davis, M. H. (1980). A multidimensional approach to
individual differences in empathy. Catalog of Selected
Documents in Psychology, 10, MS. 2124, p85.
Davis, M. H. (1983). Measuring individual differences in
empathy: evidence for a multidimensional approach.
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 44, 113126.
Davis, M. H. (2000). The role of the amygdala in
conditioned and unconditioned fear and anxiety. In J.
P. Aggleton (Ed.), The Amygdala: A functional
analysis, (pp.289-310). Oxford: Oxford University
Press.
Davis, M. H., & Franzoi, S. L. (1991). Stability and change
in adolescent self-consciousness and empathy. Journal
of Research in Personality, 25, 70-87.
Day, R., & Wong, S. (1996). Anomalous perceptual
asymmetries for negative emotional stimuli in the
psychopath. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 105, 648652.

261

Desimone, R., & Duncan, J. (1995). Neural mechanisms of
selective visual attention. Annual Review of
Neuroscience, 18, 193-222.
Dodge, K. A. (1991). The structure and function of reactive
and proactive aggression. In D. J. Pepler & K. H.
Rubin (Eds.), The development and treatment of
childhood aggression, (pp.201-218). Hillsdale, NJ:
Erlbaum.
Dodge, K. A., Asher, S. R., & Parkhurst, J. T. (1989).
Social life as a goal coordination task. In C. Ames &
R. Ames (Eds.), Research on motivation in education
(Vol. 3, pp. 107-135). San Diego, CA: Academic Press.
Dodge, K. A., Lochman, J. E., Harnish, J. D., Bates, J. E.,
& Pettit, G. S. (1997). Reactive and proactive
aggression in school children and psychiatrically
impaired chronically assaultive youth. Journal of
Abnormal Psychology, 106, 37-51.
Dodge, K. A., & Newman, J. P. (1981). Biased decision
making processes in aggressive boys. Journal of
Abnormal Psychology, 90, 375-379.
Dodge, K. A., Pettit, G. S., McCaskey, C. L., & Brown, M.
M. (1986). Social competence in children. Monographs
of the Society for Research in Child Development, 51
(2, Seriel No.213).

262

Dodge, K. A., Price, J. M., Bachorowski, J. A., & Newman,
J. P. (1990). Hostile attributional biases in severely
aggressive adolescents. Journal of Abnormal
Psychology, 99, 385-392.
Dolan, M. C., Deakin, J. F., Roberts, N., & Anderson, I. M.
(2002). Quantitative frontal and temporal structural
MRI studies in personality-disordered offenders and
control subjects. Psychiatry Research, 116, 133-149.
Dollard, J., Doob, C. W., Miller, N. E., Mowrer, O. H. &
Sears, R. R. (1939). Frustration and aggression. New
Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
Duncan, J. (1998). Converging levels of analysis in the
cognitive neuroscience of visual attention.
Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B,
353, 1307-1317.
Eichelman, B. (1987). Neurochemical and psychopharmacologic
aspects of aggressive behavior. In H.Y. Meltzer (Ed.),
Psychopharmacology: The third generation of progress
(pp.697-704).
Eisenberg, N., & Strayer, J. (1987). Critical issues in the
study of empathy. In Eisenberg, N. & Strayer, J.
(Eds.), Empathy and its development (pp.1-13).
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

263

Elliot, F. A. (1978). Neurological aspects of antisocial
behavior. In W. H. Reid (Ed.), The psychopath. New
York: Bruner/Mazel.
Essau, C. A., Sasagawa, S., & Frick, P. J. (in press).
Callous-unemotional traits in community sample of
adolescents. Assessment.
Everitt, B. J., Cardinal, R. N., Parkinson, J. A., &
Robbins, T. W. (2003). Appetitive behavior: impact of
amygdala- dependent mechanisms of emotional learning.
Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences, 985, 233250.
Ewen, R. B. (1998). Personality: A topical approach.
Mahweh, NJ: Erlbaum.
Eysenck, H. J. (1977). Crime and personality (3rd ed.).
London: Paladin.
Eysenck, H. J. (1996). Personality and crime: Where are we
now? Psychology, Crime and Law, 2, 143-152.
Eysenck, H. J., & Gudjonsson, L. (1989). The Causes and
Cures of Criminality. London: Plenum Press.
Farrington, D. P. (1991). Antisocial personality from
childhood to adulthood. The Psychologist, 4, 389-394.
Farrington, D. P. (2005). The importance of child and
adolescent psychopathy. Journal of Abnormal Child
Psychology, 33, 489-498.

264

Faul, F. & Erdfelder, E. (1992). GPOWER: A priori, posthoc, and compromise power analyses for MS-DOS
[computer program]. Bonn, FRG: Bonn University, Dep.
of Psychology.
Feshbach, N. D., & Roe, K. (1968). Empathy in six-and
seven-year olds. Child Development, 39, 133-145.
Flor, H., Birbaumer, N., Hermann, C., Ziegler, S., &
Patrick, C. J. (2002). Aversive Pavlovian conditioning
in psychopaths: peripheral and central correlates.
Psychophysiology, 39, 505-518.
Forth, A. E., Hare, R. D., & Hart, S. D. (1990).
Assessment of psychopathy in male young offenders.
Psychological Assessment, 2, 342-344.
Fowles, D. C., & Dindo, L. (2006). A dual-deficit model of
psychopathy. In C. J. Patrick (Ed.), Handbook of
Psychopathy (pp.14-34). New York: Guilford Press.
Frick, P. J. (1998). Callous/unemotional traits and conduct
problems: applying the two-factor model of psychopathy
to children. In D. J. Cook & A. E. Forth (Eds.),
Psychopathy: theory, research, and implication for
society (pp.161-187). Dordrechr, the Netherlands:
Kluwer Academic.

265

Frick, P. J. (2003). The Inventory of Callous-Unemotional
Traits. Unpublished rating scale. The University of
New Orleans: New Orleans, LA.
Frick, P. J., Bodin, S. D., & Barry, C. T. (2000).
Psychopathic traits and conduct problems in community
and clinic-referred samples of children: Further
development of the Psychopathy Screening Device.
Psychological Assessment, 12, 382-393.
Frick, P. J., Cornell, A. H., Barry, C. T., Bodin, S. D., &
Dane, H. E. (2003a). Callous-unemotional traits and
conduct problems in the prediction of conduct problem
severity, aggression, and self-report of delinquency.
Journal of Abnormal Child Psychology, 31, 457-469.
Frick, P. J., Cornell, A. H., Bodin, S. D., Dane, H. E.,
Barry, C. T., & Loney, B. R. (2003b). Callousunemotional traits and developmental pathways to
severe conduct problems. Developmental Psychology, 39,
246-260.
Frick, P. J., & Hare, R. D. (2001). The Antisocial Process
Screening Device. Toronto: Multi-Health Systems.
Frick, P. J., Lilienfield, S. O., Ellis, M., Loney, B., &
Silverhorn, P. (1999). The association between anxiety
and psychopathy dimensions in children. Journal of
Abnormal Child Psychology, 27, 383-392.

266

Frick, P. J., & Marsee, M. A. (2006). Psychopathy and
developmental pathways to antisocial behavior in
youth. In C. J. Patrick (Ed.), Handbook of Psychopathy
(pp.353-374). New York: Guilford Press.
Frick, P. J., & Morris, A. S. (2004). Temperament and
developmental pathways to conduct problems. Journal of
Clinical Child and Adolescent Psychology, 33, 54-68.
Frick, P. J., O’Brien, B. S., Wootton, J. M., &
McBurnett, K. (1994). Psychopathy and conduct problems
in children. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 103, 700707.
Gacono, C. B. & Hughes, T. L. (2004). Differentiating
emotional disturbance from social maladjustment:
assessing psychopathy in aggressive youth. Psychology
in the Schools, 41, 849-857.
Gacono, C. B., Loving, J. L., & Bodholdt, R. H. (2001). The
Rorschach and psychopathy: toward a more accurate
understanding of the research findings. Journal of
Personality Assessment, 77, 16-38.
Garcia, R., Vouimba, R. M., Baudry, M., & Thompson, R. F.
(1999). The amygdala modulates prefrontal cortex
activity relative to conditioned fear. Nature, 402,
294-296.

267

Gerrig, R. J. (1988). Text comprehension. In R. J.
Sternberg & E. E. Smith (Eds.), The psychology of
human thought (pp.242-266). Cambridge, England:
Cambridge University Press.
Gorenstein, E. E. (1982). Frontal lobe functions in
psychopaths. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 91, 368379.
Gorenstein, E. E. (1991). A cognitive perspective on
antisocial personality. In P. A. Magaro (Ed.),
Cognitive bases of mental disorders (pp.100-133).
Newbury Park, CA: Sage.
Gorenstein, E. E., & Newman, J. P. (1980). Disinhibitory
psychopathology: a new perspective and a model for
research. Psychological Review, 37, 301-315.
Gough, H. G. (1948). A sociological theory of personality.
American Journal of Sociology, 53, 359-366.
Gouze, K. R. (1987). Attention and social problem solving
as correlates of aggression in preschool males.
Journal of Abnormal Child Psychology, 15(2), 181-197.
Greene, R. W., Biederman, J., Zerwas, S., Monuteaux, M. C.,
Goring, J. C., Faraone, S. V. (2002). Psychiatric
comorbidity, family dysfunction, and social impairment
in referred youth with oppositional defiant disorder.
American Journal of Psychiatry, 159, 1214-1224.

268

Greg, T. R., & Siegel, A. (2001). Brain structures and
neurotransmitters regulating aggression in cats:
implications for human aggression. Progress in NeuroPsychopharmacology and Biological Psychiatry, 25, 91140.
Hall, J. A., Herzberger, S. D., & Skrowronski, K. J.
(1998). Outcome expectancies and outcome values as
predictors of children’s aggression. Aggressive
Behavior, 24, 439-454.
Hare, R. D. (1970). Psychopathy: Theory and research. New
York: Wiley.
Hare, R. D. (1982). Psychopathy and the personality
dimensions of psychoticism, extraversion and
neuroticism. Personality and Individual Differences,
3, 35-42.
Hare, R. D. (1991). Manual for the Hare Psychopathy
Checklist-Revised. North Tonawanda, NY: Multi-Health
Systems.
Hare, R. D. (1993). Without conscience: The disturbing
world of the psychopaths among us. New York: The
Guilford Press.
Hare, R. D., & Jutai, J. W. (1988). Psychopathy and
cerebral asymmetry in semantic processing. Personality
and Individual Differences, 9, 329-337.

269

Hare, R. D., & McPherson, L. M. (1984). Psychopathy and
perceptual asymmetry during verbal dichotic listening.
Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 93, 141-149.
Harpur, T. J., Hare, R. D., & Hakstian, A. R. (1989). Twofactor structure of the Psychopathy Checklist. Journal
of Consulting and Clinical Psychology, 56, 741-747.
Hartup, W. W. (1974). Aggression in childhood;
Developmental perspectives. American Psychologist, 29,
336-341.
Hartup, W. W., & de Wit, J. (1974). The development of
aggression: Problems and perspectives. In J. De Wit &
W. Hartup (Eds.), Determinants and origins of
aggressive behavior (pp.595-620). The Hague: Mouton.
Hecaen, H., & Albert, M. L. (1978). Human Neuropsychology.
New York: Wiley.
Hemphill, J. F., Hare, J. D., & Wong, S. (1998).
Psychopathy and recidivism: A review. Legal and
Criminological Psychology, 3, 139-170.
Hoffman, M. L. (1977). Empathy, its development and
prosocial implications. In Howe, H.E. (Ed.), 1977
Nebraska symposium on motivation (pp. 170-217).
Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press.
Hoffman, M. L. (1984). Interaction of affect and cognition
in empathy. In Izard, C.E., Kagan, J., & Zajonc, R.B.

270

(Eds.), Emotions, cognition, and behavior (pp.103131). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Hoffman, M. L. (2000). Empathy and moral development:
Implications for caring and justice. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
Hood, K. E. (1996). Intractable tangles of sex and gender
in women’s aggressive development: An optimistic view.
In D. M. Stoff & R. B. Cairns (Eds.), Aggression and
violence: Genetic, neurobiological and biosocial
perspectives (pp.309-335). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
ICD-10; WHO, (1992). Icd 10: International Statistical
Classification of Diseases and Related Health
Problems. World Health Organization.
Johnston, J. B. (1923). Further contributions to the study
of the evolution of the forebrain. Journal of
Comparative Neurology, 35, 337-481.
Kahneman, D., & Tversky, A. (1973). On the psychology of
prediction. Psychological Review, 80, 237-251.
Kagan, J., & Snidman, N. (1991). Temperamental factors in
human development. American Psychologist, 46, 856-862.
Kamphus, R. W., & Frick, P. J. (1996). Clinical Assessment
of child and Adolescent Personality and Behavior.
Boston: Allyn & Bacon.
Kandel, E., & Freed, D. (1989). Frontal lobe dysfunction

271

and antisocial behavior: a review. Journal of Clinical
Psychology, 45, 404-413.
Kegan, R. (1986). The child behind the mask: Sociopathy as
developmental delay. In W.H. Reid, D. Dorr, J.I.
Walker, & J. W. Bonner (Eds.), Unmasking the
psychopath: Antisocial personality and related
syndromes (pp.45-77) New York: Norton.
Kernberg, O. (1998). A psychoanalytic theory of personality
disorders. In J.F. Clarkin & M.F. Lenenweger (Eds.),
Major theories of personality disorder (pp.106-140).
New York: Guilford Press.
Kimonis, E. R., Frick, P. J., Fazekas, H., & Loney, B.
R. (2004). Psychopathy, aggression, and the processing
of emotional stimuli in non-referred children.
Manuscript submitted for publication.
Kirkman, C. A. (2002). Non-incarcerated psychopaths: why we
need to know more about the psychopaths who live
amongst us. Journal of Psychiatric and Mental Health
Nursing, 9, 155-160.
Kochanska, G. (1993). Toward a synthesis of parental
socialization and child temperament in early
development of conscience. Child Development, 64, 325347.

272

Kochanska, G. (1997). Multiple pathways to conscience for
children with different temperaments: from toddlerhood
to age 5. Developmental Psychology, 33, 228-240.
Kochanska, G. (2002). Mutually responsive orientation
between mothers and their young children: A context
for the early development of conscience. Current
Directions in Psychological Science, 11, 191-195.
Kochanska, G., De Vet, K., Goldman, M., Murray, K., &
Putman, P. (1994). Maternal reports of conscience
development and temperament in young children. Child
Development, 65, 852-868.
Kosson, D. S. (1998). Divided visual attention in
psychopathic and nonpsychopathic offenders.
Personality and Individual Differences, 24, 373-391.
Kosson, D. S., & Newman, J. P. (1986). Passive avoidance
learning in psychopathic and nonpsychopathic
offenders. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 95, 257263.
Kruh, I. P., Frick, P. J., & Clements, C. B. (2005).
Historical and personality correlates to the violence
patterns of juveniles tried as adults. Criminal
Justice and Behavior, 32, 69-96.
Lahey, B. B., & Waldman, I. D. (2003). A developmental
propensity model of the origins of conduct problems

273

during childhood and adolescence. In B. B. Lahey, T.
E. Moffitt, & A. Caspi (Eds.), Causes of conduct
disorder and juvenile delinquency (pp.76-117). New
York: Guilford Press.
LaPierre, D., Braun, C. M. J., & Hodgins, S. (1995).
Ventral frontal deficits in psychopathy:
neuropsychological test findings. Neuropsychologia,
33, 139-151.
Lazarus, R. S. (1991). Cognition and motivation in emotion.
American Psychologist, 46, 352-367.
LeDoux, J. (1998). The Emotional Brain. New York:
Weidenfeld & Nicolson.
Levenston, G. K., Patrick, C. J., Bradley, M. M., &
Lang, P. J. (2000). The psychopath as observer:
emotion and attention in picture processing. Journal
of Abnormal Psychology, 109, 373-386.
Linnoila, M., Virkkunen, M., Scheinin, M., Nuutila, A.,
Rimon, R., & Goodwin, F. K. (1983). Low cerebrospinal
fluid 5-hydroxyindoleacetic acid concentration
differentiates impulsive from nonimpulsive violent
behavior. Life Science, 33, 2609-2614.
Loeber, R. (1982). The stability of antisocial and
delinquent child development, Child Development, 53,
1431-1446.

274

Loeber, R., Farrington, D. P., Stouthhamer-Loeber, M.,
Moffit, T. E., Caspi, A., & Lynam, D. (2001). Male
mental health problems, psychopathy, and personality
traits: key finding from the first 14 years of the
Pittsburgh youth study. Clinical Child and Family
Psychology Review, 4, 273-297.
Loeber, R., & Hay, D. (1997). Key issues in the development
of aggression and violence from childhood to early
adulthood. Annual Review of Psychology, 48, 371-410.
Loeber, R., & Schmaling, K. B. (1985). Empirical evidence
for overt and covert patterns of antisocial conduct
problems: A meta-analysis. Journal of Abnormal Child
Psychology, 13, 337-352.
Loeber, R., & Stouthamer-Loeber, M. (1998). Development of
juvenile aggression and violence: Some common
misconceptions and controversies. American
Psychologist, 53, 242-259.
Loney, B. R., Frick, P. J., Clements, C. B., Ellis, M.
L., & Kerlin, K. (2003). Callous-unemotional traits,
impulsivity, and emotional processing in adolescents
with antisocial behavior problems. Journal of Clinical
Child and Adolescent Psychology, 32, 66-80.
Loney, B. R., Frick, P. J., Ellis, M. L., & McCoy, M. G.
(1998). Intelligence, psychopathy, and antisocial

275

behavior. Journal of Psychopathological Behavioral
Assessment, 20, 231-247.
Lorenz, A. R., & Newman, J. P. (2002). Deficient response
modulation and emotion processing in low-anxious
Caucasian psychopathic offenders: results from a
lexical decision task. Emotion, 2(2), 91-104.
Lynam, D. R. (1997). Pursuing the psychopath: capturing the
fledgling psychopath in a nomological net. Journal of
Abnormal Psychology, 106, 425-438.
Lynam, D. R., Caspi, A., Moffitt, T. E., Raine, A.,
Loeber, R., & Loeber-Stouthamer, M. (2005).
Adolescent psychopathy and the Big Five: Results from
two samples. Journal of Abnormal Child Psychology, 33,
431-443.
Matthys, W., Cuperus, J. M., & Van Engeland, H. (1999).
Deficient Social Problem-Solving in Boys with ODD/CD,
With ADHD, and With Both Disorders. Journal of the
American Academy of Child & Adolescent Psychiatry,
38(3), 311-321.
McClaskey, C. L. (1988). Symptoms of ADHD, ADD, and
aggression in children: Teacher ratings, peer
sociometrics, and judgments of hypothetical behavior.
Unpublished doctoral dissertation, Indiana University.

276

Mezzich et al. (1997). Substance use and risky sexual
behaviors in female adolescents. Drug Alcohol
Dependency, 44, 157-166.
Milich, R., & Dodge, K. A. (1984). Social information
processing patterns in child psychiatric populations.
Journal of Abnormal Child Psychology, 12, 171-189.
Millon, T., Simonsen, E., & Birket-Smith, M. (1998).
Historical conceptions of psychopathy in the United
States and Europe. In T. Millon, E. Simonsen, M.
Birket-Smith, & R. D. Davis (Eds.), Psychopathy:
Antisocial, criminal, and violent behavior (pp.3-31).
New York: Guilford Press.
Mitchell, D. G. V., Colledge, E., Leonard, A., & Blair,
R. J. R. (2002). Risky decisions and response
reversal: is there evidence of orbitofrontal cortex
dysfunction in psychopathic individuals?
Neuropsychologia, 40, 2013-2022.
Moffitt, T. E. (1993). Adolescence-limited and life-coursepersistent antisocial behavior: A developmental
taxonomy. Psychological Review, 100, 674-701.
Moffitt, T. E., & Caspi, A. (2001). Childhood predictors
differentiate life-course persistent and adolescencelimited antisocial pathways among males and females.
Development and Psychopathology, 13, 355-375.

277

Moffitt, T. E., & Lynam, D., Jr. (1994). The
neuropsychology of conduct disorder and delinquency:
Implications for understanding antisocial behavior. In
D. Fowles, P. Sutker, & S. Goodman (Eds.), Progress in
experimental personality and psychopathology research
1994: Special focus on psychopathy and antisocial
behavior: A developmental perspective (pp.233-262).
New York: Springer.
Moyer, K. E. (1976). The psychobiology of aggression. New
York: Harper & Row.
Naglieri, J. A., LeBuffe, P. A., & Pfeiffer, S. I. (1994).
The Devereux Scales of Mental Disorders. San Antonio,
TX: Psychological Corporation.
Nasby, W., Hayden, B., & DePaule, B. M. (1979).
Attributional bias among aggressive boys to interpret
unambiguous social stimuli as displays of hostility.
Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 89, 459-468.
Newman, J. P. (1998). Psychopathic behaviour: an
information processing perspective. In D. J. Cook, A.
E. Forth, R. D. Hare (Eds.), Psychopathy: Theory,
research and implications for society, (pp.81-104).
Dordrecht: Kluwer.
Newman, J. P., & Kosson, D. S. (1986). Passive avoidance
learning in psychopathic and nonpsychopathic

278

offenders. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 95, 252256.
Newman, J. P., & Schmitt, W. A. (1998). Passive avoidance
in psychopathic offenders: a replication and
extension. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 107, 527532.
Newman, J. P., & Wallace, J. F. (1993). Divergent pathways
to deficient self-regulation: implications for
disinhibitory psychopathology in children. Clinical
Psychology Review, 13, 699-720.
O’Brien, B. S., & Frick, P. J. (1996). Reward dominance:
associations with anxiety, conduct problems, and
psychopathy in children. Journal of Abnormal Child
Psychology, 24, 223-240.
Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention
(OJJDP; n.d.). Statistical briefing book 20032004. Retrieved on December 12, 2005, from
http://ojjdp.ncjrs.gov/ojstatbb/index.html.
Oxford, M., Cavell, T. A., & Hughes, J. N. (2003).
Callous-unemotional traits moderate the relation
between ineffective parenting and child externalizing
problems: A partial replication and extension. Journal
of Clinical Child and Adolescent Psychology, 32, 577585.

279

Panksepp, J. (1998). Affective Neuroscience: the
foundations of human and animal emotions. New York:
Oxford University Press.
Pardini, D. A., Lochman, J. E., & Frick, P. J. (2003).
Callous/Unemotional traits and social-cognitive
processes in adjudicated youths. Journal of the
American Academy of Child & Adolescent Psychiatry, 42,
364-371.
Pastor, M. C., Molto, J., Vila, J., & Lang, P. J.
(2003). Startle reflex modulation, affective ratings
and autonomic reactivity in incarcerated Spanish
psychopaths. Psychophysiology, 40, 934-938.
Patrick, J. C. (1994). Emotion and psychopathy: startling
new insights. Psychophysiology, 31, 319-330.
Patrick, C. J., Bradley, M. M., & Lang, P. J. (1993).
Emotion in the criminal psychopath: startle reflex
modulation. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 102, 8292.
Patterson, C. M., & Newman, J. P. (1993). Reflectivity and
learning from aversive events: toward a psychological
mechanism for the syndromes of disinhibition.
Psychological Review, 100, 716-736.

280

Perry, D. G., Perry, L. C., & Rasmussen, P. (1986).
Cognitive social learning mediators of aggression.
Child Development, 57, 700-711.
Perry, D. G., Williard, J. C., & Perry, L. C. (1990).
Peers’ perceptions of the consequences that victimized
children provide aggressors. Child Development, 61,
1310-1325.
Pettit, G. S., Dodge, K. A., & Brown, M. M. (1988). Early
family experience, social problem solving patterns,
and children’s social competence. Child Development,
59, 107-120.
Porter, S., Birt, A. R., & Boer, D. P. (2001).
Investigation of the criminal and conditional release
profiles of Canadian federal offenders as a function
of psychopathy and age. Law and Human Behavior, 25,
647-661.
Poythress, N. G., & Skeem, J. L. (2006). Disaggregating
psychopathy: Where and how to look for subtypes. In
C. J. Patrick (Ed.), Handbook of Psychopathy
(pp.172-192). New York: Guilford Press.
Price, I. (2000). Determining if skewness and kurtosis are
significantly non-normal. Retrieved November 18, 2006
from The University of New England at

281

http://www.une.edu.au/WebStat/unit_materials/c4_descri
ptive_statistics/determine_skew_kurt.html.
Price, J. L. (2003). Comparative aspects of amygdala
connectivity. Annals of the New York Academy of
Sciences, 985, 50-58.
Pulkkinen, L. (1987). Offensive and defensive aggression in
humans: a longitudinal perspective. Aggressive
Behavior, 13, 197-212.
Putnam, S. P., Ellis, L. K., & Rothbart, M. K. (2001). The
structure of temperament from infancy through
adolescence.

In A. Eliasz & A. Angleitner (Eds.).

Advances/proceedings in research on temperament(pp.
165-182). Germany: Pabst Scientist Publisher.
Quay, H. C. (1992). The psychobiology of undersocialized
aggressive conduct disorder: a theoretical
perspective. Development and Psychopathology, 5, 165180.
Raine, A., O’Brien, M., Smiley, N., Scerbo, A., & Chan,
C. J. (1990). Reduced lateralization in verbal
dichotic listening in adolescent psychopaths. Journal
of Abnormal Psychology, 99(3), 272-277.
Rhee, S. D., & Waldman, I. D. (2002). Genetic and
environmental influences on antisocial behavior: a

282

meta-analysis of twin and adoption studies.
Psychological Bulletin, 128, 490-529.
Rogers, R., & Dion, K. (1991) Rethinking the DSM-III-R
diagnosis of antisocial personality disorder. Bulletin
of the American Academy of Psychiatry and Law, 19, 2131.
Rolls, E. T. (1997). The orbitofrontal cortex.
Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B,
351, 1433-1443.
Ronningstam, E. (1999). Narcissistic personality disorder.
In T. Millon, P. H. Blaney, & R. D. Davis (Eds.),
Oxford textbook of psychopathology (pp.674-693). New
York: Oxford University Press.
Rothbart, M. K., & Bates, J. E. (1998). Temperament. In W.
Damon (Ed.), Handbook of child psychology: Vol. 3.
Social, emotional, and personality development
(pp.105-176). New York: Wiley.
Roussy, S., & Touplin, J. (2000). Behavioral inhibition
deficits in juvenile psychopaths. Aggressive Behavior,
26, 413-424.
Salekin, R. T., Leistico, A. R., Neumann, C. S., DiCicco,
T. M., & Duros, R. L. (2004). Psychopathy and
comorbidity in a young offender sample: taking a
closer look at psychopathy’s potential importance over

283

disruptive behavior disorders. Journal of Abnormal
Psychology, 113, 416-427.
Salekin, R. T., Rogers, R., & Machin, D. (2001).
Psychopathy in youth: pursuing diagnostic clarity.
Journal of Youth and Adolescence, 30, 173-195.
Seagrave, D., & Grisso, T. (2002). Adolescent development
and the measurement of juvenile psychopathy. Law and
Human Behavior, 26, 219-239.
Serin, R. C., & Amos, N. L. (1995). The role of psychopathy
in the assessment of dangerousness. International
Journal of Law and Psychiatry, 18, 231-238.
Slaby, R. G., & Guerra, N. G. (1988). Cognitive mediators
of aggression in adolescent offenders: I. Assessment.
Developmental Psychology, 24, 580-588.
Smetana, J. G. (1993). Understanding of social rules. In
M. Bennett (Ed.), The Child as Psychologist: An
introduction to the development of social cognition,
(pp.111-141). New York: Harvester Wheatsheaf.
Soderstrom, H., Hultin, L., Tullberg, M., Wikkelso, C.,
Ekholm, S., & Forsman, A. (2002). Reduced
frontotemporal perfusion in psychopathic personality.
Psychiatry Research, 114, 81-94.

284

StatSoft, Inc. (1984-2003). Multiple Regression. Retrieved
February 20, 2006 from
http://www.statsoft.com/textbook/stmulreg.html
Steiner, H., & Cauffman, E. (1998). Juvenile justice,
delinquency, and psychiatry. Child and Adolescent
Psychiatric Clinics of North America, 7, 653-672.
Stevens, J. P. (2002). Applied multivariate statistics for
the social sciences (4th ed), (pp.80-172). Mahwey, New
Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
Tabachnick, B. G., & Fidell, L. S. (2007). Using
Multivariate Statistics (5th edition), (pp.60-194).
Boston, Massachusetts: Pearson Education, Inc.
Tomlin, R. S. (1987). Linguistic reflections of cognitive
events. In R. S. Tomlin (Ed.), Coherence and grounding
in discourse (pp. 455-479). Amsterdam: John Benjamins.
Tranel, D., & Damasio, H. (1994). Neuroanatomical
correlates of electrodermal skin conductance
responses. Psychophysiology, 31, 427-438.
Trasler, G. B. (1978). Relations between psychopathy and
persistent criminality – methodological and
theoretical issues. In R. D. Hare, D. S. Schalling
(Eds.), Psychopathic Behaviour: Approaches to
research. Chichester: John Wiley & Sons.

285

Turiel, E., Killen, M., & Helwig, C. C. (1987). Morality:
its structure, functions, and vagaries. In S. Lamb
(Ed.), The Emergences of Morality in Young Children,
(pp.155-245). Chicago, IL: University of Chicago
Press.
Veit, R., Flor, H., Erb, M., Hermann, C., Lotze, M.,
Grodd, W., & Birbaumer, N. (2002). Brain circuits
involved in emotional learning in antisocial behavior
and social phobia in humans. Neuroscience Letters,
328, 233-236.
Verona, E., & Vitale, J. E. (2006). Psychopathy in women:
assessment, manifestations, and etiology. In C. J.
Patrick (Ed.), Handbook of Psychopathy (pp.415436). New York: Guilford Press.
Verona, E., Curtin, J. J., Patrick, C. J., Bradley, M.
M., & Lang, P. J. (2004). Psychopathy and
physiological response to emotionally evocative
sounds. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 113, 99-108.
Viding, E. (2004). Annotation: understanding the
development of psychopathy. Journal of Child
Psychology and Psychiatry, 45, 1329-1337.
Viding, E., Blair R. J. R., Moffitt, T. E., et al.
(2005). Evidence for substantial genetic risk for

286

psychopathy in 7-year-olds. Journal of Child
Psychology and Psychiatry, 46(6), 592-597.
Vitacco, M. J., Rogers, R., & Neumann, C. S. (2003). The
Antisocial Process Screening Device: An examination of
its construct and criterion-related validity.
Assessment, 10, 143-150.
Vitale, J. E., Newman, J. P., Bates, J. E., Goodnight,
J., Dodge, K. A., & Pettit, G. S. (2005). Deficient
behavioral inhibition and anomalous selective
attention in a community sample of adolescents with
psychopathic traits and low-anxiety traits. Journal of
Abnormal Child Psychology, 33, 461-470.
Wakefield, J. C. (1992). Disorder as harmful dysfunction: A
conceptual critique of DSM-III-R’s definition of
mental disorder. Psychological Review, 99, 232-247.
Waschbusch, D. A. (2002). A meta-analytic examination of
comorbid hyperactive/impulsive/inattention problems
and conduct problems. Psychological Bulletin, 128,
118-150.
Webster College Dictionary. (2002). New York: Random House.
Weiner, B., & Graham, S. (1984). An attributional approach
to emotion development. In C. E. Izard, J. Kagan, & B.
Zajonc (Eds.), Emotions, cognition, and behavior

287

(pp.167-191). Cambridge, England: Cambridge University
Press.
Widiger, T. A. (2006). Psychopathy and DSM-IV
Psychopathology. In C. J. Patrick (Ed.), Handbook of
Psychopathy (pp.156-171). New York: Guilford Press.
Williamson, S., Hare, R. D., & Wong, S. (1987). Violence:
criminal psychopaths and their victims. Canadian
Journal of Behavioral Science, 19, 454-462.
Williamson, S., Harpur, T. J., & Hare, R. D. (1991).
Abnormal processing of affective words by psychopaths.
Psychophysiology, 28, 260-273.
Willis, L. M., & Foster, S. L. (1990). Differences in
children’s peer sociometric and attribution ratings
due to context and type of aggressive behavior.
Journal of Abnormal Child Psychology, 18, 199-215.
Woodworth, M., & Porter, S. (2002). In cold blood:
Characteristics of criminal homicides as a function of
psychopathy. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 111, 436445.
Wootton, J. M., Frick, P. J., Shelton, K. K., &
Silverthorn, P. (1997). Ineffective parenting and
childhood conduct problems: The moderating role of
callous-unemotional traits. Journal of Consulting and
Clinical Psychology, 65, 301-308.

288

